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THE PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION.[1]

AT the close of the year which marks the Darwin Centenary and the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the *Origin of Species*, it seems to me peculiarly fitting that the American Philosophical Association, as well as other learned societies, should avail itself of the privilege of commemorating this event. I have therefore been minded to choose for the president's address, a subject having direct reference to that labor of thought which has placed the philosophical as well as the scientific world under a permanent debt of gratitude to Charles Darwin.

We of the present generation may be said to be living in the Darwinian age of thought. Every subject of research or of speculation during the last fifty years has been profoundly affected by the new methods and new problems which the doctrine of evolution has provoked. For philosophy, however, it has been not so much an introduction to new as a revival of old problems and methods. In an age which antedated the birth of Darwin and his years of patient and fruitful investigation, philosophical insight had already divined in broad outlines at least the program of evolution.

One of our most eminent biologists, Professor Osborn, president of the Museum of Natural History in New York, testifies most appreciatively of this anticipatory work of philosophy. In his historical study, *From the Greeks to Darwin*, he speaks of those pioneers in the field of evolutionary theory, Bacon, Leibniz, Kant, Lessing, Herder, Schelling and Hegel, as follows :

" It is a very striking fact that the basis of our modern methods of studying evolution was established not by the early naturalists,

[1] Delivered as the presidential address before the American Philosophical Association at Yale University, December 28, 1909.

nor by the speculative writers, but by the philosophers. They alone were upon the main track of modern thought."[1]

Thus the early prophecy of philosophy became later the triumph of science. But it is not what philosophy has contributed to science but rather the influence which science in its doctrine of evolution has exerted upon philosophical thought that is to be my theme on this occasion. This influence has been both various and significant. To Darwin and the Darwinian discussion, philosophy owes the rise of genetic psychology, genetic logic, the evolutionary theory of ethics, the historical study of religion and of our institutional life, both political and social. A new interest and meaning have been given to the philosophy of nature, and particularly to the question of man's place in the cosmos, and his relations to the animal world of which he is a part and to which he is kin. The *Origin of Species* carried with it a challenge, to investigate the origin of all our philosophical concepts, and assess them at their sources.

The first and most obvious questions of a philosophical nature, however, which were suggested by the Darwinian hypothesis and subsequent controversy, have either been answered according to a general consensus of opinion, or else the interest in them has abated because other more pertinent and significant problems have claimed their place.

I have particularly in mind three problems which have been subjected to the fiery trial of heated discussion, but which have been superseded each in turn by others, suggested by a clearer and more penetrating appreciation of the central issues involved.

I would designate these more significant issues as they present themselves to the philosophical thought of the day—problems of the second order—second however not in importance, but second in the sense of their having displaced the earlier and less discerning lines of inquiry.

The questions of a philosophical nature which were precipitated by the Darwinian doctrines were as follows :

I. The first we may regard as a special case of the origin of species—What is man ? Has he a common ancestry with the

[1] P. 87.

animal kingdom in general and particularly with his most closely allied species, the anthropoid ape—that droll caricature of human form, and crude but clever imitator of human activity? This question at one time stirred the philosophical and more especially the theological world to its depths, and yet it has long since lost its former interest. For, it is recognized that man's origin in this respect does not affect his present status. Other considerations determine that, and not his remote ancestry :—Does man at present represent a term in the series of evolution which has a unique worth and significance? Is he in the animal progression and yet not of it? Such are the problems which deserve a more careful consideration.

II. There is a second question which in the earlier discussions was debated with much vehemence and acumen on either side. It concerns the ground *motif* of a Naturphilosophie : Does the unfolding of the evolutionary series in forms increasingly complex give evidence of a teleological factor? Darwin's contribution to our knowledge of the processes of evolution has tended to effect the elimination of the teleological factor. His description of the external features at least of a progressive development of plant and animal life through natural causes, particularly through the working of natural selection, has set aside the traditional explanation which was expressed in terms of a crude conception of an extrinsic teleology exhibited in the structure and function of specific organisms.

The question of purpose in nature has been superseded by that of purpose in human nature. Regarding man as a member of the organic series, what is the significance of the appearance in the midst of this series at a certain stage of an evident purpose, directing activity toward a definite end? What is the meaning of this peculiar fact, that what is concealed in nature is revealed in man?

III. The third question which was raised at the beginning of the Darwinian discussion, and which has failed of a satisfactory answer even to this day, is this: "Are the processes of life to be regarded as mechanical or are they vital?" Mechanism has not as yet spoken the last word upon this subject. Its explanations are felt to be inadequate even on the part of the most hope-

ful of its advocates. We are not yet prepared for Haeckel's declaration that "Consciousness is the mechanical work of the ganglion cells."[1]

On the other hand, the older form of vitalism is out of court, and neo-vitalism has not yet made good its claims and promises, despite so eminent an advocate as Driesch. In the midst of such uncertainty, philosophy has turned its attention to another question, and upon it has seemingly centered for the present time its exclusive interest. It is this: Is not the unknown factor in evolution essentially unknowable? Is not the human intellect by reason of its very nature incapable of interpreting a continuous and progressive process such as that which is characteristic of plant and animal organisms? Is any theory of knowledge adequate to comprehend the infinite variety of life?

We will now turn our attention to the more particular examination of these three questions in the forms which during the progress of discussion they have now finally assumed.

I. In the early discussion concerning man's place in the cosmos both parties to the controversy were at fault. The one was afraid to face the facts lest man's dignity and worth might be impaired by the discovery of his lowly origin; the other, in interpreting the facts, fell into the snare of the genetic fallacy in assuming that the discovery of man's remote ancestry could be regarded in any sense as an explanation either of the process by which he had attained his present estate, or of the significance of that estate itself. The many points of resemblance between the human species and the rest of the animal world can neither belittle man, nor explain him. The supposition of the common origin of man and the higher Simian family only serves to emphasize the manifest differences of man and the ape at the present stage to which the processes of evolution have brought them both.

Going backward the lines converge to a common point; but from that point onward they diverge with an ever increasing distance in their separation. The Darwinian theory of natural selection cannot explain and was never intended to explain the origin of the process of evolution, or the ground of the course

[1] *Monism*, p. 47.

which it pursues. At best, natural selection acts, as De Vries characterizes it, like a sieve through which the already existing forms which nature assumes are impartially sifted. It is evident that it is a sieve which distributes the chances of death, and in no sense can it determine the basis of life. Evolution merely shows the existence of a process whose operation starts at one point in a developing series and continues to another ; and it is quite as incapable of explaining the nature of the origin as it is the significance of the goal. Professor Tyndall, for instance, places the first term of the evolutionary series at a distance far more remote than the beginnings of the plant or animal kingdom, discerning in the nebular star dust "the promise and the potency" of every form of life. And along the lines of this backward vision, it is necessary for every student of evolution today to reckon not only with the theory of organic but of inorganic evolution as well. Professor Tyndall, however, states most emphatically that "evolution does not, it does not profess, to solve the ultimate mystery of the universe. It leaves that mystery untouched. For granting the nebula and its potential life, the question, whence came they ? would still remain to baffle and bewilder us. At bottom the hypothesis does nothing more than transport the conception of life's origin to an indefinitely distant past."[1]

We must all concede what Darwin pointedly calls to our attention, as though in our pride we needed constantly to be reminded of it, that ' man still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin.' Although we may have come from a stock which we share in common with the ape, nevertheless we have come a long way ; and although we have risen from the dust of the earth, and to that dust we return, yet the significant fact remains, that we *have risen*, and that for the brief space at least while thought holds sway over our lives we decline to be confused with this dust under our feet, or with the animal which follows to heel, or which mimics our bodily movements and gestures as he chatters to us from his cage.

Setting aside, therefore, this problem of origin which has been so widely debated in the course of the evolution discussion, there

[1] *Essay on the Use and Limit of the Imagination in Science*, p. 49.

is the present and more pertinent question, as to whether after all the difference now existing between man and the animal may not be regarded as a negligible factor. There are many who today would reduce this difference to such a minimum that it becomes practically a vanishing quantity. Darwin describes the difference between man and the animal as one of "degree and not of kind."[1]

This has been quoted so often and repeated with such satisfaction as a final explanation, that a due consideration of its real meaning has not been given—at least in certain quarters. It is easy to fall into the fallacy which I would characterize as *acquiescence in a reiterated formula*. Inasmuch as we form one of the terms of this relation, the difference between man and the animal, which is alleged to be one of degree and not of kind, may well challenge our attention, and more particular reflection.

In the first place, there is a question of fact involved. Is the only difference between man and the species of animal most closely allied to him, merely one of degree and not one of kind? Philosophers should not assume as true what biologists are to-day questioning. Professor Bateson, one of the most eminent of the British biologists, states in his recent essay on "Heredity and Variation in Modern Lights": "In the light of present knowledge it is evident that before we can attack the Species-problem with any hope of success there are vast arrears to be built up. He would be a bold man who would now assert that there was no sense in which the term Species might not have a strict and concrete meaning in contradistinction to the term Variety. We have been taught to regard the difference between species and variety as one of degree. I think it unlikely that this conclusion will bear the test of further research."[2] If this opinion holds good regarding the difference between species and variety, it will certainly apply much more forcibly to the difference between such widely separated species as man, and those animal forms most closely resembling him.

There is a second consideration, however: Even granting that all differences may be expressed as differences in degree, it does

[1] *Descent of Man*, p. 193.

[2] *Darwin and Modern Science—The Cambridge Commemoration of the Darwin Centenary*, pp. 94 f.

not necessarily follow that quantitative differences do not connote qualitative differences as well. On the contrary, not only among the phenomena of physical science, but also throughout the whole realm of the biological world, quantitative differences do have a commonly recognized qualitative significance. One indicates the presence of the other, but does not in the remotest manner explain it. A single quantitative difference, moreover, is sufficient to give rise to a set of qualitative changes of so marked a character as to constitute a wholly new species. The consequent changes which may possibly result, and which would seem to be out of all proportion to the initial change, occur according to the well known law in biology of correlative variation. Organs and functions so hang together that a seemingly insignificant quantitative change in one part often carries with it a marked transformation of the entire organism itself. It is simply begging the question to argue, for instance, that inasmuch as the human brain closely resembles the brain of the higher order of the anthropoid apes and as the only discernible difference is chiefly that of volume, or rather extent of effective surface, therefore the differences between the ape and man may be reduced at the last analysis to the quantitative one of brain dimensions. The very point at issue is not this obvious difference which is expressible in quantitative terms, but the question whether this difference of bulk is sufficient to account for the qualitative differences which are correlated with it, namely,—conceptual thinking, speech, the use of tools, the dominance over the animal world and the control of nature, a moral sense and religious aspiration, the faculty to look before and after, to learn from the past and to plan for the future.

It will be urged that animals show all of these seemingly characteristic features of man, though in a less degree. It is indeed true that animals do show the rudiments of all these so-called higher qualities of man. The significant point of it all is that they remain in the rudimentary stage generation after generation. And there is no evidence of any progress leading beyond what seems to be a final and complete stage of development. Man shows, however, a unique capacity of exhibiting in forms of increasing progression the limitless possibilities of the evolution process. In him all natural forces become tremendously acceler-

ated, so that from the standpoint of the method of evolution alone, aside from all other considerations, we have the significant phenomenon of a process unfolding its various forms after a manner common to all, until a form is reached which not only differs from all the others, but which marks a radical change in the very process itself by transcending its own limitations, enlarging its scope and determining its ends. Intellect may be potential in Darwin's "Simian ancestor with arboreal habits and caudal appendage," or even in Tyndall's "fiery cloud"; but it is actual in man and that too in a unique manner and degree.

Darwin has observed that if man had not been his own classifier, he would never have thought of founding a separate order for his own reception.[1]

This is, however, the most significant quality of the human species, that man can contemplate the process of which he is a part, and can become 'his own classifier,' and claim a unique *status* for himself. The very fact that man can critically study the process, formulate its procedure, classify its results and generalize its phenomena, is in itself a mode of transcending the very process itself. The cosmical forces at a certain stage in their development become reflective in man. Man is a philosophical animal. In his capacity for reflection, he exercises a gift that cannot possibly possess any 'survival value.' It brings to him no advantage in the struggle for existence. But in the satisfactions which accrue to him in giving free play to these inner compulsions of thought, he proves that thought is something more than an instrument of competition and that man himself is not actuated merely by animal needs and desires, but is capable of responding to a vocation which has a higher sanction than the forces of nature and the demands of a bare existence.

II. The question suggests itself at this point concerning the significance of the purposeful activities of man in relation to the natural process of evolution. Every system of naturalism seeks to eliminate all teleological factors from the course of nature. However successfully nature may be freed from the implication of purpose, it is not so simple or easy a task to explain away the fact of purpose in human nature.

[1] *Descent of Man*, p. 231.

Professor Huxley draws attention to the fact that Darwin's originality consists in showing how harmonies which had been regarded as implying the agency of intelligence and will, could be explained without any such intervention.[1]

However, such explanation is wholly inadequate concerning the conscious free purposes of man. For while man is a product of the evolutionary process he is also a determining factor—a factor of such consequence that it has made man the dominant species of the earth. The various forces of the universe operating for ages according to natural law and tendency, with no evidence of purposeful activity, nevertheless develop out of themselves an order of being whose essential nature it is to adapt means to ends, not only those most immediate, but also those most remote. The appearance of man in the evolutionary series is an indication that the later stages of an apparently continuous development may not be due to the same causes only as the earlier stages.

The making of a man may not have been the definite end of the evolutionary process, but man himself has made it the end. He has compelled the processes of nature to minister to his well-being and progress. If the world was not made for him, he has nevertheless appropriated the world to his own use and purpose.

By reason of this teleological endowment, man's development is a conspicuous illustration of orthogenetic evolution, of a straight-forth progress toward an end which is the realization in the most complete manner of the sum-total of his varied possibilities. This is something more than the ability to attain certain specific ends as they may become objects of desire from time to time in the course of the daily routine of life. For man possesses a capacity also of coördinating the various separate ends of his experience in some single aim which comprehends them all, and which exercises a unifying function over his activities and desires. Moreover, the ends of the individual are also coördinated with those of his fellows in such a manner as to constitute a society, ordered by the play of those human forces which tend to unify the various parts of the social organism. And in every such organism there is an exhibition on a large scale of an immanent finality.

[1] Huxley, "Criticism on the Origin of Species," *Collected Essays*, Vol. II, p. 102.

This possession of an intelligent purpose on the part of man has given him an immense advantage in that struggle for existence which lies at the basis of the Darwinian hypothesis of natural selection ; and for the processes of evolution as they are today operative, this teleological factor has an exceedingly intimate and important significance.

Alfred Russell Wallace gives his very emphatic estimate of this intellectual factor of evolution in the following passage, which was first written in 1864 and which has been re-stated by Wallace in a recent article published in the *Fortnightly :*

"At length, however, there came into existence a being in whom the subtle force we term *mind*, became of more importance than his mere bodily structure. Though with a naked and unprotected body, *this* gave him clothing against the varying inclemencies of the seasons. Though unable to compete with the deer in swiftness or with the wild bull in strength, *this* gave him weapons with which to capture or overcome both. Though less capable than most other animals of living on the herbs and fruits which unaided nature supplies, this most wonderful faculty taught him to govern and direct nature to his own benefit, and make her produce food for him when and where he needed. From the moment when the first skin was used for a covering, when the first rude spear was formed to assist in the chase, when fire was first used to cook his food, when the first seed was sown, or shoot planted, a grand revolution was effected in nature, a revolution which in all the previous ages of the earth's history had had no parallel, for a being had arisen who was no longer necessarily subject to physical change with the changing universe, a being who was in some degree superior to nature, inasmuch as he knew how to control and regulate her action, and could keep himself in harmony with her, not by change in body, but by an advance in mind." [1]

Man, regarded as the child of nature, nevertheless develops a power under the influences of nature herself, which in turn commands and subdues these natural forces to his will and bidding.

Professor Osborn has designated the four inseparable factors of evolution as heredity, ontogeny, environment, and selection; vari-

[1] *The Fortnightly Review*, N. S., Jan. 1, 1908, p. 14.

ation he also mentions but regards it in the light of a secondary factor.[1] Man, by the light of reason, and the strength of will, has essentially modified all of these factors, and at times has completely neutralized one or more of them. The natural course of the hereditary process must have experienced some radical transformation when man first appeared as an off-shoot of the Simian stock. Characterize it as an extreme variation, as a mutation, or as the development of a recessive into a dominant factor, or of a potential into an actual, or what you will, the fact remains that certain new and definite determinants must have appeared in the midst of the old. For the natural processes of heredity, whether we regard them as simply conserving the original germ-plasm, or as gradually accumulating the natural gains and accomplishments of a race experience, are not sufficient alone to account for the unique, unannounced, and unanticipated evolution of man. Moreover, so far as his ontogenetic development is concerned, the human being possesses so large a capacity of educability that the progress of a single generation brings to him acquisition and achievement incomparably superior to that which other orders of the animal kingdom can show through ages upon ages.

It is in reference to his environment that man's power and unique position are most conspicuously shown. He not only knows how to adapt himself to his environment, but he knows how to adapt his environment to himself. He does not wait for natural selection to promote him on the one hand, or on the other to degrade and destroy him. He is master of his fate ; he compels his surroundings to serve his need and desire. Moreover, by virtue of his intellectual endowments man shows an increased tendency toward variation. In originality and in inventiveness he puts forward his progressive development in knowledge and efficiency by immense stretches. Professor Osborn shows in the same article to which I have referred above that when one of these factors varies, all the others vary with it. Consequently man, who is able to cause all of these factors to vary at will, brings into the natural course of evolution determining factors of profound significance and far-reaching influence. The terms which are used to describe the process of evolution before the appearance

[1] *Science*, N. S., Vol. XXVII, p. 148.

of man are wholly inadequate to describe those processes after his appearance. So far as man is a product of the preceding stages of evolution, he may be regarded merely as one term among many of an indefinitely continued series; but, so far as he is the dominant factor in the course of his own development, giving character and determination to it, he is unique, and in this respect at least cannot be grouped with any other order of animal, however closely they may resemble him in form and function, or in the crude exercise of a rudimentary intelligence. What such a man as Charles Darwin alone has accomplished in modifying the character of the race far transcends our powers of estimation, or of conjecture.

Not only has man determined in a large measure the course of his own development, but the evolution of the human factor in the series has also modified in many essential features the process of the series itself. Man's occupation of the earth has changed the natural environment both of plants and of animals. Entire species have been exterminated ; others have been protected and cultivated. Deserts have been turned into fertile fields, and fertile fields into waste places. Fauna and flora alike are affected by the introduction of the human factor into their environment. Man has become a directive force in evolution. The process of natural selection is being constantly modified by human selection. The experiments in agriculture on a large scale, the selective breeding of domestic animals, the preservation of game, the special culture of fish in almost every stream and lake in the civilized world, the domestication of wild animals, the production of new varieties of fruits and vegetables—all indicate that man's control of the phenomena of life exerts an influence upon the evolutionary series of a permanent and essential character.

This then is the paradox of evolution, that a process giving no evidence of intelligent purpose develops a product whose characteristic feature is purposeful activity ; that what is a product, becomes a determining factor in the subsequent development of the process ; and that natural selection produces an effect, capable of modifying and at times defeating the influences of natural selection itself by reason of that very selective faculty which these influences originally evolved.

III. There is a third problem, which has grown out of the earlier controversies between the advocates of mechanism and of vitalism. It is insisted in certain quarters that all vital processes are essentially of such a nature that the human intellect is incapable of comprehending them, at least by the ordinary procedure which logical habit pursues in the investigations of other sciences. Fechner in *Einige Ideen zur Schöpfungs- und Entwickelungsgeschichte*, James in *A Pluralistic Universe*, Bergson in *L'Evolution Créatrice*, Underhill on the "Limits of Evolution" in the Oxford essays on *Personal Idealism* and more recently still Waggett on "The Influence of Darwin on Religious Thought" in the *Cambridge Centenary Volume* — all present from their different points of view a more or less scathing indictment of logic, on the ground of its inadequacy to interpret the characteristic features of the living processes of nature. Our conceptual intelligence, it is urged, reaches its natural limit at the point where it begins to concern itself with vital phenomena. It represents superficial aspects ; but fails to penetrate beneath the surface of things. Bergson, for instance, expresses this general point of view in his characteristic manner : " Mais de là devrait resulter aussi que notre pensée, sous sa forme purement logique, est incapable de se représenter la vraie nature de la vie, la signification profonde du movement évolutif. Créé par la vie, dans ses circonstances déterminées, pour agir sur des choses déterminées, comment embrasserait-elle la vie, dont elle n'est qu'une émanation ou un aspect ? Déposée, en cours de route, par le mouvement évolutif, comment s'appliquerait-elle le long du movement évolutif lui-même ? Autant vaudrait prétendre que la partie égale le tout, que l'effet peut résorber en lui sa cause, ou que le galet laissé sur la plage dessine la forme de la vague qui l'apporta. De fait, nous sentons bien qu'aucune des catégories de notre pensée, unité, multiplicité, causalité mecanique, finalité intelligente, etc., ne s'applique exactement aux choses de la vie: qui dira où commence et où finit l'individualité, si l'être vivant est un ou plusieurs, si ce sont les cellules qui s'associent en organisme ou si c'est l'organisme quise dissocie en cellules?"[1]

Regarding the indictment of the conceptual processes of logic more in detail, we find that it consists of several counts:

[1] Henri Bergson, *L'évolution créatrice*, Introduction, p. ii.

Logic, it is held, is incapable of interpreting the continuous. It represents finished products but not the processes themselves; it deals with what is, but not with what is becoming. Mr. Underhill expresses this idea in the following paragraph:

"Logically the task before the mental evolutionist is the same as that before the biological evolutionist. He must start with the ultimate fact of conscious mind; he must discover the permanent laws of mental processes . . . ; but here, just as much as in the changes of the inorganic sphere, and as in the vital process of the organic sphere, the actual processes involved, will *ipso facto* elude his understanding. Mental products and the laws and stages of their production, these constitute his science. The real process is beyond him, the process as it actually goes on in fact."[1]

And in a similar vein, Bergson states, "Notre intelligence, telle qu'elle sort des mains de la nature, a pour objet principal le solide inorganisé. . . . L'intelligence ne se represente clairment que le discontinu—"[2]

It is urged also that the conceptual intelligence fails to represent adequately the special case. The particular bit of experience, pulsing with life, and warm with a sense of intimate reality, becomes cold and dead when tabulated as an instance and illustration of a universal idea, whose verbal expression has long since become stereotyped, and consequently depotentiated of its full meaning.

Mr. P. N. Waggett, in his "Essay on Darwin and Religious Thought," expresses this criticism of our conceptual processes from the standpoint of religion: "The conception of uniformity which is a necessity of scientific description has been taken for the substance of history. We have accepted a postulate of scientific method as if it were a conclusion of scientific demonstration. In the name of a generalization which, however just on the lines of a particular method, is the prize of a difficult exploit of reflexion, we have discarded the direct impressions of experience; or, perhaps it is more true to say, we have used for the criticism of alleged experiences a doctrine of uniformity which is only valid in the region of abstract science."[3]

[1] *Personal Idealism*, p. 218.

[2] *L'évolution créatrice*, pp. 167, 168.

[3] *Darwin Centenary Volume*, p. 478.

It is also alleged that conceptual thought fails to interpret adequately the relation of cause and effect. Professor James expresses this in his chapter on "Bergson and Intellectualism": "Concepts, in the deeper sense of giving *insight*, have no theoretic value, for they quite fail to connect us with the inner life of the flux, or with the causes that govern its direction. Instead of being interpreters of reality, concepts negate the inwardness of reality altogether. They make the whole notion of a causal influence between finite things incomprehensible. No real activities and indeed no real connexions of any kind can obtain if we follow the conceptual logic; for to be distinguishable, according to what I call intellectualism, is to be incapable of connexion."[1]

Moreover, the logic which is under indictment, it is insisted, fails utterly to account for the acknowledged contradictory elements in our experience. While a conceptual logic by its very nature separates ideas one from another, and lays down lines of mutual exclusion, the actual experiences of life on the contrary continually force upon us the contradictory, the incompatible and the incongruous.

Such is the case against conceptual logic, and I believe most profoundly that these strictures arise from a misapprehension of the true function of logic. If it is the mechanical thing which these statements imply, not only knowledge of living processes and experiences would prove impossible, but any knowledge whatsoever,—of the flux of things, or of the forms of established solidity; of the phenomena of dynamic change, or those of static repose. In fact, the logic underlying the criticism is so far from superior to the logic that is the object of the criticism, as to indicate most conclusively that the logic under indictment is a logic falsely conceived, and is never employed in the actual processes of thought either critical or reflective. Intellectualism can be attacked only by the weapons of intellectualism itself; and the more successful the attack, the more conspicuous is its futility.

I believe that the processes of logic have a far wider scope, and a less mechanical function than these criticisms imply, and that as a matter of fact the activities of thought are actually akin to

[1] *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 246 f.

the organizing forces of life themselves which they are supposed to be wholly incapable even of representing.

The charge is made against conceptual thinking that it cannot portray life because it cannot portray the continuous. On the contrary, it is the peculiar function of our thought to represent the continuous. Our perceptual intelligence sees things in detached fragments; our conceptual thought integrates them into a continuous whole. I may not be able to see a process but I can think it. In the most conceptual of all processes, the mathematical, there has been devised a method by means of which differential elements, essentially discrete, are capable of integration. While conceptual thought possesses the analytical power of separating a given process into elemental parts, into discrete portions of space, or separate instants of time, it must not be overlooked that it functions also in a synthetic capacity, by means of which the connecting lines of continuity are established so that the mind can hold together the elements in one undivided whole. It not only separates the curve of the ellipse into its differential elements, but those elements in turn it constructs into the continuous curve. The ellipse can be regarded as a point in motion whose direction changes continuously. The conceptual logic is capable, moreover, not only of grasping the fact that there is change such as this, but it can discover and formulate the law of this change. Here the change is uniform, and it might be urged that because it is a mere mechanical process, it can be thus determined and expressed. It is possible, moreover, to determine and express a law where the change is not uniform, but proceeds at an accelerated rate, as the law of falling bodies. Thus we are able to express by our logical processes how change itself changes. Inasmuch as the rate of change is uniform, the varying increment admits of exact formulation. The question however naturally suggests itself at this point: Can vital processes of change be thus formulated? Here the law of change is not apparent. And yet it is a wholly gratuitous assumption that therefore there is no law of change at all; or that, if there is, the changing process is of such an order that our intellects by their very nature are incapable of appreciating it. It is quite as reasonable to suppose that vital processes elude our mental grasp because of their exceeding great

complexity. There is, moreover, every indication from the results of biological investigation of recent years that the continuous changes in the vital processes proceed according to law, and although according to a law at present unknown, yet not necessarily unknowable. In the understanding of this problem the frontiers of our knowledge have been pushed forward in a most astonishing manner, and by methods and hypotheses which are essentially intelligible. It is not a new logic that is needed, but further advances of the old. The complexity of the processes is being reduced to simpler and simpler terms. In the rapid progress of experimental results in biology, there is not the faintest suggestion that the processes of evolution are in any sense capricious or lawless.

The most complex of all the processes of life, that of the continuous development of the race in unbroken line from generation to generation, has been simplified to an extent which a decade ago it would have been impossible even to conceive, by the rediscovery in 1900 of the work of Mendel, and the formulation of the Mendelian law. This marked the era of the introduction of order into a confused mass of biological phenomena.

Bateson in his essay on "Heredity and Variation in Modern Lights" speaks of this discovery in a most significant manner as follows : " Those who had a preliminary acquaintance with the facts of Variation were not wholly unprepared for some such revelation. The essential deduction from the discovery of segregation was that the characters of living things are dependent on the presence of definite elements or factors, which are treated as units in the processes of Heredity. These factors can thus be recombined in various ways. They act sometimes separately, and sometimes they interact in conjunction with each other, producing their various effects. All this indicates a definiteness and specific order in heredity, and therefore in variation. This order cannot by the nature of the case be dependent on Natural Selection for its existence, but must be a consequence of the fundamental chemical and physical nature of living things. The study of Variation had from the first shown that an orderliness of this kind was present. The bodies and properties of living things are cosmic, not chaotic. No matter how low in the scale we go, never do we

find the slightest hint of a diminution in the all-pervading orderliness, nor can we conceive an organism existing for a moment in any other state."[1]

I have quoted the paragraph somewhat at length in order to show the direction which the biological research of today is taking. It is towards an intelligible account of the vital processes. The 'orderliness' of these processes does not mean necessarily that they are to be eventually explained in a purely mechanical way; on the contrary, according to Mendel's law the elements entering into the varied combinations are still vital units.

It does mean, however, that whether the secret of life is to be discovered in an original *élan vital* as Bergson puts it, or in an *entelechy* as Driesch emphatically insists, or in *the elementary accumulators of nervous energy* acting after the manner of electrical phenomena, as Rignano conceives it, it must as the inner spring of life operate according to the law of its own nature, and exhibit as its essential features order and regularity. And if it exhibits order and regularity in its functioning, it is so far forth intelligible, and there is, to say the least, no presumption against its being conceptually discerned. Every presumption favors an intelligible process, expressible in terms of law or laws.

I believe most profoundly that the processes of thought are essentially the processes of organization, and not of mere "fabrication" as Bergson very stoutly insists.[2] For thought does not work upon its material from without, combining part to part in an external way, but it works from within after the manner of the architectonic principle of a plant which accumulates its material and informs it, building up its structure by building it into its own nature. It is just because the thought processes are vital, organic, metabolic, that I believe they possess no inherent incapacity for interpreting the phenomena of life.

Another count against logic is that it fails in dealing with the special case; that there is always something about the concrete instance which no abstract category, rubric or formula can adequately cover; that what is needed is a logic of particulars, that conceptual logic must carry on its process by means of universal

[1] *Darwin Centenary Volume*, p. 92.
[2] *L'évolution créatrice*, p. 100.

ideas, and the universal is but a spectral representation of the living reality. Of course an artificial and mechanical view of the relation of the universal to the particular in logic will justify this contention that the conceptual logic can deal with mechanical rigidly set relations, but not with vital processes or experiences. I am bold enough and possibly some may add rash enough to quote Hegel in this connection, and insist that "the particular is the universal." The relation between the universal and particular in our knowledge is not an external one; but it is essentially organic. Darwin who in his thinking was so conspicuously fertile in generalization, was preëminently the expert investigator of the special case. He was not content to note an exception merely as such, and then dismiss it from his mind. Every exception was a challenge to him to discover its ground; and the discovered ground in turn became at once the occasion and reason for modifying the general law. Darwin's studies in variation were an attempt to search out the rationâle of particularization. My colleague, Professor Edwin G. Conklin, in a recent article on *The World's Debt to Darwin* comments as follows upon this particular phase of Darwin's labors:

"The positive side of Darwin's theory, and indeed of every other theory of evolution, is the *variability* of organisms, and the principal question which confronted him as it confronts every evolutionist today, was this: 'What is the nature and what are the causes of variation?'"[1]

In seeking the causes of variation, Darwin was profoundly convinced that every particular instance has a universal significance,—that is, it can be ultimately embodied and expressed in a general law. And every student of science today, every serious scholar in whatever field of research feels a compulsion to discover the light of the universal, in order that it may illumine the particular phenomenon under investigation. It is impossible to disclose the nature of the particular case without some insight into the relations which it sustains to certain determinants having a universal and necessary significance. In the investigation of the vital processes of nature, the causal necessity may be veiled, and the supposed universality confronted with outstanding excep-

[1] *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. XLVIII, p. xlvi.

tions; nevertheless it is the fundamental belief in some underlying necessity and universal relation which spurs endeavor to persevering research, and renders the mind impatient of inexact methods and inadequate results. Bergson, James, and others of the same way of thinking, take a very circumscribed view of conceptual logic, when they regard it as a process of subsumption—of describing the special case only so far as it fits into a ready-made group idea. Thinking always becomes mechanical and inadequate when the particular instance is seen only in the light of doctrine, or of theory.

No biological discovery may be due to pure reason, as Bergson maintains[1] but on the other hand no discovery in biology or any other science has ever been due to pure observation unaided by the collaborating function of the intellect in discovering its universal significance.

It is true that actual concrete experiences rich in content and instinct with life cannot be comprehended in abstract categories. Our thought forms, however, are not stereotyped. It is only a very crude logic which regards its function as one of reference of particulars to fixed forms. The particular case is illuminated by the universal ; it is never absorbed or exhausted by it. Logic then is not subsumption but interpretation ; and the process is a vital one in this sense, that there is a constant reciprocal action between the particular phenomenon and the universal concept which we employ to interpret it. To use a phrase of Professor James, there is a constant " endosmosis " or conflux of the particular with the universal in our knowledge. Professor James applies this characterization to the relation of particulars to particulars in experience. It applies equally well to the relation of particulars to the universal.

Every change in one is reflected in the other. Every separate experience leaves a deposit of its particular significance in the corresponding concept, enriches it, makes it living knowledge, because of the very fact that it is capable of change and growth. For there is a growth in conceptual knowledge, an organic growth, in which the material elements of experience are being constantly appropriated and assimilated. The influence of Darwin upon

[1] *L'évolution créatrice*, p. iii.

logic is most conspicuous and significant in reference to the theory of classification. Modern logic does not conceive of its concepts as water-tight compartments. They possess no inevitableness of solidity about them. They do not form a closed system. They are mobile, fluid, plastic. They take a form which is ever changing with enlarging experience. The modern theory of classification today provides for limiting cases, for the arrangement of its terms in a serial order of progression, for the merging of one class into another, for a wide range of variations about a type, for the appearance even of *mutations* which are unexpected and unannounced. New forms are not discarded because there is no place for them, but they are given a place which they themselves compel. Every system of classifying vital phenomena is a living system, subject to constant change and adjustment. It is after this manner that Darwin built up his body of knowledge, a body having the spirit of life, and not a mass of dead immobile elements. However, on the other hand, a study of particular instances without conceptual knowledge as an instrument of interpretation and of direction would prove a wholly confused and futile undertaking. Bateson has given a very illuminating statement concerning the method of investigating the particular phenomenon: "To those who have made no study of heredity, it sometimes appears that the question of the effect of conditions in causing variations is one which we should immediately investigate, but a little thought will show that before any critical inquiry into such possibilities can be attempted, a knowledge of the working of heredity under conditions as far as possible uniform must be obtained."[1] He emphasizes here the necessity of having some knowledge of the law of uniform behavior in general, in order to interpret the variations which may occur in particular instances. Variations have meaning only when the type has been established, and is duly recognized as such.

Höffding in his essay on *Evolution and Modern Philosophy* insists that "evolutionism and systematism are opposing tendencies which can never be absolutely harmonised one with the other. Evolution may at any time break some form which the system-monger regards as finally established." And he quotes Darwin

[1] *Darwin Centenary Volume*, p. 95.

as saying in point — "I had thought the same parts of the same species more resemble (than they do anyhow in Cirripedia) objects cast in the same mould. Systematic work would be easy, were it not for this confounded variation which, however, is pleasant to me as a speculatist, though odious to me as a systematist." [1]

It is to Darwin's everlasting glory that he overcame this seeming opposition, and gave the world an object lesson in true logical procedure, by constructing a working system which was capable of rationalizing his facts, and yet at the same time sufficiently elastic to modify its own lines so as to comprehend new varieties and seeming exceptions. Darwin was essentially a system maker; but his system was made for facts, and not facts for his system.

As a corollary to this conception of the relation of systematic knowledge to the variable instances which it comprehends, there is the problem of the reconciliation of the contradictories which experience exhibits, and which it is alleged our logical concepts are incapable of interpreting. Here again it is only an artificial view of logic which regards its concepts as set with an iron rigidity.

Professor James insists that "for conceptual logic the same is nothing but the same." [2] This bare statement of the law of identity modern logic repudiates most emphatically. The essential nature of the concept is that it represents unity in the midst of difference, identity in variety; and this is richly illustrated in those great constructive concepts of science whose characteristic feature has been the effort to confine in one idea the reciprocal action of opposed forces. Such are the concepts of action and reaction, attraction and repulsion, stress and strain, positive and negative electricity, north and south poles of the magnetic field, endosmosis and exosmosis, anabolism and catabolism. All of these express a synthesis of opposed elements. And in the light of concepts such as these, it is absurd to declare that the essential nature of concepts is that of rigid exclusion and unrelated isolation.

If our intellect is incapable of aiding us in the interpretation of

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 457.
[2] *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 257.

nature, what faculty will lead us to the light? Bergson suggests that there is an intuitive faculty of apprehension by means of which in the concrete experience we come to know life as it is. This comes from immediate insight, and not reasoned knowledge. Our intuitive faculty we are constantly sacrificing to the demands of our intelligence. Intuition is a higher order of knowledge; and we are content foolishly to follow the lead of the lower. "L'intuition est l'esprit même, et en un certain sens, la vie même."[1] From this fervent declaration of Bergson, we see that he is by nature an intellectual mystic, and it is through the mystical interpretation of life that he hopes the more fruitful results of knowledge will appear. Similarly Professor James holds that knowledge is born through "a stroke of intuitive sympathy."[2]

However, even if knowledge of the deeper mysteries of life is to arise in intuitive apprehension, such knowledge is so much unavailable energy. It must be transmuted sooner or later into intelligible forms if it is to be available for intelligent beings. Of course life is more than logic, and actual experience more than knowledge. But knowledge is the interpretation of life, and there can be no progress in experience without an accompanying endeavor on our part to interpret it. We are accustomed to regard the poetical insight as that which most correctly interprets life; yet the poet is not one who simply feels the thrill of being in its infinitely various manifestations. His function is to express the feeling which his intuition discloses. And he merits the distinction of a poet only so far as his expression sounds a universal note. Shakespeare was preëminently the potrayer of particular characters. And yet in his plays every individual stands out as a universal type. The ability to express the concrete particular in universal form is the great poet's consummate gift. I believe most profoundly in the knowledge that is born of insight, unreasoned and at times seemingly unreasonable, and yet if it is to acquire a distinct value and significance for us we must admit it to a permanent place in our body of knowledge as a whole.

At a time when we are celebrating the achievement of Darwin and his followers in the study of the processes of life, I would enter

[1] *L'évolution créatrice*, p. 290.
[2] *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 263.

a vigorous plea for the presumption which such achievements create, namely, that, the possibilities of intellectual progress in this field are by no means exhausted ; that new experiences are certain to arise, but not a new order of experience ; that the intellectual organization of knowledge can never give place to the particular and isolated glimpses of truth which a mystical intuition may be capable of apprehending, but that such glimpses of the truth must themselves become the possession of the intellect, or they will prove evanescent and illusive.

It is the peculiar duty and privilege of philosophy, moreover, to exalt the prerogatives of intellect. Let it not be thought that the intellect is compelled to go into bankruptcy, or that we who are its followers are called upon to declare the repudiation of its obligations. I do not for a moment believe that science and philosophy have been for ages on the wrong road, or that the treasures of the past are not to be richly conserved in the progress of the future. It is possible that the intellect may be but a single and indeed a very insignificant phase of " a force far more vast and profound," as Bergson declares. It is an interesting conjecture, one to play with in an idle mood of speculative fancy, but it can never be a working hypothesis, nor a truth to build or to rest upon, or to allure us to turn aside from the main course of intellectual evolution in order to follow its uncertain light into unknown and possibly barren fields. Knowledge may never comprehend life in its fullness ; for knowledge is the interpretation of life and not its duplication. On the other hand, that intuition which is ' life itself ' can for that very reason never be knowledge.

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SCHOPENHAUER'S CONTACT WITH PRAGMATISM.

ACCORDING to Schopenhauer, the world is ultimately will. It is a daring conception, and an original one, at least comparatively so. Philosophers have ordinarily held that either mind or matter was the basic thing ; Schopenhauer says, neither, but something more primitive yet. If possibly a third supposition should be mentioned, namely, that the final reality is force, Schopenhauer might be imagined to answer: Yes, but what kind of force? for force directed to an end and spontaneously directed, the only kind the world reveals, *is* will.

But if force is thus interpreted, and if matter is, as Schopenhauer holds, simply the manifestation (the visibility or perceptibility) of will, we have still to ask what we are to make of mind, and what is its place and function in the scheme of things? Schopenhauer's views on this point are of interest, and in a way anticipate the recent pragmatic movement.

In and of itself, as he holds, the will or driving force of the world is unconscious, blind. Consciousness belongs to its accidents rather than its essence—it may live on and work in unconsciousness, may do so even in ourselves. Now the lack of consciousness, where the end or aim of the will is simple, involves no harm. The will in the stone wants only one thing — to move toward the center of the earth. It is not alive (the form of its particles makes not the slightest difference to it), is in no danger, has no enemies, is without an aim or interest beyond the simple one already mentioned — it does not need intelligence. Perhaps we may say the same of the chemical compounds—water, the various acids, salts and so forth. Even those highly complex chemical compounds we call living things and which have the wondrous power to react against the disintegrating influences of the medium in which they live and to make themselves whole again, may not need more than their simple specific appetites or affinities to keep them going, when their nutriment is abundant and near at hand. When however the situation changes and the nutriment becomes scarce,

or when in the same situation the wants multiplying the organization itself become more complex, and just the right nutriment for it is harder to find, then the power to move about, and, if to move, then to have guidance in moving so as to more surely hit upon what is needed, becomes of advantage. Accordingly, the animal part of the living kingdom (which is, roughly speaking, the part of it that moves about and seeks its food, instead of finding it at hand ready-made) practically always develops some measure of intelligence—and the office of this intelligence [happily defined as "associative memory" by Professor Jacques Loeb] is simply to minimize the number of haphazard movements and give some sort of guidance to the living creature in seeking food and avoiding danger and harm. In short, the familiar adage here applies, " Necessity is the mother of invention " ; the will does invent;[1] what it needs, what it imperatively wants, it contrives sooner or later to get. To put the matter baldly, but perhaps not too strongly, the intellect is, according to Schopenhauer, an invention of the will — not that it is created outright (for will, as Schopenhauer conceives it, belongs in general to the spiritual side of things and contains the potencies in itself of intellect as of everything else), but that as a distinct positive existence the will calls it forth ; and the fruits, the objective results of its labor become patent or visible in that part of the living organism we call the nerves, the nervous centers and the brain.

The process of developing intellect goes on in the animal kingdom and culminates in man — and it is simply the greater difficulty of getting subsistence and the greater range of man's wants that give him the extraordinary development of intellect that he has.[2] The world to the animal, his mental picture of the world, is made up of the things that are to be got or avoided in it — and the things to be got are principally things to eat, to drink, or to satisfy his sexual cravings ; other things he comes to fasten his attention on point to these things — for he may be keen in observing connections and exploring causes and in this way may come to have a tolerably intelligible system of things in his mind. But with objects related (directly or indirectly) to his wants he

[1] Cf. J. Volkelt's striking passage and references, *Schopenhauer*, 3d ed., p. 209.
[2] *Werke*, VI, p. 103.

stops ; beyond these limits he does not notice ; perhaps never, remarks Schopenhauer, has an animal fixed his eyes on the heavens and the stars.[1] The world of animals is entirely a practical world, made up of the things that mean their weal or woe ; their ideas are all motives, guides to action. It is much the same, Schopenhauer observes, with the common run of men — *i. e.*, the same in kind or principle. They may observe more keenly, and often have to, and the world becomes more subtly connected and larger to their eyes ; the remote heavens are not unimportant to man, for thence is the light by which he walks, thence the heat that makes things grow for him, there the guidance he needs when he travels across the seas in search of what he cannot find at hand. And yet with men as a rule, as with animals, the world, their picture of the world, is made up of the things that are good and bad for them; they attend very closely perhaps to the things that concern them, but other things they are incurious about. They may even, to lighten their mental labor, form abstract conceptions, they may build up sciences and arts, they may reason and conclude, they may make the invisible a part of their world and worship and pray, but all ultimately is to the end of better serving their practical needs, and the great fundamental need is to live and to continue life when as individuals they are gone. Goethe once summed up the reason and motive of the multifarious activity of man : " Er will sich nähren, Kinder zeugen and die nähren so gut er vermag; weiter bringt es kein Mensch, stelle er sich wie er auch will." The intellect is a helpful instrument to these ends. As it is the invention, so it is the servant of the will. The rational part of the intellect, the reason, is. Its office is to get for us what we want, when we have to take roundabout steps to get it — for in this complicated world in which we live, above all complicated for so specially organized a being as man, we have to do a lot of out-of-the-way observing and inferring and reasoning to compass our desires. Even supernatural help may seem needed. But the end of religion as truly as that of the sciences and arts is to make life securer and more successful. And if reason is ever recalcitrant and negative, attempting to lord it over the will instead of serving it, it may be brought to terms by asking, with a

[1] *Ibid.*, IV, *Ueber den Willen in der Natur*, p. 75.

brilliant psychologist of our own day: "What is reason for, but to give us reasons for what we want to do?" As matter of fact men's religious beliefs have usually been determined by their needs — what would help them to live and to go on living amid difficulty and discouragement has been the shaping thing. The will to live has been the major premise (silent or otherwise) to practically all ordinary conclusions, religious and other.

I am not sure whether it is right to say that this general view makes an approach to present-day pragmatism or not. In certain ways it sounds like it, but I am diffident about making positive assertions, for though I have written an article about pragmatism,[1] I am not sure I understand it. What I am now concerned about is to state positively Schopenhauer's conceptions. The intellect, as it ordinarily exists, knowledge as men ordinarily possess it, are, according to him, of entirely practical tendency and character.[2] Ideas are guides to action, motives rather than anything else[3]—we observe things only so far as they concern us, as our interests are involved in them, but not disinterestedly, or as we might say a pure intelligence would. Show men how a certain matter is related to their practical interests, how they could live better and easier and more surely get what they want, if they knew about it, and though it seems at first remote, they attend,—otherwise, it hardly concerns them. Philosophy and the ultimate problems of the sciences most men do not bother about; they have problems enough of their own, they say. Theoretic curiosity is a rare phenomenon. The ordinary man does not linger, says Schopenhauer; it is only his way in life that he seeks.[4] Schopenhauer once became almost lost in wonder and contemplation in observing the plants in the Dresden hot-house;[5] most people would passingly notice and admire — perhaps comparing what they saw with what they had seen elsewhere or had at home, or wishing they might buy this or that or could send it to a friend — this and little more; the deep mystery and inner

[1] *Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1908.

[2] *Werke*, III, p. 323.

[3] III, p. 430.

[4] II, p. 221.

[5] See the incident as narrated by Frauenstädt, in Möbius, *Schopenhauer*, pp. 55-56.

nature of these wonderful growths would hardly detain them or give them a thought.

And yet, strangely enough, this invention of the will to serve its own ends, is capable of uses beyond those for which it was designed — and is the beginning of an entirely different glory of human life, though (as Schopenhauer views the matter) of a tragedy, too. It is a servant that can more or less release itself from its master and assert its own right to be. In other words, the practical functions of the intellect may be transcended. How this can be is almost a mystery, but we can in a measure trace the steps of the transformation:—

Schopenhauer raises the question whether the higher animals do not sometimes observe without ulterior purpose. A dog appears at times to be simply gazing — he puts himself at the window and attentively follows with his eyes everything that passes by ; monkeys occasionally look around, as if they were bethinking themselves about their surroundings.[1] Who can say but that even animals, when no wants urge them, in leisurely moments so to speak, may have a disinterested curiosity, or the faint beginnings of it ? Man's life is at first beset with care (perhaps even more so than that of the animals) and the satisfaction of his wants, the striving for food and for mates, almost entirely engages him; yet at rare moments, it would seem as if his eager will may lapse into quietness, and he simply look, idly, aimlessly observe. The foundations of what we may perhaps be allowed to call Schopenhauer's anti-pragmatism or super-pragmatism are laid in what he says of the sensational life itself. Usually our sensations are agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or painful — *i. e.*, the will is affected by them and implicated in them ; particularly is this true of all sensations of touch and taste and smell. And yet sometimes a sensation may be without positive character in this respect, may of itself scarcely give pleasure or pain, be a simple datum before us — for instance, a sensation of sight or of sound, especially one of sight.[2] Certain combinations of colors may engage us hardly more than "a painted ship upon a painted ocean." Of course, if dazzling they may be

[1] IV, *Ueber den Willen, u.s.w.*, p. 75.
[2] *Ibid.*, III, pp. 30–31 ; cf. II, p. 23.

painful, or they may excite us if by association they suggest danger or pleasure hard by ; otherwise they may be a kind of neutral quantity. And yet on these neutral colors or sounds, so destitute of significance from any practical point of view, the half-sleeping, half-waking intelligence may curiously linger. Though ordinarily observing for practical reasons, and though for this purpose it has been evoked by the will, once evoked it may attend on its own account—and simply gaze, contemplate, try to fathom and comprehend. Perhaps in some vague, dim way even animals do this, in idle moments ; man, when the strain and stress of life abate, certainly does — it is a kind of reverie, a sort of detached contemplation, yielding perhaps no practical fruit and from which the animal or man may be rudely shaken and taken by practical necessities, and yet, according to Schopenhauer, the beginning and anticipation of the highest reaches of the human spirit, philosophy and art.[1] The disinterested, willless contemplation is rare and the intellect as it exists and is trained (and necessarily trained) in most men is not fitted for it — it is with them exclusively a practical instrument, exceedingly sharp and subtle for the purposes of the will, and capable, one might say, of creating a whole host of practical sciences and useful arts (including economics, politics, law and even morals as often understood), but without promptings beyond. The will looks at everything in relation to itself ; what it cannot use it has no use for. And yet the contemplative activity of the intellect sometimes arises.

Schopenhauer is quite explicit on these points. He says, the intellect born of the will is the natural servant of the will, and only as such does it ordinarily do its work well.[2] Its end and aim are simply to be the medium of motives;[3] and it is not constituted so as to judge theoretically and philosophically.[4] And

[1] Volkelt (*op. cit.*, p. 307) says that, according to Schopenhauer's mature view, morality (Tugend und Heiligkeit) has a different origin, although "das bessere Bewusstsein" of Schopenhauer's early years was to him the common birth-place of both the genius and the saint.

[2] *Werke*, III, p. 323.

[3] III, p. 430.

[4] IV, *Die beiden Grundprobleme, u.s.w.*, p. 41 ; cf. Volkelt, *op. cit.*, p. 251 and references to passages in the Grisebach ed.

yet sometimes there is relatively speaking a surplus of intellect, *i. e.*, more than the will needs for the practical purposes of life; and in this new situation, the intellect, finding itself free, may follow its own instincts and do what the will does not ordinarily allow it to do.[1] Now the nature, the specific inborn instinct of the intellect, is to know;[2] even in serving the will, this is its function — it gives it light or truth by which to guide itself (although only so much truth as the will wants). But when free, it may seek truth apart from this service, it may go on in its pursuit indefinitely — it may try to penetrate to the very idea and essence of things,[3] a matter about which the will is not concerned, being intent only on its own satisfactions.

Yes, Schopenhauer takes a step further. Not only may the intellect, in happy moments, free itself; but if it is to be true to itself and follow its own law,[4] it must free itself. For the will is not only limited in its aims, wanting only a certain amount of truth, it may have a disturbing influence on the intellect and keep it from getting the truth. By this, Schopenhauer has in mind the familiar fact that we often see what we want to see, and don't see what we don't want to see — *i. e.*, the intellect becomes one-sided.[5] He points to the influence of our wishes and hopes in distorting and clouding our vision[6]; love and hate, he says,

[1] III, pp. 331, 422; cf. on the "abnorme Uebermass des Intellektes," in the case of those able to penetrate to the ideas of things (Grisebach ed.), I, p. 253; II, p. 443; V, pp. 613f.; see a particular statement, along with an explanation of the physiological counterpart of genius, and a clear illustration from chemistry (Frauenstädt ed.), III, 431.

[2] III, pp. 243, 427.

[3] Volkelt (*op. cit.*, p. 288) thinks that for this "eine völlige Umschaffung unseres Intellektes" is needed; but this is not the case; the "willensfreie Erkennens der Ideen" is only an extension and intensification of the dog's "Gaffen." Schopenhauer specifically says, in speaking of the pure subject of knowledge, that it is "das *eine* Weltauge, was aus allen Erkennenden Wesen blickt" (*Werke*, II, p. 233). Moreover, the 'Genius' is only distinguished from ordinary man in degree, not in kind: all have some "Vermögen in den Dingen ihre Ideen zu erkennen" (*Ibid.*, II, p. 229).

[4] Schopenhauer speaks of the intellect as having its "eigenen Trieb" and "eigene Gesetzen" (III, 427). It is something that "ohne vom Willen angetrieben zu sein, dennoch energisch thätig ist" (III, 436); something that acts "aus eigener Kraft und Elasticität" (III, 444).

[5] III, 436.

[6] III, 242–3.

falsify our judgments altogether.[1] One might cite as a partial instance Schopenhauer's own treatment of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.[2] In questions of religion particularly the will asserts itself imperiously — we want that which is comfortable; what is true and has no comfort about it we care little for, and a truth that is uncomfortable we positively reject. In a sense, then, emancipation from the will and its cravings is a necessity for the intellect. Schopenhauer has much to say of the objectivity of the intellect and the subjectivity of the will — we now see what he means. The intellect in itself, in its own proper activity, has nothing necessarily to do with what comforts, satisfies, or gratifies the will : that kind of a view only gives us things in relation to ourselves, our wants and desires, it is only an outer and more or less accidental aspect of things — the intellect, following its instinct and law purely, seeks the object as it exists independently of ourselves, as it would be whether we with our wants and cravings and will were here or no. That is to say : the pure intellect sinks itself in the object, almost becomes it — for it is only separated from it by the fact that it is a subject and knows ; if it is a mirror,[3] it is a mirror absolutely and has nothing about it that warps the vision and makes it see one thing and not another — makes it finite, partial, or false.

I know not whether in all this Schopenhauer transcends what is properly called the pragmatic point of view or not ; but he seems to. The intellect, in its proper or at least highest exercise, leaves practical considerations entirely to one side, according to his view. There must be admitted to be a kind of antinomy (a relative one) in his views on this subject.[4] It is one of his most characteristic doctrines — one on which he almost prides himself and thinks that he originated — that the intellect is not

[1] III, p. 244, cf. p. 426. Cf. Volkelt, *op. cit.*, pp. 228f. and 250f., where Schopenhauer is quoted as calling the will the " heimliche Gegner " and " beständige Störer " of the intellect.

[2] Volkelt, *Ibid.*, p. 227, suggests this, and refers to Paulsen, *Schopenhauer, Hamlet, Mephistopheles*, pp. 84ff.

[3] Schopenhauer speaks of the intellect as becoming under these circumstances a " heller Spiegel des Wesens der Welt," a " klarer Spiegel der Welt " (II, p. 219; III, p. 435) ; also a " Weltauge " (II, p. 219).

[4] Volkelt happily comments on the difficulties and contradictions involved (*op. cit.*, pp. 291–4), without however resolving them.

the root thing in man, but the will ; he does not tire of dwelling on the subserviency of the intellect to the will, on its exclusively practical bent and aim — it is a mere lantern for the will, a mere watchman which it puts on guard to spy out enemies or friends, or a mere glass in which it may see what itself is doing ;[1] and yet the weird magician who has called forth this help, as it were, from subterranean recesses of his being,[2] sooner or later finds himself confronted with it as with a strange creation — it seems foreign, bent on passing beyond its master's control, so that an onlooker might be prompted to exclaim to the will, " You have raised this ghost, but can you lay it ? "[3] Schopenhauer finds the will perplexed and more than perplexed at times, over the conduct of this questionable servant. The will, he says, opposes itself to activities of the intellect that are directed to anything aside from its own aims ;[4] or again, the will as the principle of subjectivity (*i. e.*, of longing and want) is the antithesis, even the antagonist, of purely objective knowledge ;[5] he speaks of the intellect as becoming something almost foreign, yes, in its highest ranges, something unnatural, really supernatural.[6] For as if the will had an *Ahnung* (foreboding) of what Schopenhauer believes the intellect must finally discover, namely, the futility of its striving, its necessary misery and emptiness, it has an instinctive aversion to all merely theoretic curiosity — and, when the great discovery is brought home to it, it shudders (sich darüber entsetzt).[7] So great, so radical, according to Schopenhauer, is the final antagonism between intellect and will — so far beyond,

[1] On the physiological side, Schopenhauer speaks of the intellect, *i. e.*, its objective manifestation, the brain, as leading a " Parasitenleben " on the organism (III, p. 449); on the intellect as a glass, " wie wir beim Rasiren uns eines Spiegels bedienen," see III, p. 291.

[2] " Aus ihm entsprossen " is Schopenhauer's phrase (III, p. 572). Moreover, Schopenhauer recognizes the substantial identity of the subject of knowledge with the will, though he calls this " das Wunder κατ' ἐξοχήν (II, p. 296).

[3] Schopenhauer speaks of a "völlige Ablösung " (III, p. 438); "völlig abgetrennt," he says on p. 435.

[4] III, p. 435.

[5] III, p. 421 ; on p. 523, " die Erkenntniss " is spoken of as " ein ihm [dem Willen zum Leben] ursprünglich fremdes hinzukommendes Princip."

[6] III, pp. 431, 440.

[7] III, p. 655.

if I may say so, any instrumental or pragmatic view of the intellect does he go.

And yet this purely objective view of things, apart from any question as to whether they are of service to us, is, according to Schopenhauer, the foundation of philosophy and art. In those rare circumstances (not, it is to be noted, of want, but of superfluity) in which the intellect is freed from the will, it becomes genius. Just why Schopenhauer uses this word is not altogether clear, for it suggests being inspired[1] — a state Schopenhauer did not hold in the highest respect any more than Socrates did. Rather does the intellect in seeing and objectively contemplating follow its own nature, as truly as the will does in craving ; nor is there any thought of being overpowered by an influence from outside.[2] If there is anything like excitement and exhilaration in the activity of genius, anything like being as it were " taken out of ourselves " and transported, it is perhaps relatively, in that we escape the thraldom of the wishes and wants that ordinarily beset us, and breathe another air — and in that the self out of which we say we are taken *is* that will, with its claims and urgencies, that marks us off from other things and is the basis of what we ordinarily call our separate personality or individuality. For in philosophic or aesthetic contemplation, there is, according to Schopenhauer, so deep a silence of the will, that our individuality passes from sight[3] — who we are and what we are, what we have done, what we hope for, become irrelevant matters. When we see the setting sun in such a mood, it is the same whether we see it from a prison or from a palace.[4] I must quote Schopenhauer here, for I cannot do justice to him in any paraphrase. " In the moment," he says, " when loosed from the will, we give ourselves up to pure will-less knowing, we enter as it were into another world, where all that stirs the will, and sometimes so violently agitates us, is no more. From all that we are emancipated as truly and as completely as in sleep or in a dream ; happiness and misery have vanished ; we are no more an individual — that is, forgotten — but only a pure sub-

[1] II, p. 222 ; III, p. 431.
[2] Schopenhauer recognizes that the term is " bildlich " (III, p. 431).
[3] III, p. 245.
[4] II, p. 232.

ject of knowledge ; we only still exist as an eye of the world, that is indeed one and the same in all knowing creatures, but that only in man gains complete freedom from the service of the will, by which means the difference of individuality vanishes so entirely that it is all the same whether the beholding eye belongs to a mighty king or to a wretched beggar. For neither happiness nor sorrow is taken over those bounds with us. So nigh us is a sphere in which we escape from all our misery." [1] In another passage, Schopenhauer asks, " Why has the sight of the full moon so beneficial, so quieting, and so elevating an influence upon us ? " And his answer is, " Because it is an object of contemplation, but never of willing.

> " The stars excite no craving,
> One is happy simply in their glory." (Goethe.)

Moreover, the moon is elevated and elevates us, since without any relation to us and forever strange to earthly impulses, it moves on and sees all but has part in nothing. Contemplating it, the will, with its perpetual needs, vanishes out of consciousness and this becomes knowledge purely. The elevating impression is further heightened by the fact that the moon shines without warming — the reason, doubtless, why it has been called chaste, and identified with Diana." [2]

Schopenhauer carries this doctrine far. Throughout the world philosophic insight or aesthetic appreciation is conditioned on our having no personal interest in the object that is in view. No one laid greater stress than he on the moral view of things — he put a moral world-order at the foundation of the physical [3] and declared that the last summit in which the significance of existence culminates is ethical;[4] and yet morality itself could be made the object of purely theoretic curiosity, and in considering it, as in considering any subject, so-called practical or moral interests should not bias us more than any other.[5] And from this highest object down to the lowest, philosophy is bent on seeing the thing entirely as it is in itself; it attends to the

[1] II, p. 233.
[2] III, pp. 428–9.
[3] III, p. 677.
[4] IV, *Die beiden Grundprobleme, u.s.w.*, p. 261.
[5] IV, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

humblest organism, the smallest crystal, the merest dust and earth in the same spirit. The practical man wants to know how to use things ; the philosopher wants a knowledge that is perchance of no use whatever [1] (save as it satisfies the philosophical instinct itself). It is Aristotle's doctrine of *θεωρία* over again—of that theoretic vision, which the Greek philosopher held to be the supreme occupation of God as well as of men.[2]

I have spoken of philosophy *and* art — and fundamentally, *i. e.*, in the view that lies at the basis of them, they are not so different. Let a man look at a landscape with a view to owning it, to buying or selling it, and the aesthetic view of it vanishes. Just as, Schopenhauer says, we get the ideas in things, only when we ourselves have no interest in them,[3] so he declares " Alles ist nur so lange schoen, als es uns nicht angeht "[4] (things are beautiful only so long as we are not concerned in them). The difference of philosophy and art lies only here—philosophy attempts to formulate the ideas of things *in abstract conceptions*, art represents them in *sensible form;* but both presuppose disengaged contemplation or vision—both see the ideas, the essential meaning, of things altogether irrespective of any relation to ourselves; one giving back the ideas abstractly (to the mind simply), the other concretely (to the senses also).[5]

It may be interesting to follow Schopenhauer's interpretation of philosophy and art, as purely disinterested activity, further. His doctrine of ideas recalls that of Plato. And however mystical it sometimes sounds, it is logical at bottom. When Schopenhauer speaks of the idea of a thing he has nothing else in mind than what the thing really, ultimately, is — would be whether we with our interests were here or not, would be to any kind of an intelligence.[6] Nor is it merely the outer relations of the thing he has in mind, the where it is or the when or the why or the

[1] III, p. 444.

[2] *Nichomachean Ethics*, Bk. X, ch. vii.

[3] III, p. 422.

[4] III, p. 428.

[5] See Volkelt, *op. cit.*, pp. 297–8.

[6] It is only not quite the thing itself, in that it is *to an intelligence* and so is partly objectified. The idea is " allein die möglichst *adäquate Objektität* des Willens oder Dinges an sich, ja selbst das ganze Ding an sich, nur unter der Form der Vorstellung " (II, p. 206).

wherefore ; it is *what* the thing is that is the capital point. For instance, electricity is generated under certain circumstances which may be called its causes or occasion ; it can also be turned to certain uses, in running street cars, in imparting strength and healing to our bodies, and has already, we may say, uses or functions in the economy of nature generally — but learning why and how and wherefore it is, does not tell us *what* it is, and it is on the what, the actual nature of the thing itself, that philosophic curiosity fixes its gaze. Ordinary science accepts this as a datum, goes on to find how the object may be got and how it may be used, and does not bother its head further. Philosophy starts with a wonder at what science takes as a fact. Equally irrelevant to philosophy is the when or the where of the electrical phenomenon; now we observe it on a live wire in our streets, now in the clouds above our heads — but it is the same phenomenon in both cases. We saw it to-day, and we saw it last week, and Caesar saw it crossing the Alps two thousand years ago ; but it is the same identical thing always. Philosophy wonderingly asks what it is, irrespective of the when and the where and the wherefore and the why — which are all irrelevant questions in its eyes, though practical science is alone concerned with them. After explanation and reasoning and all that action of the mind that follows the principle of sufficient reason have done their best, it (philosophy) occupies itself with the residuum; the scientifically inexplicable is just its object.[1] I have spoken of electrical phenomena; but the same is true of a horse or a bear or a bird or a fish or a flower or a crystal[2] — these things always emerge under certain conditions, there is always a when and a where and a why (even if we cannot always say a wherefore) that can be definitely determined ; but what is the strange thing that emerges, what is its distinctive and essential nature ? — this is philosophy's question and to ask that and to ask what is the idea of the thing are in essence

[1] Volkelt cites (*op. cit.*, p. 145) on this point *Werke* (Grisebach ed.), I, pp. 128ff.; II, 211ff.; V, p. 9. Nachlass, II, p. 10, and IV, p. 46. So (Frauenstädt ed.), I, pp. 97–8.

[2] Cf. the instances of the clouds, brook, ice, etc. (II, p. 214); as to the aesthetic view of a tree, see II, p. 247.

the same.[1] The philosophic mind, according to Schopenhauer's conception, loses itself in this wondering contemplation — it is not satisfied till it has seen all, seen clearly, seen to the bottom. This seeing is of no earthly use, yet there is strange joy in it. It may, of course, in special cases, be mistaken — it may see awry — and what it takes to be the bottom may not be the bottom; Schopenhauer thought the scientifically inexplicable, the ultimate what of each particular thing, was will in the various stages of its manifestation — and Schopenhauer may have been mistaken; but in portraying the philosophical spirit and in stating the philosophical question,[2] I am persuaded he was not mistaken — and admitting that he may have been mistaken in his concrete vision only means after all that there is an *idea of philosophy* as of everything else, an idea that may not have a perfect fulfillment in an individual case, any more than the idea of a leaf or of a flower need always be carried out in its particular representatives.[3]

[1] Some think to dispose of Schopenhauer's view by saying that there are no unalterable eternal Platonic ideas, such as Schopenhauer conceived, that Darwinism and the theory of evolution have shown that species change, come and go, much like individuals; and perhaps this is true. But it does not touch the essence of Schopenhauer's view — for because objects change, it does not follow that we may not speak of the ideas of objects, while they last, and may not distinguish the ideas more or less from the particular objects themselves, just as we may distinguish the idea of a certain manufacture of locomotives from any of the ten or a hundred specimens the locomotive works may turn out. There may be successive styles or varieties of locomotives in the course of time, but the idea of each style is separable from its particular representatives, and the man who could not see the idea for the individuals and identified it with the iron and brass of any one individual or of all together, would hardly be said to possess ordinary insight, not to say philosophical.

It may be of interest to remark that Schopenhauer recognized the general fact of evolution. "Die Urformen der Thiere" are "eine aus der andern hervorgegangen." The first man we have to conceive of as born in Asia from the orang-outang, or in Africa from the chimpanzee. But the change was not by infinitesimal gradual steps. Herein Schopenhauer comes nearer to De Vries than to Darwin. Cf. Volkelt, *op. cit.*, p. 220–2 and his citations: *Werke* (Grisebach ed.), III, p. 253; V, pp. 167ff., 278; II, p. 366; also Lindner-Frauenstaedt. *Arthur Schopenhauer, von Ihm, über ihn*, pp. 168f.

[2] Cf. another statement of the nature of philosophy: "Das ganze Wesen der Welt, abstrakt, allgemein u. deutlich in Begriffen zu wiederholen, und es so als reflektirtes Abbild in bleibenden und stets bereit liegenden Begriffen der Vernunft niederzulegen: dieses und nichts anderes ist Philosophie" (II, p. 453).

[3] Schopenhauer speaks of genius as seeing not merely what Nature has actually formed, but what she is striving to form (II, p. 220).

But if such is philosophy in its idea and spirit, and in its joy, no different at basis is art. Art is the sensible representation of the ideas that philosophy states in concepts. Why are there so many bad pictures? Schopenhauer somewhere asks. And his answer in substance is, that the artist does not *see* — he is not disengaged enough, not leisurely enough, too much occupied with other things, wanting to please or to flatter or to make something pretty, or perhaps he is so constituted that he cannot see, imagining that he has the power of artistic vision when he has not, seeing one little thing about the object rather than the whole. The artist must see the idea of the object and all accidental details in subordination to the idea. There are various views of art abroad; some think it is a play of the fancy, that its office is to give us more beautiful things than the world presents, that its aim is to lift us above reality. Not so Schopenhauer — to him it is seeing the idea in reality, the idea, the essential meaning, of each particular thing. On its subjective side, *i. e.*, as feeling and appreciation, it is what all are capable of; and the office of objective art, *i. e.*, of works of art, is simply to elicit and educate this feeling, and to make the clearer vision of the artist common property. Art gives the ideas of things, of a tree, a flower, a sunset, a face *more clearly* — that is all; for aesthetic pleasure and aesthetic perception are the same at bottom in him who paints the picture and in him who enjoys it.[1] The work of art only facilitates, according to Schopenhauer, that disinterested objective knowledge of things which we all dimly have or can have, and enables us, as it were, to slip into the mood and the insight, which our ordinary pre-occupations and cares as well as poorer perception keep us from getting. And art has an advantage and superiority over philosophy, and is in a sense truer than philosophy, in one particular point — namely, in that it gives the idea of the object individually, not as a general conception. For the reality of things is individual, according to Schopenhauer, and the concept as a generality, as an abstraction, is most unreal. Not this or that phenomenal tree, indeed, is real, and yet all the same, the real tree (of a particular species) is not an abstraction in our minds, but an entirely objective and

[1] II, p. 229.

individual thing that only appears to be different according to the here or there, the now or then. To use the German word, the reality, the idea of a thing is always an *Anschauung*, not a *Begriff ;* and when art gives us the idea of an object in an individual form, it comes nearer the truth than when philosophy states it in abstract propositions. The artist is simply one who has the power to detect more faithfully the individual idea in an object and the technical skill to reproduce it in plastic form, so that we common mortals now see it as we could never have directly ; but the idea is always seeable, it is never a mere thought — that is one of Schopenhauer's characteristic conceptions.[1]

And as broad and inclusive as is the scope of philosophy, so is that of art (in Schopenhauer's view). There are grades of beauty and there are different kinds of beauty, but everything seen in its idea, and as the manifestation of that idea, is in so far beautiful.[2] The only question is whether we can transcend ourselves personally and individually enough to see things in this way. Some things are so against our will, so disagreeable and repulsive, that we cannot look at them objectively — that is, the aesthetic view is psychologically impossible ; they are what we call disgusting or loathsome — our repugnance here simply overpowers us.[3] In another way the same is true of what we call the charming (das Reizende) ; by this we mean that it immediately excites and incites the will — we want to have the object, to possess it — and this feeling, too, is inconsistent with that disinterested attitude, that losing one's self in the object, which is the soul of art.[4] That which excites passion is not a fit subject of art, Schopenhauer observes. Yet even that which is against our will, the hostile powers of nature, for instance, storm and wind and desert wastes and the tumults of the sea and inaccessible mountain peaks where no life can live, may become in a peculiar sense beautiful to us, — may become sublime, if we can for the moment forget ourselves, be loosed from our individuality and become one with the vast, towering,

[1] Cf. II, pp. 276–7 ; cf. Volkelt, *op. cit.*, p. 311.
[2] II, pp. 247–8.
[3] II, p. 246.
[4] II, pp. 244–5.

or terrible things we contemplate. It is, as Schopenhauer subtly observes, because our state is sublime, that we call the objects sublime.[1] The beautiful we ordinarily feel at once; but when we have to conquer a preliminary opposition and rise to it by effort, it becomes the sublime. And the significance of a picture of a storm, as contrasted with a real experience, lies, I may add, in this: — in the picture we can see the storm objectively, nothing hinders our absorption in its grandeur or sublimity — in the other case, we are *in* the storm and the power of objective vision practically vanishes.

Disengagement from self, from the will — the contrary of every kind of interest except the aesthetic itself — this is the absolute condition of art. And in this disengaged state, the humblest objects may become beautiful. Schopenhauer points to the works of the Dutch painters of still life, and to the landscapes of Ruisdael, as showing how the most insignificant objects and scenes may become subjects of aesthetic appreciation, when disinterestedly viewed and attentively considered.[2] Yes, he says, as every human individual and every human action is significant in history,[3] since the idea of humanity is unfolded in them, so everything in the world, if it can only be objectively viewed and seen as the expression of its idea, is beautiful.[4]

Thus, not only in general, but in his detailed view of philosophy and art, Schopenhauer rises above what perhaps may be called the pragmatic point of view.

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[1] II, 238.

[2] II, p. 232, cf. p. 248, and III, p. 462 (the passage beginning, "Wie aesthetisch ist doch die Natur" and ending "Jedes nachlässigste Plätzscher wird alsbald Schön").

[3] II, p. 271; with this agrees the assertion that in the human (unlike the animal) world each individual is to be regarded as a particular idea, "gewissermassen eine neue (Platonische) Idee" (III, p. 614).

[4] II, pp. 247–8.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SCHELLING'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

SCHELLING is an important figure in the history of post-Kantian philosophy. As a disciple of Fichte, he grasped sooner than any one else the spirit of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. As the early friend and teacher of Hegel, he took conspicuous part in the new idealistic movement. More even than this, he was deeply interested in the advances in empirical science which characterized the closing years of the eighteenth century. Both as a subjective idealist and as the forerunner of the modern nature philosophy Schelling saw clearly the necessity of a Theory of Knowledge as the basis of his philosophical labors. Here, in the problem of how our human consciousness can know the abstract universal of the idealist and the empirical fact of the scientist, Schelling shows himself as a philosophical critic of extended influence and marked significance.

Every student of the Theory of Knowledge is interested, as Schelling was, in discovering what we mean by the simple expression 'I know.' The attention, if directed at first to the process of knowing, the mental activity, soon changes its focus to the object of the process, the thing known. 'I know' means nothing unless there is implied a something, an 'object,' which I somehow hold before consciousness. This object of knowledge, this something that I know, may take almost any form from God to moral ideals, material objects, or will attitudes, but it is always a something vividly important to the knowing consciousness. In a sense, therefore, the activity of knowing is bound up in the character of the thing known. Accordingly, if the student of the Theory of Knowledge is to understand the problem of what is implied in our human cognitive processes, he must recognize that knowledge is dependent on the character of the thing known.

Modern interest in the Theory of Knowledge derives its inspiration from the genius of Kant. In fact, from a certain point

of view nearly all of Kant's critical writings may be considered as a series of treatises on the Theory of Knowledge; for Kant himself saw clearly that we must understand the relation between consciousness and its object before we are in a position to discuss the kind of reality which belongs either to the perceiving consciousness or the objective thing perceived. Kant was thoroughly conscientious in his efforts. He sought to establish a critical foundation to a Theory of Knowledge before he crossed over into the shadowy realms of metaphysics. The spirit of this method of Kant was not without avail in its influence on his disciples. Reinhold and Schelling, and to a lesser degree Fichte and Hegel, saw clearly the primal importance of a critical understanding of human knowledge. Each sought in his own case to define precisely what constituted the true relation between the knower and the known.

The interest in Reinhold is little more than historical, yet it acquires a certain importance when one remembers that from the controversies of the university Kantians, of whom Reinhold is typical, arose the brilliant labors of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Reinhold had the very important effect of focusing the attention of Kant's disciples, during the closing years of the eighteenth century, on the Theory of Knowledge as a premise to the theory of reality. For this, if for nothing else, he is deserving of the gratitude of modern students of epistemology. With Reinhold the inquiry into — "What is given in the representation (Vorstellung)?"— constitutes, with certain ethical and religious corollaries, practically the whole of philosophy. In this inquiry he finds that the representation or idea as it occurs in consciousness implies two fundamental realities. On the one hand there is the "representing subject," [1] which is subjective and personal. This is Kant's "transcendental unity of a apperception" made to stand for the basis of our processes of cognition. On the other hand is the "represented object." [2] This is external and impersonal. It is Kant's "thing-in-itself" transformed into an object of knowledge. In the interplay of these two essential factors Reinhold believes that he has made Kant's critical phi-

[1] *Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens*, 1789, Section VII.

[2] *Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre*, 1794, Section I.

losophy more consistent. His critics, Fichte and Schelling, however, maintain that instead of rendering Kantian criticism more consistent Reinhold has himself reverted to the standpoint of pure dogmatism, through his insistence on the final reality of the "pure object of knowledge." His critics would join consciousness and its object in one span of reality. This is what the Theory of Knowledge of both Fichte and Schelling sought to do.

The interest which both these two men feel in the Theory of Knowledge is, therefore, historically explicable. Yet of the two, it is Schelling who feels the importance of the critical tendency in the Theory of Knowledge more than Fichte. It is he, one is led to believe, who first develops a clear and distinct doctrine of the relation between the process of knowing and the character of the known object. Fichte, on the other hand, is primarily a logician, at times when he is not either a metaphysician or a moralist. In consequence of this attitude, his Theory of Knowledge suffers in spite of repeated assurances to the contrary. He begins his labors with the purely logical inquiry into the postulates of self-evident truth. He is merely putting to himself the same old question that stirred philosophy from Descartes to Kant: How can a philosophical system progress beyond the merest rudiments without being founded on unquestioned certainty? To Fichte this problem assumes the form: "What is the first, absolutely unconditioned ground-proposition of knowledge?"[1] This question is asked in terms of the Theory of Knowledge; it is answered merely in terms of logical form. Certainty of knowledge is to Fichte mere logical certainty $(A = A)$.[2] The vastly important thing for knowledge was, to this critic, the assertive act of our human selfhood which every cognitive process involves. Beyond this Fichte does not show how a separate and distinct Theory of Knowledge can be built from this foundation. He falls back immediately into logical formalism. The writer of the *Wissenschaftslehre* fails to distinguish between a fact of knowledge and a fact of logic. This failure is perhaps the root of all the difficulty that we find in tracing out the various ramifications of his deductive method.

[1] *Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre*, 1794, Section 1.
[2] *Ibid.*

With Schelling all this was different, yet the influence of Fichte during the first three years of his career somewhat dims the interest of the young Schelling in a distinct and separate Theory of Knowledge in the sense in which we use the term at the present day. Historically, one may remark in passing, Schelling's first treatise [1] makes no advance over Fichte in the treatment of a separate and definite Theory of Knowledge. Like his master, he looked for metaphysical truth in a fact of knowledge and immediately merged all considerations pertaining to how we know into the question, "What is the basis of truth?" To accomplish this he deduced the fundamental logical proposition of identity ($A = A$) from an immediate fact of knowledge. This was to him the basis of all philosophy. Then from this identity Schelling proceeded to develop the universal form of the Ego as a subsequent step. The second little essay,[2] published the next year while interest in Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* was still high, shows interesting departures from Schelling's earlier work and from anything Fichte had written. This second work proceeds from a particular fact of knowledge [3] to the conception of an "unconditioned knowledge," [4] and then from this to the Absolute Ego.[5] This is truly an important distinction between the Schelling of this second essay and Fichte. It is an interesting difference which must have been overlooked by those who see a complete correspondence between the early writings of Schelling and the *Wissenschaftslehre* of his master. In starting his deductive method from an "unconditioned" in knowledge, as knowledge (Wissen), instead of an "unconditioned" in mere logical certainty, Schelling laid the foundation of the conception of a mechanism of cognitive processes which should be epistemological rather than logical.

Once the problem of knowledge was clearly before Schelling a new difficulty presented itself to his own mind. Consistently with the spirit of his own idealism he is interested in the sub-

[1] *Über the Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie überhaupt*, 1794.

[2] *Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte in menschlichen Wissen*, 1795.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

jective universals which played such an important part in the philosophical speculations of Fichte and his contemporaries. At one time this concept is represented by the Absolute Ego, at another time by the Unconditioned, and again by the Absolute Reason, or simply the Absolute. In whatever form the conception appears, it assumes the role of an all-inclusive universal, conceived presumably by extending the concept of the subjective or consciousness so as to embrace the universe. Schelling wished to strengthen the belief of his readers in the Absolute by weaving the concept into his Theory of Knowledge. Hence the problem: How can our finite processes of knowing realize the existence and the nature of the Absolute? This question becomes one of vital moment to his whole system of idealism.

The relation between the finite consciousness and the absolute consciousness gave Schelling at times considerable difficulty. At one point [1] he almost relinquishes the inquiry altogether, suggesting that it is a matter quite beyond the range of our intelligence ; yet almost in the next breath he takes refuge in a kind of Platonic remembrance, suggesting that in a measure we can reproduce in our own consciousness, by a process of " free imitation," [2] some of the essential characteristics of the Absolute consciousness. Beyond this somewhat vague reference Schelling's entire Theory of Knowledge crystallizes about certain types of cognitive process which vary according to the character of the object that each type is especially designed to grasp. It is the problem of the relation of the knower to the known, solved by varying the description of the process of knowing according to the character of the thing known.

If we consider Schelling's work as a whole, it is possible to discover perhaps three of these different forms of the cognitive process. There is one form which Schelling alludes to as Transcendental Knowledge. This process of cognition is of a peculiarly abstract character, so abstract indeed that its object is its own activity. It is described most fully in Schelling's idealistic writing, more particularly in the *System des Transcendental Idealismus*. A second form of cognition, to which Schelling

[1] *System des Transcendental Idealismus*, 1800, p. 93.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 94.

constantly appeals, is that of the perception of concrete individual objects, things or ideas. This is quite opposite in its description to the previous type. Transcendental Knowledge is so abstract that it can know only itself as its object of knowledge; the intuition of particulars, on the contrary, is directed toward the individual objects of a consciously conceived world. It is, therefore, not at all abstract, but the most individual and "determinate" of all our various states of knowledge. This form of cognition is treated most fully, as would naturally be expected, in those writings of Schelling in which he describes his philosophy of nature. The third form of cognition is in a sense a synthesis of the two previous types. Schelling calls it "Intellectual Intuition." The term is meant to represent a kind of cognitive process which somehow grasps at one bound the richness of all concrete facts. The breadth of its comprehension is universal, while the objects with which it is concerned are concrete and individual. Such attempts to describe an absolute synthesis of opposites are, of course, familiar to students of German Idealism. They meet an analogous conception in the synthesis represented by the third and highest movement of the logical dialectic. Intellectual intuition is mentioned constantly by Schelling from the first essays cast in Fichtean moulds to the advent of the religious philosophy many years later. In a sense it is the capping stone of Schelling's Theory of Knowledge, a kind of ideal state of mind to which he may appeal when he has occasion to describe the cognition of a universal object of any kind.

To understand the trend of Schelling's Theory of Knowledge and the character of its influence on his contemporaries it may be interesting to follow in some detail these three forms of cognition.

Transcendental knowledge (das transcendentale Wissen) is meant by Schelling to represent a state of mind not altogether unfamiliar to students of German idealism. He characterizes it as "knowledge of knowledge" — a kind of cognitive process in which the object of knowledge is somehow lost in the process itself. It represented in Schelling's mind the activity of consciousness struggling to make itself objective, and then to view itself in this position. In this effort it finds the object ever

slipping away, a kind of will-o'-the-wisp that eludes the grasp at every turn. Hence arises the evasiveness of the whole activity. Hence, too, one may remark, arises the difficulty which Schelling, or any interpreter of his, will always find in describing transcendental knowledge as something appreciably real and significant.

Beyond this bare description, not altogether free from verbalism, one surmises, Schelling gives us little intimation of the functions and the scope of transcendental knowledge. He tells us that because of the absence of any concrete object, other than merely its own self, transcendental knowledge possesses the highest form of all knowledge — universality — but it is not necessarily the highest "principle of knowledge" nor the "highest principle of being."[1] One may remark in passing that the "highest principle of knowledge" in Schelling's mind was represented by intellectual intuition, the third form of cognitive process to be described presently; and the "highest principle of being" at this period of Schelling's activity was represented by the principle of self-consciousness.

The treatment of transcendental knowledge, from the scattered references throughout the *System des Transcendental Idealismus*, leads one to believe that the whole subject was far from clear in Schelling's own mind. He saw, evidently, the necessity of reinforcing his own subjective idealism by some precise Theory of Knowledge. Transcendentalism required a state of cognition which does not possess the limitations of our ordinary sense perception. It must have some kind of an 'object,' however, in order to be true knowledge. With these two considerations before him Schelling began his Theory of Knowledge by the verbal concept of a state of cognition so undetermined and undefined as to be in form universal, but yet bearing some resemblance to the finite processes of our ordinary sense perception. Such a state of knowledge seems to involve covertly a contradiction between the unlimited and the limited. But the sweeping, imaginative mind of the young Schelling passed easily over this difficulty, here as elsewhere, by falling back upon the complex staging of a higher synthesis. In view of this he seems to imply that transcendental knowledge has the 'pure form' of

[1] *System des Transcendental Idealismus*, 1800, p. 27.

universality, yet in the character of viewing itself as object it contains the germ of determined particularity. Thus easily, according to this brilliant transcendentalist, can the infinite and the finite unite in knowledge.

The result of Schelling's treatment of the first of his series of cognitive processes is that he has tried to define what he considers the most abstract and universal form of knowledge. It seems empty, for its only content is itself. It seems futile, for mere knowledge of itself carries us not a bit farther toward a solution of the old problem: "How can we know the world in its reality?" Schelling must have realized this inadequacy; for nowhere except in the *System des Transcendental Idealismus* does this abstract form of cognition receive more than passing notice. It will be remembered that most of Schelling's time and attention, once he was beyond the immediate influence of Fichte, was devoted to the production of works on the philosophy of nature. Here Schelling shows himself the philosopher of empirical sciences. The problem of knowledge narrows itself to the special problem of the knowledge of objects.

In the effort to supply an adequate background for the empirical facts of science Schelling introduces a new tendency into German idealism. In a sense, he commenced the long series of investigations into the relation between science and philosophy which lead up to the present-day 'nature-philosophy.' Fichte, in the spirit of his own subjectivism, did not attempt to supply a philosophical background for the world of empirical fact, except to state merely that there were conditions under which a subjective process might assume an objective form. Schelling saw that no such verbal solution would meet the concrete richness of science. To his broader vision both nature, in all its multifarious forms, and mind, with its almost infinite possibilities, are phases of one ultimate reality. But Schelling went beyond this new form of Spinozism; he thrust directly into the foreground the old problem of Locke and Leibniz: How can we know of the existence of objective phenomena? In meeting this question fairly Schelling defines his second form of cognition, that of the intuition of individual things.

The intuition of the particular is that which gives us the as-

surance of the existence of an outside world, and is the first condition of any philosophy of nature.[1] Had Schelling interpreted this presupposition literally, he would have felt no further necessity of dealing with the problem of knowledge in the nature-philosophy. But his mind was so strongly inclined to construct universals at the expense of particulars that he could not rest satisfied with this simple statement. As one essay follows another, he sees more and more in the intuition of particulars an expression of universal spirit, and soon leaves the field of empirical fact to soar into the heights of abstract formalism. Nature is defined as an original, evolving force — a "productivity"[2] — and the individual objects of sense perception as the "mere products (natura naturata)" of this original activity. The particular arises when the "first force of nature" is opposed for a moment of time by its opposite or negating tendency. In the so-called "identity period," after the publication of the *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie*, the original simplicity of the problem of sense perception is entirely lost. Schelling reverts first to Spinozism and then to Platonism in his effort to explain how the Absolute may become crystallized from time to time in our simple, ordinary knowledge of particulars. In these efforts there is little of historical significance.

In the *System des Transcendental Idealismus*, the problem of particular intuition is treated in a very elaborate fashion from the point of view of subjective idealism. Schelling here desires to give an outline of a natural history of self-consciousness in the form of a series of activities. It is, therefore, inevitable that he should meet the problem of particular intuition in an idealistic rather than a naturalistic setting. Schelling, more than either Fichte or Hegel, succeeded in separating the cognitive act of intuition as a fact of knowledge from the metaphysical significance to be attributed to the particular. He asks, to use his own terms, "How the Ego comes to intuit itself as limited?"[3] To explain this he depicts the universal principle of self-consciousness struggling to realize or express itself in

[1] *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*, 1797, pp. xx ff.

[2] *Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie*, 1799, p. 22.

[3] *System des Transcendental Idealismus*, 1800, p. 100.

concrete situations. It is the plot or spirit of the drama making itself objective and determinate in the successive acts and scenes. The lower strata of these objectifications of self-consciousness correspond to the knowledge of the particular, and are therefore similar in meaning to what was considered as intuition of particulars in the nature-philosophy. Students of Hegel will recall at this point the "sense certainty" and the opening chapters of the *Phenomenologie*. With Schelling this idealistic setting seems to alter the appearance of the problem, as it was stated in connection with the naturalistic writings in the preceding paragraph. In essence, however, the treatment is the same.

The highest level in the series of cognitive processes was called by Schelling Intellectual Intuition (intellectuelle Anschauung). This is to be sharply contrasted with the intuition of particular concrete facts, the description of which connected Schelling most closely with the world of empirical fact. Transcendental intuition represented to him the special form of knowledge which had as its function the knowing of the Absolute in some form. "The transcendental intuition is the organ of all transcendental thinking."[1] The first treatment of this cognitive process occurs in the *Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie*, at the conclusion of a series of pages in which Schelling has sought to define the Unconditioned Ego in such universal terms that it seemingly cannot be reached by sense perception. In this predicament Schelling must either admit that the Absolute is unknowable, as his critics have contended,[2] or else describe how the ultimate reality of the universe, as the Unconditioned Ego, can be known to human consciousness. Schelling chose the latter course. He brought into the foreground the conception of intellectual

[1] *System des Transcendental Idealismus*, 1800, p. 100.

[2] The ordinary objection to Schelling is that he has defined the Absolute in such universal terms that it can not be understood by human knowledge. It is therefore inconceivable and a meaningless abstraction. The preface of Hegel's *Phenomenologie des Geistes* is usually quoted as the source of this criticism. As a matter of fact it may be traced back to a pamphlet by one Franz Berg, at that time professor of church history in Würzberg. It was entitled *Sextus oder über die absolute Erkenntniss von Schelling*, 1802. It has been long forgotten—not so the polemic. Every writer since that time, who has had occasion to allude to Schelling, has restated it with apparent originality.

intuition, which needs no "object"[1] in the ordinary sense of an object of knowledge. For intellectual intuition the only object is the Absolute Ego — "the Ego is the mere condition for its own intellectual intuition."[1] With this somewhat confusing review, and a casual remark on Kant's attitude toward intellectual intuition, Schelling closes his first observations on the subject. Later on in the same work, when considering the character of the Absolute Ego, Schelling tells us that as the reality of the Ego "is absolutely outside of all time, the form of its intellectual intuition is eternity."[2]

In the *Philosophische Briefe uber Dogmatismus und Kriticismus*, Schelling refers to intellectual intuition as an activity of the mind in which the intuited and the intuiting are one, and in the later contributions to the *Fichte-Niethammer Journal* he tells us that the human spirit can abstract from all objectivity and have an intuition of the Absolute. This intuition is intellectual, and through it arises pure self-consciousness.[3]

The tendency to give to intellectual intuition an increasingly important function becomes pronounced in the *System des Transcendental Idealismus*. In the previous writings Schelling had stated that intellectual intuition could have no object — an assertion which he must have recognized as ridiculous, since the very essence of any cognitive process is to know something. But in these first essays Schelling dreaded above all things to make the Ego any kind of object, fearing to fall into the meshes of the Reinholdian dogmatism, against which he railed in the *Philosophische Briefe*. Now, in the *System des Transcendental Idealismus*, he conceives of a way of assigning an object to intellectual intuition without detracting from its universal form. This is by asserting that the Absolute of the world-consciousness, as the knower of all processes of knowledge, creates its object by intuiting its own infinite and absolute reality.[4] After 1800 this new interpretation predominates in Schelling's constant effort to explain how we can know the Absolute, and paves the way to a closer connection between intellectual intuition as the form

[1] *Vom Ich als Princip*, 1795, p. 49.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 105.
[3] *Fichte-Niethammer Journal*, Vol. VII, p. 134.
[4] *System des Transcendental Idealismus*, 1800, p. 59.

of knowledge and the Absolute as its metaphysical content. Schelling's notes on an essay by Eschenmayer on *Das höchste Princip der Natur-Philosophie* suggests this change.[1] The essay presents a doubt as to how nature as ' pure activity ' could be known. The problem is just opposite to Schelling's earlier inquiry as to how the Ego as ' pure subjectivity ' could be known. Schelling had already in the *System des Transcendental Idealismus* met this latter question by asserting that the Absolute Ego, through the act of consciousness, must be both unlimited subjectivity and limited objectivity, in order that it may be known by intellectual intuition. Already before this he had called the limited objectivity, nature.[2] It was, therefore, a comparatively easy step, in answer to Eschenmayer, to bring the two propositions together and assert that the knowledge object of an intellectual intuition was a pure ' subject-object.' It intuited, in an absolute synthesis the pure subject as Ego and the pure object as nature. " What I call nature is nothing more than the pure objective of the intellectual intuition of the pure subject-object." [3] Nature as well as Ego can only be known through intellectual intuition, because by no other means can it be elevated to the position of a correlative with subjectivity.[3] This conception of intellectual intuition has become so firmly fixed that its name is changed to Absolute Reason.[4] With this the Theory of Knowledge becomes merged in the Theory of Reality. Intellectual intuition and its object, the Absolute, become one in the Absolute Reason. In the *Fernere Darstellungen* of the *Neue Zeitschrift*, 1802–3, Schelling returns to the old description of intellectual intuition as the highest principle of knowledge.[5] It " knows the Absolute in and for itself," [6] yet this does not prevent him from devoting the entire section to proving that the intellectual intuition of the Absolute and the Absolute itself are one and the same. This tendency to sub-

[1] *Zeitschrift für speculative Physik*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 109.

[2] Stated explicitly in *Einleitung zur dem Entwurf.*, 1799, pp. 26–27 ; and implicitly in the earlier *Idee zur einer Philosophie der Natur*, 1797, introduction.

[3] *Zeitschrift für Speculativ Physik*, Vol. II, 1, pp. 126–136.

[4] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, 2, p. 1.

[5] *Neue Zeitschrift für Speculativ Physik*, 1802, p. 23.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

merge both knowledge and reality in a form of mysticism becomes more evident in the *Bruno* and the various works immediately following. With this confusion our interest in intellectual intuition ceases.

In summing up Schelling's Theory of Knowledge, it is interesting to note the position of intellectual intuition with respect to the two previous types of cognitive process. Transcendental knowledge was described as the form of knowing wherein there is no differentiation of object. It could know only itself and was, therefore, empty and sterile. The intuition of particular objects was concerned with limited individuals. It grasped ideas and things. Intellectual intuition now appears as a true synthesis of the two previous types. Students of logical method can see perhaps a resemblance between these three states of cognitive process and the three moments of the dialectic movement of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Schelling himself pointed out no such parallelism, but his mind was so thoroughly saturated with the dialectic method of thought that his thinking fell easily into its moulds. Both transcendental knowledge and the first phase of the logical dialect are alike abstract, vague, and indeterminate. The significance in each case lies in what is to follow. Particular intuition and the antithesis of the dialectic are both concerned with particular, definite objects. Their sphere is the individual. Intellectual intuition, the highest state of knowledge, represents the generality of mere knowing, the most abstract form of the cognitive act, and this same abstractness made concrete through the intuition of an object, the Absolute. Students of Hegel would be inclined to say it represented knowledge made "An-und-fur-sich-seyn." Similarly, the synthesis stage of the dialectic represents a logical form embracing both the universality of the thesis and the individuality of the antithesis. Without pressing this analogy too far, however, one cannot help feeling impressed with the importance of Schelling's efforts to bring the absolute idealism of the movement to which he belonged into accord with a Theory of Knowledge. Here lies the importance of his work. In striving to express human knowledge in terms of a cognitive act directed toward certain objects of knowledge, Schelling exerted

a marked influence. It was this tendency to demand a solution to the problem of knowledge that is of consequence, rather than the idealistic Theory of Knowledge that took shape beneath his hands.

ARTHUR S. DEWING.

CAMBRIDGE.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION: THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING, YALE UNIVERSITY, DECEMBER 27–29, 1909.

Report of the Secretary.

THE ninth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at New Haven, Conn., in Yale University, on December 27, 28, and 29, 1909. The Treasurer's report for the year ending December 31, 1909, was read and accepted:

Frank Thilly, Secretary and Treasurer, in Account with the American Philosophical Association.

Receipts.

Balance on hand December 31, 1908	$357.97
Dues and sale of Proceedings	177.72
Interest	13.49
	$549.18

Expenses.

Proceedings of the Association for 1908	$ 20.50
Printing and Stationery	29.03
Clerical aid	13.30
Stamps and express	16.51
Johns Hopkins Smoker	20.00
	$ 99.34
Balance on hand December 31, 1909	449.84
Total	$549.18

The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: *President*, Professor Charles M. Bakewell, of Yale University; *Vice-President*, Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy, of the University of Missouri; *Secretary-Treasurer*, Professor Edward G. Spaulding, of Princeton University; *Members of the Executive Committee* (for two years), Professor W. H. Sheldon, of Dartmouth College, and Professor Norman Smith, of Princeton University; (for one year), Professor Frank Thilly, of Cornell University.

Upon recommendation of the Executive Committee five new members were elected: Professor B. H. Bode, of the University of Illinois; Professor G. S. Brett, of the University of Toronto; Professor A. R. Gifford, of the University of Vermont; Dr. M. C. Mott-Smith, of Colby College; and Professor C. H. Toll, of Amherst College.

The invitation of Princeton University to hold the tenth annual meeting of the Association at Princeton was accepted.

The Committee on Early American Philosophers presented a financial statement and was continued. The Committee on Comparative Lexicon reported progress and was continued. The sum of 100 marks was appropriated as a contribution to the Fichte Memorial at Berlin, the payment to be made through Professor Gabriel Campbell. Professors Creighton and Albee were chosen as a committee to audit the accounts of the Treasurer.

A committee consisting of Professors Royce and Bakewell was chosen to prepare a memorial on the death of Dr. William Torrey Harris.

It was voted to tender the thanks of the Association to Professor Bakewell, Yale University, and the officers of the Graduates Club for their cordial hospitality.

The following are abstracts of the papers read at the sessions of the Association:

The Philosophical Aspects of Evolution. JOHN GRIER HIBBEN.

[The President's Address, which appears in this number (March, 1910) of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.]

Intuitionism and the Ethics of Renunciation. CHARLES GRAY SHAW.

Intuitionism is an ethical sphere whose four points are found in *conscience* as a sense, *rectitude* as a judgment, *freedom* as human spontaneity, *duty* as human responsibility. In discussing these four ideas, intuitional ethics has habitually overlooked the sphere itself in its solidity, wherein consists the totality of the ethical problem. In reality, he who lives his life and knows his world must choose between a course of self-realization in eudæmonism, or self-repudiation in rigorism. Without fully

realizing it, the intuitionist is urging man on toward this life-negation, with its resultant loss of human selfhood. Such an ethical view is quite possible, if not tenable, as the following metaphysical and moral considerations will show.

(1) It is metaphysically possible for the self-active human soul to will its own non-being, in accordance with a dormant death-instinct. (2) Ethically considered, humanity possesses a passion for morality, which is as strong as the desire for happiness. (3) In its inmost nature, the soul of man reveals a root of bitterness in the form of a hatred of life, which makes tragedy an entertainment and renunciation a relief. (4) In his religious faith, man tends to believe in pain as though it were more real than pleasure.

These tendencies, implicit in consciousness and idealized in culture, contribute to a firm pessimistic ideal of renunciation, recognizable in Buddhism, Christianity, Monasticism, Schopenhauer, and Russian literature. From the standpoint of humanistic ethics, such a form of renunciation is regarded as an illusion, a fixed idea due to despair of life. Nevertheless, the ideal of renunciation contains a truth expressed more consistently, as an *acquiescence*, to use Spinoza's expression, and this may be urged without depreciating our human values. Inspired by such an ideal, the moral subject is led to accept both the world and humanity in their totality, while he rests content with a sense of selfhood, which may find it necessary to deny the Dionysiac will-to-live, while it upholds the Apollonian ideal of intellectual individuality.

The Conception of Philosophy in Recent Discussion. MORRIS R. COHEN.

One may roughly divide the history of modern American philosophy into three periods which might be called, respectively, the theological, the metaphysical, and the scientific. The first period, which had the old *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* as its organ, made problems relating to God, Freedom, and Immortality its central interest. The leaders at this time, however, were practical men of affairs who believed that they had found from their superior point of view, fruitful insight into

the fields of religion, art, history, education, and practical politics. With the founding of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW control of philosophy passed into the hands of professional teachers who conceived their task as the formation of a world-view based on a critique of the special sciences. Since the publication of Dewey's *Studies in Logical Theory*, the tendency of philosophic discussion has been to give up the consideration of a *Weltanschauung* and the task of criticising the special sciences, and to concentrate, instead, on special problems in logic and epistemology. It is thus hoped to turn philosophy into a modest special science.

The aim of this paper is to suggest that while progress in certain fields of philosophy can only be made by the introduction of strict scientific method, the whole task of philosophy is a wider one, in which a general consensus is neither possible nor of great moment. In many respects the aim and methods of philosophy are like those of poetry and of reflective literature, generally. In so far as it *is* a science, it is much nearer to the social than to the physical sciences.

A truly humanistic conception of philosophy would make it use literature and the social sciences to build up a *Lebensanschauung*, and the physical sciences to build up a *Weltanschauung*. Such an ideal may seem an impossible one, but it is indispensable for culture and sanity. It is especially necessary as a corrective to the present anarchic tendencies of college education due to over-specialization.

Metaphysical Movements in Science. JAMES H. HYSLOP.

The larger metaphysical movements of science today show an intimate relation with some problems in both ancient and modern thought which are often left out of account. The starting point showing what the development has been is in the Greek idea of inertia, or inability of matter to produce motion, of itself. The Greek thinkers did not speak or think of inertia as an essential property of matter. In many of their discussions and assumptions, they tacitly took for granted that matter was passive and inactive, but, on the other hand, when they came to speak of it in certain relations, they assumed that it was capable of self-

activity. It is quite probable that they recognized the distinction between inert matter and self-active matter, though they never undertook to develop this.

The Epicureans made it very clearly self-active; hence, inertia was not conceived by them as one of the essential properties of matter. When Christianity came forward, it made matter essentially inert, and hence, went outside of matter to account for all the phenomena of nature. When the revival of science came about, the doctrine of gravitation, on the one hand, and of chemical affinity, on the other, modified the doctrine which previous philosophy held, and endeavored to frame their conceptions consistently with that doctrine, though greatly modifying it.

In more recent thought, the reference of gravitation to ether and not to matter as centers of force has shown a tendency to revert again to the medieval conception of inertia. In chemical science, the use which is made of the catalytic processes tends to show that even chemical affinity is not a spontaneous activity of matter, but is instigated from without. In addition to that, the important functions assigned to ether show a very marked tendency to get outside of matter altogether in accounting for the phenomena of nature. What this will mean remains for the future to determine.

The Mathematical Temper in Philosophy. BROTHER CHRYSOSTOM.

The striking points of similarity to be found in the fundamental principles of Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant, suggest the query: Does mathematics fix one's point of view in the consideration of philosophical problems?

All three leaders accept the theory of innate ideas in some form, all three start with plausible postulates, and all three prefer the deductive method of proof. In all three, likewise, there is a pronounced leaning to subjectivism, the result probably of their predilection for the mathematical viewpoint. How, then, are we to reconcile the dictum that mathematics affords excellent training for philosophy, with the lessons taught us by the history of philosophy?

Considered as a culture study, mathematics is held to promote accuracy of reasoning and power of self-development. It enables one to attain a high degree of abstractive thought and trains one to make good use of one's mental equipment. Yet it practically assumes that man is but a thinking machine, for it ignores both the field of his emotions and, what is more to our purpose, his powers of observation. It turns his attention from the objective to the subjective, from the real to the ideal. Its most ardent advocates can hardly claim that it develops either power of observation or breadth of view; while its thoroughness is restricted to a very limited sphere. The radical change of view to be found in some of the later philosophical views of Leibniz, that is, after his work in mathematics had been done, would seem to confirm these strictures. Mathematics may afford excellent preparation for formal logic, but is inadequate as a propædeutic for the study of nature or man. It tends to promote a rigidity of mind which is not favorable to philosophic pursuits. The philosophic mind needs accurate and extended observation as well as training in reason. It needs premises broad enough to support its conclusions.

An Interpretation of the Syllogism. HERBERT MARTIN.

Formal logic is on the defensive. It is being reinterpreted. By what it can contribute will its value be determined. Its reinterpretation will consist in a re-emphasis of its essential principles, and in the elimination of its outgrown artificialities. With this in mind I would offer as of value the interpretation of the syllogism in terms of the Aristotelian dictum, namely: Whatever is predicated of a term distributively may be predicated of any other term of which the original term may be affirmed. To illustrate: Given:

No quadrupeds are men
All men are animals

Interpretation: The quality of being a quadruped is denied to every man, that is, to every being of whom man may be affirmed. But in the second premise man is affirmed of some animals, therefore the quality of being a quadruped may be denied to some animals, or, conclusion, some animals are not quadrupeds.

Apart from the value of one method of approach, the immediate values of this method are three: First, its large use of conversion, giving the student skill in the detection of the implications of a given proposition. Second, it does away with the discussion of the valid modes in the several figures. There has not occurred to me a single case where from two premises a valid conclusion can be drawn, in which this method will not apply. Even Baroko and Bokardo, by the employment of obversion, submit gracefully to this treatment. Third, by this interpretation the mysterious methods for the reduction of the figures are no longer needed. For the method of interpretation is itself essentially that of the first figure. Simply indicate the steps in your interpretation and you have the first figure. In interpreting the example taken, I have said, 'The quality of being a quadruped is denied to every man,' which, when put in the form of a proposition becomes, 'No men are quadrupeds.' Again, 'The quality of being a man is affirmed of some animals,' giving the proposition, 'Some animals are men'; therefore it followed that the quality of being a quadruped could be denied to some animals, or, some animals are not quadrupeds. These propositions placed in order give us a syllogism in the first figure.

The Logical Structure of Self-refuting Systems. E. G. SPAULDING.

[This paper will be published in an early number of this REVIEW.]

The Ego-centric Predicament.[1] RALPH BARTON PERRY.

Ontological idealism is best expressed by the proposition: Everything (T) is defined by the complex, I know T. For the purposes of this proposition the "I" is in no need of any definition beyond what it contains from its being the initial term in this complex. In order to make it plain that the term is generalized, substitute ego, or E, for the pronoun. The term T is primarily distinguished from other terms only in that it has unlimited denotation; it refers to anything and everything. It is desir-

[1] This paper has been published in full in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. VII, No. 1.

able that the operation or relation "know" should be freed from its narrower intellectualistic meaning; and it will, therefore, prove convenient to use the expression R^e, to mean any form of consciousness that terminates in a thing. Thus R^e may refer to thinking, remembering, willing, perceiving, or desiring. Ontological idealism, then, is a theory to the effect that T necessarily stands in the relation R^e to an E, or that the relationship $R^e(E)$ is indispensable to T. Now the attempt to prove this theory at once reveals a predicament that might otherwise escape notice. One must attempt to discover the precise nature of the modification of T by $R^e(E)$; but one promptly encounters the fact that $R^e(E)$ cannot be eliminated from one's field of study, because "I study," "I eliminate," "I think," "I observe," "I investigate," etc., are all cases of $R^e(E)$. In short, $R^e(E)$ is peculiarly ubiquitous. There can be no question concerning the fact; it owes its importance in the estimation of philosophers to its being one of the few facts to which philosophy has itself called attention. But we are still left in doubt as to what the fact proves with reference to the problem which reveals it. The contention of the writer is that it proves nothing; or rather that it proves only the impossibility of using a certain method to solve the problem. In other words it is not an argument, but a methodological predicament. We cannot employ a method which in other cases proves a convenient preliminary step, the empirical, denotative method of agreement and difference.

The Ontological Value of Ideas and Feelings. WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING.

We cannot wholly identify I-am with I-know. Knowledge laps over what I am into what I am not. Its ambition to know 'reality' means its intention to set up intercourse with being ontologically independent of my being. The idealist says: "Give me any object, however independent, and I will show you an I-think (or I-will) which will take it in"; but to this the realist has a legitimate rejoinder, viz.: "Give me any I-think, however capacious, and I will show you an object independent of that very thought." The matter cannot be settled, therefore, by referring to reflection, as a phenomenon. It can only be settled

by a self-supporting theory of the relation between idea and reality. Now an idea is not a useful scratch on the surface of experience (James, Bergson, Lovejoy) intrinsically different from the experience; it is the experience itself assuming quasi-political relations with other experiences. As the State translates customs into laws or 'institutions,' that is, gives customs powers of language, self-maintenance, and self-defense in presence of competition and attack which did not appear in their historical context, yet without destroying the identity of the custom, so the mind without losing the identity of the experience translates its original experiences into ideas, endowing them with powers of comparison, free bearing, etc., which as experiences in historical order they did not have. Hence: *there is nothing in experience which is not also in idea*. This is true of experiences of time, of change, of novelty, of particularity, and the rest of the alleged extra-ideal characters of reality. Thinking (legislation) is a process of metabolism between reality and self; the objects of thought are independent being *in the process of becoming self-stuff*. They are independent precisely as they are experienced and thought to be: first, as prior, original, in existence, so that the reality of the self is derivative from theirs; second, as necessary, authoritative, correcting the idea in so far as it holds itself open to correction. Their independence is thus correlative to our dependence, hence is not absolute.

In what Sense can Experience be Timeless? C. A. BENNETT.

1. The now frequent expression 'timeless experience' is ambiguous and calls for examination. Ignoring then the question whether such an experience is actual or not, let us ask: "Does our finite experience give any indication of what timeless experience would be like if it existed?"

2. Assuming as valid the distinction between conceptual and perceptual time, let us confine our attention to one experience of the latter. The uses of 'timeless' resting on the conceptualist view are therefore ignored. The main characteristics of our experience of conceptual time may be summed up by saying that "it is the impulses and interests that the present does not satisfy that bring the fact of time before us" (Ward). That is,

the consciousness of time arises in so far as our desires fail to find satisfaction, in so far as attainment is regarded as remote. This can be freely illustrated from everyday experience.

3. The converse of this is true. With attainment and the satisfaction of desire the consciousness of time disappears. May such an experience be called timeless? Here a distinction is necessary. Attainment is of two kinds: (*a*) Attainment in the mystic experience. Attainment at a definite moment of time. The end of a quest. After it there is nothing. This is timeless, but is it experience? (*b*) Attainment in the creative artistic experience. Artistic activity is innocent and transcends teleological categories. In so far, however, as the artist has an object at all, that object is self-expression. But in this case attainment is not reached at a definite moment of time, but is continuously realized through continuous activity. Since there is attainment, there is no consciousness of time. Artistic activity then gives a hint as to the nature of an experience in which there should be perfect self-expression and no consciousness of time — an experience, further, sharply distinguishable from that of the mystic.

Life and Mind as Forms of Energy. W. P. MONTAGUE.

The two most interesting problems in the philosophy of science today are: (1) The psycho-physical problem of the relation of consciousness to the organism and, (2) the bio-physical problem of the relation of vital to non-vital processes. With regard to the first problem there are two hypotheses in the field: parallelism and interactionism; each of them is admittedly defective. With regard to the second problem there are also two hypotheses current: mechanism and vitalism; each of these is admittedly defective. The theory that life and mind are forms of energy is designed to solve these problems in such a way as to meet the monistic arguments of the parallelist and mechanist, on the one hand, and the dualistic arguments of the interactionist and vitalist, on the other.

The part of the paper read at the meeting dealt only with the psycho-physical applications of the theory. The thesis to be proved was the following: *Mental states, as we actually experi-*

ence them, are identical with what indirectly or from an external standpoint we describe as the forms of potential energy into which the kinetic energies of neural currents are transformed in the synaphes of the neurons. Some of the reasons urged in support of this thesis were the following: (1) Potential energy or stress is from the physical point of view only the potentiality from which and into which notion can be transformed. Mental states must also be regarded in the same way as the *termini a quo* and *ad quem* of physical motions. (2) Mental states seem to occur at those moments when (by reason of its redirection) neural energy is passing from a purely kinetic through a more potential phase in the nervous system. (3) A field of consciousness and a field of potential energy agree in possessing unity, self-determination, and subject-object polarity. (4) They agree in behaving teleologically or with reference to a future end toward which they tend in spite of obstacles. (5) They agree in the capacity to embody at each present moment the results of past events, preserved in their distinctness. (6) They agree in embodying a self-transcendent reference to what is beyond them in space or time. Thus if mental states are forms of potential neural energy, their paradoxical cognitive function of *meaning* or revealing an extra-organic outside world not identical with themselves is explained. Potential energy can exist (*a*) in a balanced or static condition, as (1) in an electric charge, (2) in a coiled spring, or (3) in a gravitating mass held at rest by a support; or it can exist (*b*) in association with kinetic energy, as (1) the magnetic field associated with an electric current, (2) as the centrifugal force associated with a revolving planet, or (3) as the acceleration of a freely falling body. Corresponding to (*a*) would be the stored up systems of memory images and psychical dispositions of which we are not normally conscious, while corresponding to (*b*) would be those ever-changing experiences which are regenerated by the sensori-motor currents and which make up the field of attention in waking life.

The Epistemological Dilemma of Biology with Reference to Space. WALTER B. PITKIN.

The peculiarities of the imitative reflex make it impossible for the biologist to consider space as merely a form of experience.

This reflex has high significance for every theory of perception, inasmuch as it produces, through a perception of visual forms and movements, an imitation which the imitator himself either cannot normally perceive at all or which he perceives only indirectly; and, of the entire process, only the end terms can be experienced at all. The organ of vision is a device for preserving and reproducing, in a peculiarly diffracted form, the geometrical characteristics of objects affecting the retina. That it should be so constructed confirms the natural belief that the problems which give rise to organic development, particularly to consciousness, are problems in a spatial world antedating experience.

The Generating Problem. KARL SCHMIDT.

(No abstract furnished.)

The Significance of Suicide. JAMES GIBSON HUME.

European investigators have endeavored to discover the influence of climate, season, weather, age, sex, marriage, profession, religion, upon suicide. These statistical tables are valuable. We require, however: (1) A separate table for those undoubtedly insane, putting in a class by themselves those sane enough to be influenced by rational motives. (2) Under religion, those who really believe in some creed should be distinguished from those nominally attached to it. (3) There should be a table of statistics of the divorced. (4) There should be an earnest attempt made to get beneath the statistics to the hidden influences—the 'moral causes.'

The commission and report by the Prussian government on suicides among school children indicates the need of similar inquiries into the causes and conditions leading to adult suicides. This might lead to insights that would guide preventive measures. These investigations should take into account the following: Physiological. The influence of epileptic, neurotic, dissipated parents. Influence of nerve exhausting vices, of mental overwork, of monotonous employment, of sedentary occupations. Psychical: The influence of monotony, of excitement, of excessive pursuit of wealth or pleasure, of disappointments, worries, of gambling. Literature: The influence of

morbid sentimentalism in poetry and prose representing death as extinction, ignoring or denying the moral element in life conduct and destiny. The influence of dramatic representations of suicide, sometimes as in the case of Romeo and Juliet as the tragic ending of passionate love. The influence of realistic accounts of suicide in the newspapers, sometimes, it is claimed, initiating imitative epidemics. Social: The influence of solitariness, loneliness, brooding. The presence or absence of social or family ties. The sex instinct and the effect of the perversion or thwarting of this.

Then it might be in order to try to find out to what extent and in what ways educational, social, moral, or religious influences coöperate with the hygienic in keeping men and women in physical and mental health and normal, sane, and suitable activity. Even from the present data we may get some fairly obvious suggestions. Many suicides are undoubtedly insane, others are in the incipient stages, obsessed with various 'phobias,' and probably all are in some degree morbid. Might not much be accomplished if we could succeed in convincing people of the hopefulness of cure and the need of expert advice and assistance in checking the earlier stages of threatened insanity? At present there is widespread despair.

Suicide accompanies civilization and education as an unerring index of maladjustment in society and defects in education. True education acts as a deterrent in teaching self-control, and in giving objective interests, literary, artistic, scientific, philosophical, philanthropic, moral, religious. The perverting influence of the realistic newspaper accounts of suicide should be checked by legislation.

DISCUSSION: The Problem of Time in its Relation to Present Tendencies in Philosophy.

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

A military map of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy would show some such alignment of forces as this: On one side stands with somewhat diminishing influence, the once dominant neo-Kantian type of philosophy; it unites into a single system (with some diversity of concomitants) four separable doctrinal

elements, which may be named rationalism in epistemology, eternalism in epistemology and in metaphysics, idealism, and 'this-worldliness' (or a determination to find a place and meaning in 'ultimate' reality for the concrete characters and content of experience — including its time-character). Against this there now press forward four especially aggressive new tendencies: 'anti-intellectualism,' temporalism, realism, and radical empiricism (or pragmatic nominalism). These four are not combined into a single typical system, but appear in the most diverse combinations with one another and even with one or another of the separate elements of the idealistic system, though to that system as a system they are all opposed. A programme for profitable discussion would call for an examination of the relations of logical implication or repugnancy between each two of these eight distinguishable dialectical motives, and for a determination of the internally coherent groupings of them that can be shown to be possible. But it is to be noted that there are two points upon which agreement has in some degree already been attained. First, most of the newer ways of thinking, whatever their other ingredients, contain in common the element of temporalism, and therefore show a common opposition to the eternalism of the neo-Kantian systems. Second, the 'this-worldliness' or 'concreteness' of all genuinely modern idealism, and notably of that of Royce, is not in itself opposed by any of the newer tendencies, but is rather a point of *rapprochement* between that system and nearly all of the newer ones, since it amounts to a recognition of the importance in 'reality' of those factors of experience — especially its temporal and volitional aspects — now tending to be generally emphasized.

Thus an effective plan of campaign would seem to demand that issue be joined first between temporalism and eternalism. This is the more evidently true because, if eternalism be established, idealism also will follow from at least one of the principal arguments by which the former is established; while if temporalism is proven, one important objection to realism will be removed, and also some degree of 'anti-intellectualism' would seem to be necessitated.

Such being the strategic situation, some progress towards the

testing of the logical forces available on the two sides may be made by scrutinizing two of the principal arguments for the doctrine that reality must ultimately be an Eternal Consciousness. The first of these, which may broadly be called the Platonistic, is the argument from the necessary 'eternity' of the trueness of any true judgment. By modern idealism this abstract, logical timelessness of validity as such has, for obvious reasons, been construed as the Eternity of an Absolute Mind whose self-fulfilling judgments are the truth; and this Mind is further described as an all-embracing experience. But in this combination of Platonistic eternalism with 'concrete' idealism self-contradiction arises; for it requires us to predicate genuine eternity (*i. e.*, simultaneous completeness) and genuine succession of the same experience-content. The second, or distinctively Kantian, argument for eternalism contends that succession can be conceivably apprehended, even in our experience, only if the moments of it be presented at once in the synthetic unity of a single act of representation; and that hence the whole content of temporal succession, in so far as it is empirically real, must be present as a *totum simul* in a single Eternal Consciousness. This argument, however, neglects the distinctive inner *quale* of our time-experience. If succession were merely thought about, the argument would hold; but in fact, succession is also lived through. It is not only known *in* experience, but is also predicable *of* experience; we have not merely a perception of succession, but also a succession of perceptions. The second argument for eternalism can be accepted only by those who deny the reality of this fact of actual succession, and who assert that future time as proleptically thought of is identical with that time as empirically present. This, however, appears an absurdity; and thus the two principal arguments for eternalism fall to the ground.

F. J. E. WOODBRIDGE.

The problems concerning time in modern philosophy have been bound up with general conceptions of the mind's relation to the world, and these conceptions have, in their turn, been the conscious or unconscious result of the significant achievements

of knowledge at the times they were dominant. Under the influence of Newtonian physics, the mind's relation to the world was naturally thought of in spatial terms. The mind was conceived as reality's knower. As such it could comprehend at any moment of time a certain amount of a whole which, as contrasted with it, existed all at once. It was thus possible to conceive experience as a time-span, which, as it enlarged, tended to approach an absolute (experience) as its limit. This view appears to have motived the problems of time and eternity in most of the idealistic philosophy of modern times. Current philosophy is under the influence of Darwinian, biological, and evolutionary ideas. These ideas lead to the view that mind is an incident in the development of the world. This view tends to remove the problem of time from the position of a peculiarly epistemological problem. As evolution presents the idea of a world genuinely growing, it makes it difficult to conceive experience to be a time-span's approach towards an absolute. It is more natural to think of experience as an incident in the world's history with antecedents and consequences, but without reference to an outside or other. The contrast thus presented between mind as the knower of a reality in itself absolute, and mind as an incident in the world's history, appears to be the basal contrast in current controversies.

[Professor Royce's paper, which also formed part of the Discussion, will appear in *The International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1910, under the title, "The Reality of the Temporal."]

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(Members are requested to notify the Secretary of any correction to be made in the above list.)

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

The Eternal Values. By HUGO MÜNSTERBERG. Boston and New York, 1909. — pp. xiv, 436.

While this book is not a translation of its author's *Philosophie der Werte*, it is sufficiently a reproduction of the latter to make unnecessary a new detailed review after the exhaustive and admirable criticism already published in this REVIEW, March, 1909. Consequently I shall only touch on a number of points bearing on the general problem of the logic of absolutistic philosophies, most of these points having been dealt with in the course of Professor Taylor's review, though from a different standpoint, and with a different emphasis.

In the first place, the same difficulty attaches to absolutistic voluntarism as to every type of thoroughgoing monism. When any one phase or factor of the experienced world is generalized to the point of being treated as Ultimate, as the 'Real' which explains all else, that ultimate loses all distinguishing or differential character, and hence becomes useless for explaining anything. Logically all ultimates are alike; the difference between the Unconscious of von Hartmann, the Unknowable of Spencer, the Will of Schopenhauer, and the Thought or Self-consciousness of some of the Neo-Hegelians is not an intellectually definable difference. The difference would be merely verbal were it not that associations carried over from the concrete experiences to which the Ultimate is set in contrast, and the emotional attitudes of writer and reader carry us to a certain result independent of the premise and of the logical procedure. Even the most casual reader of Münsterberg is struck with the profusion of the use of Will (and its synonyms) as a term of characterization and explanation. If the uncasual reader will take a number of specimen pages, and ask why the term Will is used rather than the term Unconscious, or *Idee*, or Unknowable Absolute; and whether the procedure, as distinct from the flavor of the outcome, would suffer if any one of these terms were substituted, he will better appreciate the meaning of my criticism. The voice may remind us of Fichte, but the body, as well as the hand, seem that of Schelling.

This suggests my second point of criticism. That Münsterberg insists constantly on the self-identical nature of Will is a natural con-

sequence of his Absolutistic logic — yet differences exist and have to be accounted for. Are they accounted for or are they only assumed, and assumed in a *way* which contradicts the Ultimate principle? To bring empirical diversities into the discussion would beg the question from the Münsterbergian standpoint; but we may at least consider differences that are essential to his own standpoint. Differences in Eternal Values themselves are asserted, implying differences in manifesting 'Will' and in our acknowledging attitudes. Consider, for example, the difference between Beauty-Value and Person-Value. The "isolated" or self-sufficient character of the Expression of Will in Beauty is familiar to all readers of Münsterberg. How does the Will that constitutes (or acknowledges) Person-Values differ? Because in the latter case, the Will takes "*new* attitudes towards *new* goals as the identical Will" (p. 112, italics mine). The introduction of novelty is indispensable, as any one will see who reads the discussion. The Will being self-identical the difference (of novelty) necessary to differentiate Person from Beauty is sought in new objects and goals, and these reflect themselves in new attitudes of Will — *i. e.*, genuine differences are carried back into Will itself.

I do not find anything but assumption, and a self-contradictory one, in such procedure. Identity is asserted when needed; differences are asserted when needed, and then *their* identity is asserted when needful. For example, "it [the 'identical will'] is a subjective self-continuity which as such is *untemporal*, and which *eternally* binds all particular acts of the individual" (p. 112, italics mine). I do not raise merely the question as to the possible meaning of this combination of the 'untemporal' and the 'novel,' although any method by which the 'novel' and the 'untemporal' may be combined in the same concept completely escapes me. More especially, I cite this union of Will as "eternally binding" particular acts and yet necessarily manifesting itself in particular acts which are genuinely diverse (because novel), as an instance of begging the problem of harmonizing identity and difference instead of solving it. Only just *taking* difference (novelty) when it is needed saves the entire universe (Persons and all) from relapsing into a case of all-embracing Beauty.

The difficulty is enhanced to my mind rather than removed by the fact that Münsterberg regards it as a caricature of his position to suppose that the Eternal Values form an eternally existing world which we simply discover or reproduce. On the contrary they "are tasks of a world which we are building" (*e. g.*, p. 166. And in his *Science and Idealism*, p. 28, he proclaimed it a caricature of his position to sup-

pose that "the world of mathematical facts which the mathematician discovers . . . exist somewhere ready-made and finished beforehand"). In some cases at least, Will is inherently a will to 'otherness,' so that development, progress, achieving are genuine traits of reality. It is futile, however, to suppose that progress or development can be established by science or by history, since science knows only self-sufficient mechanism and history only a fixed teleology. It is because to be "material of *human deed* is the absolutely necessary purpose without which we cannot think that nature which we find in our real life" (p. 274, italics mine) that we are justified in giving validity to the notion of progress. — But as such a statement inevitably raises the query whether this "absolutely necessary purpose" is necessary in any other than an individual and subjective sense, it is then asserted that the "absolutely valid value" of development lies "*exclusively* in the fact that nature in its development realizes *itself*, is loyal to its *own* purpose, fulfils its *own* intention," so that the "will to be tool of man, material of his deed, must be conceived therefore, as the objective character of nature" (p. 274, italics mine). I cannot find in this method of treatment anything but a reasoning in a circle that emphasizes this or that aspect of a self-contradictory situation according to the need of the argument. And, of course, the point of my criticism is not that Münsterburg, *qua* Münsterberg, is especially given to self-contradiction, but that the inconsistencies cited illustrate intrinsic implications of every philosophy that professes Ultimates, Absolutes, and Eternals.

At one point, however, Münsterberg's version of absolutism has special difficulties of its own. As Professor Taylor noted, Münsterberg is given to pigeon-holing and to making distinctions sharp, hard and fast. The fluent dialectic of Hegel, with its principle of negativity, furnishes a technique for 'reconciling' an Ultimate to diversity and change with less awkwardness than the strictly compartmental method of Münsterberg. The sharp separations of science from real life, of physical science from psychology, of both from history, and of knowledge, history, and psychology from art, the separation of acknowledgment with respect to the "inner life" from acknowledgment in the realm of Beauty and of Persons, and the separation of history from progress are all fraught with problems. The special difficulty I wish to consider is how and where upon this compartmental scheme, philosophy comes in — any philosophy in general, the philosophy under consideration in particular. On the face of it, philosophy is a branch of knowledge or of art, or of some combination of the two. But in *this* philosophy,

knowledge and art have been so defined that these conceptions are ruled out. If philosophy represents a peculiar form of the will-to-value, or of acknowledgment of will-values, how in the case of a given philosophy can we discriminate between a product of those subjective individual desires which are so obnoxious and a product of the over-individual will which is so eternally valid? A philosophy may be couched in terms of The Eternal Values and yet not be a case of, or exemplification of the subject of its discourse. In the end I see no reason which can be urged for the acceptance of a philosophy of the type of the one before us save that its author desires this sort of philosophy, and desires us to accept it. And when I find the philosophy running counter both to my sense of logic and my desires, I am totally without a criterion for deciding whether my desires or the author's have the indispensable over-individual quality. And barring some authoritative direct revelation of the over-individual will, I see no way of attaining the needed criterion.

This way of putting the matter may seem flippant. If such be the case, the matter at issue can be put equally well in the terms of Münsterberg's own system, and indeed in his own words. On his last page of text (p. 430) we read: "This eternal unity of outer world and fellow-world and inner world . . . would never have been possible if they were not all flowing from the same eternal absolute deed of the over-self. That this over-self is real . . . no knowledge can teach us. This certainty is founded on the rock of conviction. . . . But this conviction itself is ultimately our own deed." If the conviction is our own deed and the matter of the conviction is the character of the eternal and absolute Real, it is a point of some importance that we perform the right deed. Where in the argument, without going in the dizzy circle, is such assurance guaranteed? We may continue with our author: "We cannot leave this deed undone unless we are to sacrifice ourselves, as only through this deed our total world of willing is formed into a unity." But the difficulty recurs. If my will is subjective it can hardly validly ensure an absolute and eternal over-self, simply because that is necessary to *its* unity. And how do I get the assurance that in willing this conviction my will is not at its climacteric of subjectivity? Many individuals find that only in the most subjectivistic and relativistic of moments do they incline to will such a conviction, and that when they face objective values in their concrete objectivity their wills take a more chastened and humble attitude. I do not say this will-attitude is *the* objectively valid one of the two, but I ask how (in the terms of the Münster-

bergian philosophy) can we have any criterion for passing upon the objectivity and validity of these opposed types of will-deeds?

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Die Philosophie des Spinoza im Lichte der Kritik. Von FRANZ ERHARDT, Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Rostock. Leipzig, O. R. Reisland, 1908. — pp. viii, 502.

According to Professor Erhardt the spread of the pantheistic conception of the universe among philosophers, scientists, and theologians has its ultimate origin in the Spinozistic system. Its parallelism has taken possession of psychology, its mechanism and hostility to teleology have given aid and comfort to the enemy. The modern historians of philosophy all speak with enthusiasm of the man and with admiration of his thought; he is a thinker of unique significance, the author of a system surpassing all others. Under these circumstances, Professor Erhardt thinks, it is necessary to raise the question of the value and truth of the system, and not merely to treat it historically. He therefore proposes to subject it to careful criticism, to assume the same attitude toward it that one would assume toward any other system claiming a hearing in the court of the present. He divides his book into two parts, the first (pp. 67–195) containing the Formal Criticism, or the criticism of the method followed by Spinoza; and the second (pp. 196–465), the Material Criticism, or the criticism of the content of the philosophy. In an Introduction (pp. 1–66) and in an Appendix (pp. 466–502) he gives the results of his careful and thorough investigations of the Spinoza literature, the Introduction presenting a connected survey of the fortunes of Spinozism from its beginnings down to the present; the Appendix supplementing this historical exposition with more detailed accounts and criticisms of particular works. These parts of the book represent an immense amount of painstaking and intelligent labor on the part of the author, and form a most valuable contribution to the history of Spinozism.

The results of Erhardt's criticism are not favorable to Spinoza. He raises many objections to the form as well as the matter of the system and for the most part rejects its teachings, though recognizing the subjective greatness of the author. "I readily admit," he says, "his great importance and have no objection to his being reckoned among thinkers of the first rank; his system, however, I cannot rate so highly; and in spite of the greatness of the fundamental thought of the one substance, I cannot admit it as a system of the first rank, at

least not of the very first rank" (p. vi). We shall not enter upon the question of the relative greatness of Spinoza; such discussions are generally more or less fruitless. Whether or not he was himself a thinker of the first rank and his system not quite of the first rank, — the distinction has a meaning, which is perhaps best brought out on page 284, — his influence and standing in the history of thought are so great as to make unnecessary any apology for offering a thoroughgoing criticism of his work. Besides, one often learns more from critical expositions of a system than from colorless interpretations. Moreover, the problems discussed by Spinoza are important enough to make the searching critical examination of the solutions given by Professor Erhardt interesting and profitable; so that the book has value also as a contribution to philosophical thinking.

Most modern students of Spinoza will agree that the geometric-deductive method is not a suitable method for philosophy, and those who do not will certainly have some misgivings as to Spinoza's successful employment of the same, after reading the first part of Professor Erhardt's volume. The formal defects of the system were pointed out long ago by the contemporaries of the man, even those among them who viewed the deductive method with favor; but no one, to my knowledge, has offered so complete an analysis as is presented here. Professor Erhardt speaks not merely in general terms of criticism; he first describes the geometric method, shows how it is applied in geometry, why it is satisfactory there, and why it is not possible in philosophy. He then takes up the geometric proof in Part I of the *Ethics* (pp. 86–145), criticising the definitions, axioms, and propositions from the standpoint of methodology, and discusses the other portions of the *Ethics* in the same way in a third chapter (pp. 145–195). It is a laborious piece of work that is given here, one that tries the patience and often deadens the interest of the reader; but that is not the author's fault; the geometric method, as used by Spinoza, is not an exciting diversion, and it is not easy to follow all the formal shortcomings of the philosopher in his effort to present his doctrine in logic-proof form. Such a piece of work is a necessary answer to those who insist that Spinoza's is the most consistent system the human mind has ever constructed, and that its logic is invincible. As Professor Erhardt shows, the deductive method is untenable, not only in its geometric form, but in very principle; Spinoza could not have advanced in his thinking a single step if he had not constantly violated it, and even abandoned it entirely in certain parts of his *Ethics* (see page 176). However that may be, he certainly does

make a poor showing; the definitions and axioms are wholly unsuited to furnish a secure basis for a philosophical system. The definitions are not always clear as to meaning, most of them are objectionable in content, some of them being wholly or partially false; while the axioms are either tautologous or far from being self-evident. It is hard to see how a long line of firmly established propositions can be deduced from such insufficient presuppositions. But that is not all. There are fallacies in the argument; contradictory and ambiguous notions are employed; things to be proved are assumed; conclusions are drawn from unproved premises, and inferences are made which do not follow from their premises at all.

But the teachings are also open to serious objection on the material side, as Professor Erhardt points out in Part II, which forms the core of his book, and for the understanding of which the other part is by no means essential. In a number of chapters the conception of God, the philosophy of nature, the psychology and epistemology, and the ethics and the philosophy of religion, of Spinoza are subjected to a keen and for the most part just criticism. The objections offered in the book are, of course, not new — they are familiar to all students of Spinoza. The merit of the author consists in the detailed and thorough manner in which he handles the doctrines and the proofs; there is hardly a question of importance connected with the system that escapes his wary eye. I can do no more in this place than give some of the results reached by him. So far as Spinoza's knowledge of God is concerned, it turns out to be precarious and small. Starting with the conviction that we have an adequate knowledge of God, he is forced to confess at last that it is incomplete. Indeed, the notion of such an adequate knowledge is wholly inconsistent with his own principles. At any rate we cannot *deduce* either the existence or nature of God from his mere concept. Experience leads us to only two attributes; of those we do not know what thinking is at all, while the attribute of infinite extension proves to be essenceless and inefficient. Of the other countless attributes we remain in absolute ignorance. Moreover, the existence of a divine intellect is emphatically denied on the one hand, and mentioned as a self-evident fact on the other. This, however, Professor Erhardt regards as a mere verbal contradiction; Spinoza simply uses the traditional theistic language and interprets it in his own way. There can be no doubt that he means to deny intellect and will to the world-ground. A God, however, that does not possess intellect and will hardly deserves the name of God, and sinks to the level of a blind agency which it is impossible to conceive as having produced the given world.

The adoption of the geometric method leads Spinoza to conceive the world as a necessary logical consequence of the essence of God. But he cannot and does not consistently carry out this notion: God is not merely the logical ground, but the real or causal principle. But even so, it is impossible for him to deduce the world-content from the idea of God. It is true, he speaks of the attributes as 'powers'; and infinite thinking can be conceived dynamically; but extension cannot be so conceived even by making it an attribute of God: space cannot produce anything. Nor can the psychical phenomena be deduced from the attribute of thought. Interposing infinite modes between the particular things and the infinite attributes does not mend matters; they do not bridge the chasm. Besides, Professor Erhardt thinks, there is no exact parallelism between the infinite mode of thought and the infinite mode of extension: motion and rest.

Still, this may be merely a methodological weakness of the system: God may be the real cause of things, nonetheless. We know that Spinoza conceives God as the immanent cause, not as the transient cause; things, therefore, it has been argued, have no substantiality or independence for Spinoza; they are submerged in God. There are passages in favor of such an acosmistic interpretation. But those passages are not very numerous, and they contradict the entire spirit of Spinoza's philosophy. It is the direct opposite of acosmism; it is naturalism, even atheism. God's essence and activity is expressed solely in the particular things and does not possess a reality separate and distinct from them. That means that the notion of God is wholly superfluous and an unwarranted addition to the concept of the universe, which in itself consists of nothing but the sum of particular things. A God that coincides with the universe does not deserve the name. It is no wonder the system was called atheistic. But this is really going too far, for Spinoza did not develop his thought as logically and consistently as may seem. He vacillated between four or five different conceptions of God, without, perhaps, being aware of the opposition between them. His real meaning was most likely this: there is a unified substance underlying the world and to be distinguished from the mere sum of particular things. But he spoils the thought by saying that the substance consists of its attributes and by declaring in direct opposition to this, that all difference of attributes is abolished in the unity of substance, thereby making the substance a mere quality-less x, out of which the given reality can certainly not be derived. The substance must be regarded as the unified subject of the attributes belonging to it as such and *realiter*. Unfortunately, this notion is to

be read between the lines only, rather than clearly and distinctly expressed. At any rate, we cannot adhere to the idea of a divine world substance as the sum of particular things. If a mere plurality of things is original and ultimate, we have independent substances, and there looms up the riddle of explaining the relations between them. The riddle disappears if we assume a unified substance as the ultimate cause of the different things. It was no merit of Spinoza's to have reduced the plurality of things to a unitary world ground; that is an old thought and has been supported by better proof than by his. But it was largely an original contribution of Spinoza's to have conceived this unified world-ground also as the sole world-substance. This is the kernel of his system and an idea of extraordinary significance, representing a real advance in philosophical thought. We may admit this even if we do not regard the doctrine itself as tenable or the way it has been worked out; for in philosophy the new and ingenious solution of a difficult problem is nearly always an advance.

It is largely owing to its naturalistic character that Spinoza's pantheism is scientifically inferior to other such systems and fails to do justice to a large number of facts. Pantheism is not necessarily naturalistic; God can be conceived as a spiritual being; a God that has neither will nor intellect, nor acts according to purposes, becomes a naturalistic principle not deserving the name of God. The proper appellation for such a view is naturalistic monism or monistic naturalism. There is also a tendency to identify God and nature as the mere sum-total of all particular things — pluralism, or individualism, — but it is not prominent enough to allow us to change the label of the system.

Spinoza's philosophy of nature is mechanism, which he borrowed from Descartes, and which he makes no attempt to prove, regarding it as a settled fact. Professor Erhardt brings to bear against it the usual arguments against the one-sided mechanical explanation of the universe, and shows the weakness in Spinoza's objections to teleology (pp. 289–319). He then enters upon a detailed examination and criticism of the psychological doctrines of Spinoza (pp. 319–369), pointing out the defects of his intellectualism and his theory of the passions, and declaring his identity theory and his parallelism to be among the most untenable and erroneous theories ever set up in philosophy. He also discovers the inconsistencies and inadequacies of his theory of knowledge (pp. 369–391), and characterizes it as one of the most incomplete and unsuccessful parts of his system, — which it certainly is.

The climax of the system is reached in the philosophy of religion (pp. 432–439). The notion of God stands at the beginning and end of the Spinozistic philosophy: the first part of the *Ethics* aims at a theoretical knowledge of God, the last part deals with our practical relation to God; our freedom and happiness consist in the eternal love of God or the love of God for men. There is an apparent contradiction in the doctrine: on the one hand Spinoza denies all feelings of love and hate to God, and yet he speaks of the love of God for himself and for men. The contradiction can only be removed by supposing Spinoza to mean by God's love of himself and of man, certain forms of human love, which from the pantheistic standpoint of the *Ethics* is love of God. It would have been better if he had not made use of this concept and had not given the impression that this term had a legitimate place in his system. The fact is, he could not bring himself to give up a term that had played so great a rôle in traditional religion and metaphysics.

Professor Erhardt summarizes his results in the Conclusion (pp. 440–465). He refers to the "quantitative inadequacy" of the system: it is not a complete and elaborate system at all, but only the outline of a system. A system of the first rank must possess a certain completeness and thoroughness; but Spinoza has not worked out a single philosophical discipline. To be sure, we should not emphasize this fact if the quality of his philosophy appealed to us more favorably: if there were not such serious objections to be made to most of his teachings. This deficiency is not removed by referring to his great consistency as a thinker. The value of philosophical creations does not depend primarily on their consistency, and, besides, Spinoza's system is not remarkable for its consistency. On the formal side its consistency leaves much to be desired and is often lacking as to the content of the teaching. Its basal defect consists in its inability to deduce from the concept of God as the infinite substance his properties and the world-content. It is inconsistent and contradictory to deny intellect and will to God and at the same time to give him the attribute of thinking. It is contradictory to place the highest goal of human striving in the love of God and at the same time to rob him of all the qualities capable of inspiring such love. His psychology is not consistent; besides his theory of identity and his parallelism he presents two other views contradictory of the main view and of each other; the one betraying a decided materialistic tinge, the other emphasizing the independence of the soul in a dualistic-spiritualistic sense. There are contradictions also in his deter-

minism and in his ethical principles. There is no reason to call him particularly consistent for deriving a naturalistic world-view from naturalistic presuppositions; Haeckel has done that. Indeed, we may blame Spinoza for his obstinate adherence to his theories, nearly all of which contradict experience.

Perhaps Spinoza would have avoided some of these inconsistencies if he had pursued only scientific and theoretical ends. But his thinking was primarily guided by practical and religious interests. The highest problem of philosophy is not to tell us what to do to be saved. The final function of philosophy is to become 'pure subject of knowledge,' 'pure world-eye,' in order to mirror reality as faithfully and objectively as possible. Spinoza did not wholly succeed in preventing practical tendencies from influencing his theoretical investigations.

In order to gain an objective judgment of the value of Spinoza's work, we must also remember his historical dependence. His originality does not consist in his having offered brand new thoughts, but rather in his having developed and combined in his own way thoughts which had already existed in less developed form or in different combinations.

In short, in the opinion of Professor Erhardt, it is only a question of time when the world will cease to accord to the philosophy of Spinoza the importance which it has claimed since the eighteenth century.

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The Works of Aristotle. Translated into English under the editorship of J. A. SMITH and W. D. ROSS. Vol. VIII. *Metaphysica*, by W. D. ROSS. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1908. — pp. xv, 308.

It is a striking illustration of the fact that Germany alone among the leading nations of to-day manifests a living interest in speculative philosophy that hitherto it has not been possible to find a good translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics in any modern language save German. To say nothing of less important translations, the Germans have given us those of Schwegler (1847), Bonitz (1890), Rolfes (1904), and Lasson (1907). In French we have those of Pierron and Zevort (1840–41), and Barthélemy-St. Hilaire (1878), both of which leave much to be desired; in Italian, the unfinished translation of Bonghi (1854); in English, of the whole, only those of T. Taylor (1801) and MacMahon (1848), although translations of some of the books

have appeared separately. Of Taylor's and MacMahon's translations the best that can be said is that they are in the main unintelligible.

This reproach upon English-speaking students of philosophy Balliol College, Oxford, has removed. Professor Jowett bequeathed to the college the copyright of his works and the income is now being employed, in accordance with Professor Jowett's expressed wish, in the publication of a series of translations of the works of Aristotle. Of this series the *Metaphysics* is the first to see the light.

The general plan of the series calls for nothing more than a translation "such as a scholar might construct in preparation for a critical edition and commentary" and "the translation will not presuppose any critical reconstitution of the text." Mr. Ross states that he has followed the text of Christ in the main and has mentioned in the notes all divergences from his readings. Examination of the notes, however, shows that he has subjected the text to a careful revision and has displayed sound judgment in the modifications which he has made in it.

Mr. Ross is less disposed than Christ to rely upon Alexander, is inclined to prefer A^b to E, and rejects many of the conjectural emendations adopted by Christ. He introduces others, some original and others derived from various sources; they are seldom radical and some are very attractive. In the first six books for example he diverges from Christ's text in 66 instances. In 25 he follows A^b where Christ follows E and in 10 follows E where Christ follows A^b. He rejects 9 emendations drawn from Alexander, one from Asclepius, and one reading of T. He also rejects six of Christ's conjectural emendations. He introduces one reading from Alexander (987*a*10) and 13 conjectural emendations, two of which seem to be supported by Alexander. Of these, four (981*a*12, 985*b*18, 995*a*27, 1003*b*28), are of minor importance; four (985*b*9, 993*a*16, 1003*b*30, 1019*b*7), are attempts to make sense of unintelligible passages but are not commended by intrinsic considerations; five (988*b*28, 998*b*1, 999*a*27, 1014*a*17, 1021*a*22), are remarkably good.

The translation is couched in graceful and idiomatic English and is nearly always faithful to the text. How difficult it is to render into good English Aristotle's terse and pithy language those can best appreciate who have themselves essayed the task, and none of them will fail to acknowledge Mr. Ross' brilliant success. Yet it goes without saying that not all students of the Metaphysics will approve all the canons of translation which Mr. Ross seems to have laid down for his guidance, or accept all the interpretations which have determined his

rendering of individual passages. Points of this type to which I would direct attention are (1) the treatment of the technical terms, and (2) the introduction into the text of matter intended either to fill up the innumerable lacunæ in the expression of Aristotle's thought or to indicate the probable interpretation of passages otherwise unintelligible to the average reader.

Aristotle's technical terms are the key to his whole system of thinking. Many of them are apparently of his own coinage, and most of those which he has taken from other thinkers or from common speech bear the marks of his reflection. Few of them can be represented by any single English word with any approach to accuracy. Mr. Ross does not seem to observe any very definite principles in his treatment of these terms. He usually, or very generally, adheres to one equivalent, as "substance" for *οὐσία*, "essence" for *τί ἦν εἶναι*, but sometimes uses another without discernible reason, and the equivalents chosen not infrequently fail to express the meaning with all the accuracy possible. Thus "formula," which is used quite consistently for *λόγος*, suggests just that rigid connection between the words and a single meaning which *λόγος* in general conspicuously lacks. — *λέγεσθαι κατά* with the accusative very frequently means "is termed (or is said to be) so and so with reference to," or "is defined by reference to," or "its definition involves." Thus *τὰ καθ' ἕν λεγόμενα* is used in particular of the members of a class or the species of a genus. Mr. Ross renders it (1005*a*5) "have a common notion," (1030*b*3) "with a single meaning" (1004*a*24) *καθ' ἕν · · · οἱ λόγοι ἀναφέρονται* "their definitions are identical." In these cases the formula means that their definitions *contain* a common notion. The parallel passage (1004*a*18) *λέγεται ἢ κατὰ ταῦτα κτλ.* is more accurately expressed "is derived from." So also (1039*b*10) *οὐ γὰρ κατ' ἄλλο λέγεται* does not mean, "it is not dependent on anything else," but, "it is not defined by reference to any other (genus)."

Quite similar is the meaning of *κατ' ἀριθμὸν λέγεσθαι* in the discussion of relatives, *Δ*. 15. It means "can be defined by reference to number," hence "can be represented as a number." The passage runs as follows:

1020b 32[1] *λέγεται δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα κατ'*
ἀριθμὸν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ὡρισμένον πρὸς αὑτοὺς ἢ πρὸς ἕν, οἷον
τὸ μὲν διπλάσιον πρὸς ἓν ἀριθμὸς ὡρισμένος πρὸς ἕν, τὸ δὲ πολλα-
35 *πλάσιον κατ' ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἓν οὐχ ὡρισμένον δέ, οἷον τόνδε*

[1] Read l. 33 *ὡρισμένον* with A^bE; *ὡρισμένως* Alex. Ecorr. Chr. Ross. *πρὸς αὑτούς*; *πρὸς αὐτοὺς* codd. edd. l. 34 *ὡρισμένος πρὸς ἕν* A^b; om. *πρὸς ἕν* E. Chr. Ross.

1021a ἢ τόνδε· τὸ δὲ ἡμιόλιον πρὸς τό ἡμιόλιον κατ' ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ὡρισμένον· τὸ δ' ἐπιμόριον πρὸς τὸ ἐπεπιμόριον κατὰ ἀόριστον, ὥσπερ τὸ πολ᾽απλάσιον πρὸς τὸ ἐν κτλ.

Ross.

(1) Relative terms of the first kind are numerically related either indefinitely or definitely, either to various numbers or to 1, *e. g.* the double is in a definite numerical relation to 1, and that which is 'many times as great' is in a numerical, but not in a definite relation to 1, *i. e.* not in this or that relation to it; the relation of that which is $\frac{3}{2}$ of something else to that something is a definite numerical relation to a number; that which is $\frac{n+1}{n}$ times something else is in an indefinite relation to that something, as that which is 'many times as great' is in an indefinite relation to 1; etc.

N.

The first (named relatives) can be represented as numbers, either (as 'numbers') without specification (of what numbers) or as numbers defined with reference each to the other or to 1. For example, 'the double' in relation to 1 is a number defined by reference to 1 (*i. e.*, 2), while 'the multiple' in relation to 1 can be represented as 'a number' but not as a definite number such as this or that. 'Three halves' in relation to 'two thirds of itself' can be represented as a number defined by reference to (another) number (*i. e.*, 3 to 2), but 'the superparticular' in relation to 'its own subsuperparticular' can be represented (only) as a number undefined (by its relation to the other number *i. e.*, $n+1$ to n), like the 'multiple' to the 1.

Another term of very great importance in Aristotle's system is εἶναι with the dative, which appears when generalized as τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. It primarily signifies the "being" of the thing — that which it really and objectively is. But, since the principle that knowledge and its object (ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν) are identical is fundamental in Aristotle's epistemology, the formula also denotes the essential signification or content of the word put in the dative, and sometimes, as when the term is used of a thing which had, according to Aristotle, no real and substantive existence of its own, *e. g.*, τὸ στοιχείῳ εἶναι, τὸ ἐνὶ εἶναι, τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι, the latter connotation alone is appropriate. The first sense may generally be expressed by "the being of" and the second by "the content of," but it is often desirable to express shades of meaning suggested in the context by prefixing such adjectives as (real), (conceptual), (essential) to the one or the other. Mr. Ross generally represents this term by "essence," sometimes by "being of."

Mr. Ross occasionally supplements Aristotle's elliptical mode of

speech by adding a few words in brackets. The extent to which this method of making the sense clearer should be employed is of course a matter of taste and judgment. I would carry its use much further than Mr. Ross has seen fit to do. One or two illustrations will suffice to show what it can accomplish.

That very difficult and important chapter Z. 6 discusses the fundamental problem of Academic epistemology: Is the real thing identical with the rational content whereby it becomes known to consciousness, or not?

1031a 15 *πότερον δὲ ταὐτὸν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον, σκεπτέον. ἔστι γάρ τι πρὸ ἔργου πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας σκέψιν· ἕκαστόν τε γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλο δοκεῖ εἶναι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγεται εἶναι ἡ ἑκάστου οὐσία. ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν λεγομένων κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δόξειεν* 20 *ἂν ἕτερον εἶναι, οἷον λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος ἕτερον καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ αὐτό· τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὡς φασίν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ. ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ὅσα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἶναι* 25 *ταὐτά. οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως τὰ ἄκρα γίγνεται ταὐτά· ἀλλ' ἴσως γ' ἐκεῖνο δόξειεν ἂν συμβαίνειν, τὰ ἄκρα γίγνεσθαι ταὐτὰ τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μουσικῷ εἶναι· δοκεῖ δ' οὔ.*

Ross.

We must inquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or different. This is of some use for the inquiry concerning substance; for each thing is thought to be not different from its substance, and the essence is said to be the substance of each thing.

Now in the case of things with accidental attributes the two would be generally thought to be different, *e. g.*, white man would be thought to be different from the essence of white man. For if they are the same, the essence of man and that of white man are also the same; for a man and a white man are the same, as people say, so that the essence of white man and that of man would be also the same. But probably it is no

N.

We must inquire whether the (essential) content and the individual are the same or different, for it is of some advantage to the inquiry concerning the reality, since the individual is generally regarded as not other than its own reality and also the (essential) content is said to be the reality of the individual.

Now in case of things incidentally designated (the thing) would be generally regarded as other (than the content of the term employ d), for example, a white man is other than the content of 'white man.' For if they are the same, the content of 'man' and that of 'white man' are the same, for man and white man are the same — so say (our friends)

necessary that a *subject + an accident* should be the same as its essence. For the extreme terms are not in the same way identified with the middle term. — Perhaps *this* might be thought to follow, that the extreme terms, the accidents, should turn out to be the same, *e. g.* the essence of white and that of musical; but this is not actually thought to be the case.

hence, the content of 'white man' and that of 'man' (are) also (the same). But it is not necessary that (the contents of) all (terms employed to designate) incidentally (one thing) should be identical (with the content of that which designates it essentially) for the extreme (terms in the above illustration, content of man and content of 'white man') are not identified (with the man) in the same way. Possibly however (our learned friends) might accept the inference that the (contents of the) extreme (terms) which (designate the thing) incidentally, such as the content of 'white' and that of 'musical' are proved identical. But they do not.

Mr. Ross' note on the above passage analyzes the argument in a series of syllogisms. This it is quite possible to do, but the passage ought to be intelligible as written.

The use of supplementary material in making a passage intelligible may be illustrated by one of Aristotle's arguments against the doctrine of Ideas. It may well be that the interpretation here incorporated into the text is erroneous, for the passage is very obscure, but some meaning is better than none.

Z. 13. 1038*b* 16 * ἀλλ'

ἆρα οὕτω μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὡς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐνυπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ ζῷον ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππῳ; οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι τις αὐτοῦ λόγος; διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ
20 *πάντων λόγος ἔστι τῶν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον οὐσία τοῦτ' ἔσται τινός, ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει. ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ συμβήσεται πάλιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὐσία ἐκείνου [οὐσία, οἷον τὸ ζῷον,] ἐν ᾧ [εἶδει] ὡς ἴδιον ὑπάρχει.*

Ross.

But perhaps the universal, while it cannot be substance in the way in which the essence is so, can be present in this, *e. g.*, 'animal' can be present in 'man' and

N.

Then (the universal) cannot (be the reality of all members of a class of things) in the sense in which the conceptual being (of each member is its reality); (can

* I have placed an interrogation point instead of a period after (19) *λόγος* and have bracketed (23) [*οὐσία, οἷον τὸ ζῷον*].

'horse.' Then clearly there is a formula of the universal. And it makes no difference even if there is not a formula of everything that is in the substance; for none the less the universal will be the substance of something. 'Man' is the substance of the individual man in whom it is present; therefore the same will happen again; for a substance, *e. g.* 'animal,' must be the substance of that in which it is present as something peculiar to it.

it) however *exist in* this (conceptual being and thus be its reality)? For example (the genus) 'animal' (exists) in the (conceptual being of) 'man' and (of) 'horse' — (can it be their reality?). Is it not clear that there is a definition of 'animal' (as well as of 'man' or 'horse' and that therefore the same reasoning which led us from 'man' to 'animal' will lead us from 'animal' to its higher genera)? Nor is our argument affected even if not all the components of the reality (as the higher genera of 'animal') possess a definition, for none the less this (indefinable, highest genus at which we shall ultimately arrive) will be the reality of something (*i. e.*, of the species next below it) in the way in which the (species) 'man' is (the reality) of (the individual) man in whom it exists, and so the same (difficulty with which we have dealt in the preceding paragraph) again confronts us, for (the genus in question) will be (the) reality [gloss: "reality" *e. g.*, the 'animal'] of that in which [gloss: species] as (its) characteristic (constituent) it exists.

Yet any such criticism of this translation as may be compressed within the narrow limits of a review is in a sense captious and unfair — captious, because it seizes upon a few blemishes in a work of great magnitude and difficulty, and unfair, because the reader might regard them as typical of the whole. As a whole, Mr. Ross's translation is a masterly achievement, well worthy of a place on the shelf beside Jowett's Plato.

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Valuation: *Its Nature and Laws.* Being an Introduction to the General Theory of Value. By WILBUR MARSHALL URBAN. (Library of Philosophy. Edited by J. H. Muirhead.) London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1909. — pp. xviii, 433.

The revolt against any traditional tendency in philosophy is likely to assume picturesquely different forms. Certainly this has been, and remains, true of the unmistakable revolt against philosophical rationalism still in progress. On the one hand, it has led, — not necessarily in pragmatism as such, but in some of the excesses of pragmatism,— to a disposition to break through all technical barriers, particularly when the ultimate problems of philosophy are dealt with, while, on the other hand, in certain developments of the 'Philosophy of Value,' it has resulted in the most amazing accumulation of technicalities that has emerged from the troubled waters of recent philosophy. In truth, it may be said of the more ambitious of this second group of anti-rationalists that they have beaten the German idealists at their own game and have triumphantly developed a multiplicity of technicalities by the side of which the technicalities of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel often seem tame and obvious.

In a well-known passage Kant speaks somewhat disparagingly of examples as 'the go-cart of the judgment'; but, being a typical German (even the Scottish strain, which he himself accepted, is now, I believe, discredited), it did not occur to him that perversely ingenious distinctions and the resulting classifications might sometimes prove to be even less than 'go-carts' or anything else as useful. In fact, the tendency toward premature and artificial classification is perhaps the greatest weakness of the mainly robust and admirable German type of mind. Now the worst of an hereditary weakness is that it has no sense of justice: it is always likely to attack some really useful member of the community. Something of the kind seems to have happened in the case of the author of the present volume. It is needless for the reviewer to mention in detail the qualifications of Professor Urban for his difficult undertaking. Indeed, it would probably be within bounds to say that nobody writing in English has the same purely technical competence to deal systematically and critically with this important subject. None of the literature available at the time when the book was written seems to have escaped him; more than that, he has digested the heterogeneous material and reduced his own exposition to orderly and methodical form; better still, he has kept his head in the general confusion, learned from more than one school, and

come to conclusions which, if not highly original, at any rate show the results of the most painstaking investigation, — but, if one must be frank, he has written a sensible and learned book, on a subject of more than ordinary present interest, which it is almost impossible to read.

The fundamental defect is not quite easy to indicate. One might safely make the general charge of obscurity, but that is hardly the proper word. Indeed, 'obscurity' is a convenient blanket term which at best describes a result without indicating the cause. Professor Urban is not muddle-headed; nor is he painfully writing himself clear, as better men have done before. Moreover, he does not, so far as one can detect, shift his position appreciably as the argument proceeds. In fact, the whole treatment is rather too cut-and-dried, and the reader does not always feel that he is being let into the secret of how the author came to certain of his conclusions. The real difficulty seems to be that, aside from the very brief but clear and vigorous Preface, the whole book is written in a perverse, over-technical 'scientific' jargon that makes consecutive attention on the part of the reader almost impossible. Opening the volume practically at random, we read: "To this study of the significance of the minimum of characterisation in imputation of personal worth to the alter, should be added a word as to its reflex meaning for the self, in his feelings of personal worth as reflected in the sense of personal obligation" (p. 297). When academic teachers finally forsook a 'dead' language for their own living one, whatever that might be, the innovation was the prelude to strictly modern scholarship; but better even the use of a so-called 'dead' language than the deliberate employment of one that has never lived.

Professor Urban saves himself and his readers needless confusion at the outset by refusing to accept the sharp antithesis between 'appreciation' and 'description' which has become almost conventional in certain quarters. He says: "The antithesis between appreciation and description is . . . reducible to a distinction between two types of description, appreciative and scientific, and we may probably infer that there is at least an *appreciative* description of experiences of value. . . . Such description has as its object the communication and objectification of the intrinsic meaning of individual experience in the interest of facilitation, either conservation or increase, of appreciation." As to what can be thus communicated, "we find it to be certain references of the attitude beyond the present experience, meanings acquired in individual and social processes . . . They may

be described in general terms as *transgredient* and *immanental*. The transgredient reference, as expressed, for example, in such appreciative categories as obligation and desert, is a present feeling, but includes in it a reference beyond the present state. The immanental reference — as, for instance, the worth suggestions of æsthetic states — is a present state, referring, not beyond the present state, but to something more deeply implicit, something presupposed in it" (pp. 8–9).

So much for general standpoint; but now we come to an important question of method. It was in the interest of clearness to assume that there may be "at least an *appreciative* description of experiences of value"; for otherwise, of course, their technical treatment would seem impossible. But now the question arises: What is the relation between the proposed 'appreciative' description and ordinary 'scientific' description? We are not reassured when Professor Urban says, for example: "Strictly speaking there is no problem, scientific or unscientific, which does not have its psychological side" (p. 9). That way danger lies, the danger of hopeless confusion that has led eminent philosophical writers to insist upon the hard and fast distinction between 'appreciation' and 'description.' The author's meaning is perhaps better expressed when he says: "The question whether there is any relation between appreciative and scientific description is . . . the better known problem whether psychology should be a 'functional' or a 'content' psychology. For the latter a psychology of value is impossible; for the former it is possible, and what is more, a present fact" (pp. 12, 13). That there is a certain amount of truth in this contention may be admitted, though this is partly because functional psychology, in the hands of certain writers not primarily interested in psychology as such, has come to mean almost anything. But when Professor Urban further argues: "Values are facts, to be described as any other mental facts" (p. 13), the reader begins to suspect that he sees the fallacy. 'Facts' themselves, considered merely as such, are undoubtedly abstractions, but 'values' are as evidently abstractions of a different order, requiring essentially different treatment.

In his Preface, Professor Urban says: "The first six chapters, beginning with 'definition and analysis,' and culminating in the chapter on the general laws of valuation, seek to lay the foundations for an understanding of the different types of value judgments, their implications and their limits. . . . Chapters VII to XIII inclusive apply these results to a genetic and synthetic investigation of the consciousness of value from its lowest to its highest levels. . . . Finally, in Chapter XIV an attempt is made to show the bearing of these results on what I have ventured to call the *axiological* problem of evaluation. The

views which I have felt justified in presenting in the limited space of a single chapter represent but in outline certain philosophical conclusions to which the study of the phenomenology of valuation has led. The work was originally planned to be merely such a phenomenological study, and as such it must be judged . . . ."

In carrying out this rather ambitious program, Professor Urban exhibits a spirit of patience and thoroughness that, in itself, is worthy of all praise. Any mere indication of the successive steps of his laborious analysis or summary statement of his complicated results would be unprofitable, and, indeed, almost if not quite unintelligible; for the thoroughness we find here is too often of the kind that defeats itself. Analysis is always easier than synthesis; and analysis carried too far, without sufficient reference to the proposed synthesis, is only too likely to make ultimate synthesis impossible. By the time one reaches Chapters IX and X, on "Personal Worths," followed by two chapters on "Impersonal Over-Individual Values," one is staggering under such a weight of technicalities that the essential relations between the 'personal' and the (perhaps mis-named) 'impersonal' values become strangely elusive. In fact, it looks altogether too much as if 'personal' and 'impersonal' values had nothing to do with each other. But it is instructive to find that the real problems, when they finally come to be discussed, do not require the prodigious critical apparatus accumulated on the way. For they are essentially the old problems, not greatly clarified — if, indeed, clarified at all — by the new labels; and one must regret the too free use of the word 'law,' in cases where a technical term has been applied to a highly plausible familiar or unfamiliar generalization.

Ethics needs all the help it can receive, for we are coming to realize that its problems, so far from being the simplest, are actually the most complex that confront any science; but it may well be doubted if much help will come from this quarter. A 'Philosophy of Value' somewhat differently conceived may, indeed, contribute much; but its contribution must be something very different from an over-elaborate terminology. And there is no reason for pessimism. Ethics has outlived its entanglement with theology, metaphysics, and certain too helpful sciences that have been willing to assist by a process of 'benevolent assimilation.' It is to be hoped that functional psychology will not prove to be a more dangerous ally. All competent moralists, whatever their technical amliations, are at last soberly turning to concrete experience, the true subject-matter alike of all special sciences and of philosophy.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Idealism as a Practical Creed. Being the Lectures on Philosophy and Modern Life Delivered before the University of Sydney. By HENRY JONES. Glasgow, James Maclehose and Sons, 1909. — pp. ix, 299.

This little book, made up of seven public lectures, is a masterpiece in its own field. It presents the fundamental problems and issues of modern life in admirable literary form and oftentimes with rare eloquence, showing how the various difficulties which experience presents may be met and interpreted by the application of the principles that idealism takes as its guiding hypothesis. Philosophy, for Professor Jones, is something that has a vitally important function in relation to the thought of the time, and not a merely abstruse pursuit whose results are without practical significance. Moreover, in dealing with idealism, which the author regards as the form of philosophy most in touch with modern life, he emphasizes its unity with the other great intellectual movements of the time. "Its main hypotheses are being illustrated and made good in the sciences, especially in those which are biological and human; they are illumined in the greatest modern poetry, from Lessing and Goethe to Wordsworth and Browning; and they circulate in the arteries of our social and political life. There is a certain unanimity of endeavor and community of aspiration among the poets, philosophers, and reforming spirits of our times: they all make for Idealism" (p. 13). In modern thought this idealism is based on the notion of evolution. "There is no science, from Geology to Theology, which does not contemplate the object of its enquiry in its light. The old static, rigid, cataclysmic way of regarding objects is well-nigh obsolete. We do not consider that we understand anything rightly — nor plant, nor animal, nor man, nor even the fixed strata of the earth's crust, or the planet itself — till we can indicate its place in a process. . . . Poetry and philosophy, and even theology when it has the courage of its cause, take up the tale of natural science and continue it" (p. 23).

Lectures II, III and IV sketch the development of the consciousness of Freedom as it appears in the individual and the race — "first the Blade," "Then the Ear," "Then the Full Corn," as the chapter headings run. "The idea of Evolution is the hypothesis, the methodizing conception which we employ to render intelligible to ourselves the process which Spirit follows in becoming free" (p. 29). The guiding idea here is, of course, that of Hegel's philosophy of history, but the author's exposition is remarkably fresh and illuminating, drawing illustrations from many fields and connecting itself with fundamental moral issues.

In Lecture V, entitled "Wordsworth and Browning," Professor Jones turns

to poetry to find further confirmation and illustration of the idealistic interpretation of experience. While not ignoring the important distinction between poetry and philosophy, he nevertheless finds them essentially akin in their insight into the fundamental unity of things. Indeed, the distinction is easily exaggerated and is even apt to disappear when they are at their best. "There is much nonsense in the talk about philosophic 'system'—a parade of mechanical order where it does not exist. One would think that a philosophy is a mechanical contrivance, compact and complete; its parts morticed and jointed into premises and conclusions that can be pulled down and put up again at one's pleasure. But no system of philosophy ever answered such a description: not Plato's, or Aristotle's, or Kant's, or Hegel's, or even Spinoza's; for Spinoza's geometrical method is only surface show" (pp. 154–155). "Press as we may the distinction between the truth of poetry and the matter-of-fact of literal observation, which is the kind of truth that philosophy seeks, Wordsworth must still be regarded as a deliberate idealist and a very great one" (p. 161).

Lecture VI has the title "The Call of the Modern Age," and the concluding chapter gives "The Answer of Idealism." It is in this last lecture that one finds the most important discussion of idealism from a philosophical point of view. Brief as the treatment necessarily is, it might profitably be read by some of the recent critics of idealism who have failed to understand the more elaborate expositions of the doctrine they attack. Professor Jones does not ignore the ultimate difficulties which confront his theory, but in this general survey he is of course unable to do more than indicate the path by which he believes they may be overcome. Nevertheless, his eye for what is vital and concrete is so sure, and his grasp of speculative principles so firm as to make us eager for a fuller treatment from his pen of these ultimate questions. And indeed philosophy is always something more than 'a general point of view.' For, as Professor Jones knows well, philosophy differs from poetry in that it is called upon to justify its insight in logical detail. A general point of view requires to be made truly scientific and philosophical by being constantly redefined and applied to the concrete problems of developing experience.

J. E. C.

Darwin and the Humanities. By JAMES MARK BALDWIN. Baltimore, Review Publishing Co., 1909.—pp. xi, 118.

This little book, as the author tells us, has grown out of the revision and expansion of a paper on "The Influence of Darwin on the Mental and Moral Sciences," which was originally intended for the Darwin Celebration of the American Philosophical Society. "Personally," Professor Baldwin says in his preface, "I find it necessary as never before to call myself a 'Darwinian' simply from having written out in this little volume the relationships of the several branches of humanistic study, as I apprehend

them, from the point of view of Darwinism. . . . My favorite doctrines, and those in which my larger volumes have been in some measure original, seem now, when woven together, to have been consciously inspired by the theory of Natural Selection: I need only mention 'Organic Selection,' 'Functional Selection,' 'Social Heredity,' 'Selective Thinking,' 'Experimental Logic,' thorough-going 'Naturalism of Method,' etc. Such views as these all illustrate or extend the principle of selection as Darwin conceived it — that is, the principle of survival from varied cases — as over against any vitalistic or formal principle. . . . I think the conclusion drawn on page 87 of this volume, to the effect that natural selection is in principle the universal law of genetic organization and progress in nature — human nature no less than physical nature — is that to which the lines of evidence we now have distinctly point; and while this still has somewhat the appearance of a forecast, it is one of these reasonable forecasts which give life and interest to the progress of science and philosophy alike" (pp. viii, ix).

These conclusions will not surprise readers of Professor Baldwin's more elaborate treatises; and they will welcome this attempt to carry through and directly apply the principle of selection to the different fields of humanistic study, though recognizing that what is here presented is only an outline. The different chapters deal with: Darwinism in Relation to Psychology, the Social Sciences, Ethics, Logic, Philosophy and Religion. There are also two appended sections entitled respectively "Darwin's Judgment," and "Darwinism and Logic," the latter being a paper which originally appeared in the *Psychological Review* in reply to certain criticisms of the author's application of Darwinian principles to logic. Of these chapters perhaps that dealing with religion will appear least familiar to readers of Professor Baldwin's former writings, as it is perhaps also the most interesting and suggestive. What is characteristic throughout the book, however, is the repudiation of a mechanical interpretation of evolution, and of any attempt to explain the later modes of experience exclusively in terms of processes and categories which belong to an earlier stage.

"Every genetic change ushers in a real advance, a progression on the part of nature to a higher mode of reality. *Actually new things* — novelties — *are daily achieved in* life, *mind, and society;* results which we cannot interpret in terms of mere composition of the elements involved" (p. 87). "With the conception of an immanent principle of change, issuing in modes of reality which are progressively more and more significant for the demands of intelligence and life — the way is open for an interpretation of the world in terms of an organization of which *progressive self-integrating experience* is the type" (p. 88).

This is not the place for detailed discussion, but the two points which I have elsewhere urged in reference to Professor Baldwin's logical views may be set down here as applying to his more general conclusions: (1) Is it sufficient in distinguishing the genetic from the mechanical to insist on the "new things," which appear in the former series without exhibiting their

continuity with what preceded? And (2) does not a principle of organization whose type is found in "progressive self-integrating experience" carry us beyond Darwinism and the principle of natural selection?

J. E. C.

Le socialisme et la sociologie réformiste. Par ALFRED FOUILLÉE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. viii, 419.

The greatest problem left us by the nineteenth century is, M. Fouillée believes, the deep-rooted antagonism between the proletariat and the small capitalist class, an antagonism which has resulted from the revolution in industry caused by the introduction of machinery and from the concentration of wealth due to modern methods of finance. Economic individualism would solve this problem by the principles of a false philosophy which substitutes an abstraction — the 'economic' individual — for the real human person, and defines justice as the right of this individual to freely exchange his labor or the products of his labor for other products of equal value. Socialism, on the contrary, offers an utopian theory of society without adequate scientific basis, and deriving strength chiefly from its appeal to sentiments partly generous and partly selfish and envious.

According to the author of the present work, the solution of this problem is properly the task of a *sociologie réformiste*. Such a sociology will proceed on the principles laid down by Aug. Comte, who founded it on a secure scientific basis and believed that it should be given authority over political and economic administration. It will view all social problems in their proper historic perspective, recognizing that society in its evolution necessarily passes through three main stages: first, that of primitive social solidarity in which the individual is identified with the group — family, clan or tribe — without any consent on his part; second that in which the individual frees himself from the group, claims his rights and asserts his independence as an individual; and, third, that final synthetic stage in which all individuals are reunited in an organic system formed through their own volition because required for individual self-realization. In the present emergency sociology as a science is bound to reject the fallacies of both individualism and collectivism, and to determine the actual conditions under which the third and perfect type of social organization may be made possible. This end may be secured — M. Fouillée maintains — through the recognition of two principles, first that of the *organisme contractuel*, and, second, that of *justice reparative*. The conception of society as a contractual organism reconciles two opposing social theories. The one bases social organization upon psychological grounds and conceives it as the result of a more or less explicit agreement entered into voluntarily by the individuals concerned. The other asserts the basis of society to be biological, believing it to be rooted in a social instinct and thus a response to organic demands. An adequate social theory must combine the truth of these opposing views: understanding society as grounded upon an instinct

fundamental to human nature, which finds expression, however, in voluntary agreement and intelligent coöperation. As a logical implication of this conception of social organization, there follows the correlative principle of reparatory justice. If society is truly an organization, then in the interplay of organs — never perfectly adjusted — some parts will inevitably suffer, and it is the concern of the whole organism that these parts should be relieved and restored. And if — to state the same truth in other words — society is a voluntary association, then the universal discharge of the contractual obligation is certain to work to the disadvantage of some. It thus becomes the duty of society — and particularly so far as its intelligence and purpose are emphasized — to compensate these individuals for the ill they suffer. The present economic situation affords striking illustration of the need for, and rightfulness of, reparatory justice. The introduction of machinery, although a necessary step in social evolution, has nevertheless deprived many individuals of a large part of the product of their own labor and has also taken from them the control of the conditions under which they work. Now machinery is in no proper sense an individual possession, but a social instrument rightfully used by society for its own advancement. Since this is true, justice will compel society to make reparation for the ills which its use inflicts upon the worker, by intervening and securing for him a larger control over the conditions under which he toils and a greater share in the product of his labor. In his conclusion the author shows that a correct conception of society will not permit one to think of state and individual as so externally related that the power of the one can be increased only at the expense of the other. Rather do these opposites enter the social synthesis as complementary factors, each of which derives its meaning and reality from its other. The central power must be strengthened in order that the freedom of the individual may be preserved, and, conversely, the rights of the individuals must be preserved in order that the state attain closest unity and greatest power. In his ultimate social philosophy the author states his agreement with Hegel, except that he regards the social synthesis as a vital rather than a dialectical process.

The reviewer has here attempted to give only the fundamental tenets of Fouillée's social theory. The book contains a detailed critique of the principles and doctrines of socialism and also a brief discussion of new forms of communal effort such as the syndicate, coöperative enterprise, and state ownership of public utilities.

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Herbert Spencer's Grundlagen der Philosophie. Von P. HÄBERLIN. Leipzig, Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1908. — pp. iv, 205.

This treatise aims to supply what has been hitherto lacking in German philosophical literature — a critical study not of a particular portion of Spencer's philosophy but of the fundamental principles that underlie the

whole system. In pursuance of this purpose the author treats first of Spencer's view of the problem of philosophy, and then examines the various forms in which he presents his solution, as a doctrine of agnosticism, a law of the persistence of energy, and a theory of universal evolution. The final synthesis of these different aspects of Spencer's thought is discussed in a concluding chapter. Here the author maintains that Spencer failed to solve his problem, and dwells upon the many inconsistencies in his thought, leading back to the ultimate contradiction between the law of persistence of force first as a metaphysical principle identical with the permanence of the Absolute, and second as a scientific law of causal determination. The causes for this failure to achieve a final synthesis are found to be not primarily *logical*, residing in the nature of the concepts to be related, but *historico-psychological*, consisting of the various and conflicting tendencies at work in the mind of the philosopher due to his personality, early training, and intellectual experience.

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Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart. Von RUDOLF EUCKEN. Dritte, verbesserte und erweiterte Auflage. Berlin, Verlag von Reuther und Reichard, 1909. — pp. 172.

This — the third — edition of Eucken's Hauptprobleme is altered chiefly, as the preface states, in the way of a greater emphasis on the deficiencies of the historical forms of the church for meeting the religious needs of the present, and the necessity therefore for new forms of the religious life. The book, which is a collection of four lectures, is a remarkably penetrating analysis of religion — its foundation in human nature, the bearings of historical criticism upon it, the essential character of Christianity and its relation to the modern situation. Eucken's philosophy of religion is an attempt to avoid the defects both of the older tendency to deduce religion from metaphysics, and the modern danger that it may be swamped in a psychological subjectivism. Underlying his whole philosophy is the constant recognition of the fundamentally unitary, spontaneous character of inner spiritual personality. The proof of religion is to be found in this immediate character of personal experience, which, in the life of reason, truth, goodness, we discover in point of fact rising above a mere collection of powers and experiences, or a mere individual existence over against other things, to an intimate participation in an universal realm. This larger life present in us is the source of religion, and the sufficient guarantee of its validity — an experience whose true understanding makes it alike impossible to set off the human and divine in different spheres, or to dispense on the other hand altogether with a transcendent reality on which the interests of the spiritual life are grounded. Only relation to a universal world order can give to our inner demands a character other than that of mere ungrounded wishes and fancies, which in reality does away with religion

altogether. The basis of religion is thus personal, but it is not subjective. Such a conception meets the historical difficulty. It agrees that conditions will determine the form which the religious expression takes, but it is opposed to the modern attempt to reduce religion wholly to a complex of such external conditions. The inner and spontaneous genius by which the various discordant elements got from history are fused into a new ideal, is the one thing which the historical explaining away fails to reach. An admirable characterization of this inner spirit of Christianity is attempted in the third lecture. Perhaps the most acute and enlightening part of the book is the concluding survey of modern life and its ideals in their relation to religion. Eucken finds the typical modern spirit essentially in conflict with religion. It is subjective without any confidence in a universal order. In its opposition to the narrowness of the traditional religious interest it presses the demands of a many-sided culture, without however allowing the need of any fundamental reconstruction of its naturalistic basis, any break with the natural world of multitudinous separate interests. But in the resulting bankruptcy of religion — and this is the fatal defect in the modern tendency to set religion aside — there is an equal bankruptcy of the whole realm of values, which cannot maintain themselves on the soil of subjectivism and naturalism, — a result appearing clearly enough below the surface of most modern culture. The only hope lies in a return to religion, not indeed as a special department of experience, but as an underlying attitude toward the whole of life, although the religion of the future must take up and transform, rather than ignore, the results of culture which modern times have achieved.

A. K. Rogers.

Butler College.

The Problem of Human Life, as Viewed by the Great Thinkers from Plato to the Present Time. By Rudolf Eucken. Translated from the German by Williston S. Hough and W. R. Boyce Gibson. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909. — pp. xxv, 582.

Many signs of late have shown the increasing influence of Eucken's philosophy on English and American thought. In 1906 Professor Boyce Gibson published his *Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life*. During the year which has just ended three translations have appeared of as many works of the German thinker: *The Life of the Spirit*, translated by Pogson, reproduces the *Einführung in eine Philosophie des Geisteslebens;* the opuscule, *Christianity and the New Idealism*, is a version by the Gibsons of the *Ferien Cursus* of 1906, *Die Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart*, the volume under review, forms an English rendering of the well-known *Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker*. The growing interest which is thus indicated may be ascribed to various causes. In part, no doubt, it is due to the heightened prestige and influence of Professor Eucken in continental lands. Part may be explained by his personality, in par-

ticular as our younger scholars have met and studied with him in his Jena home. Most of all, however, account must be taken of the adaptation of the system to the needs of the time, and of the high tone of spiritual optimism which pervades it in all its parts. This phase of the case, it may be added, exactly coincides with the purpose of its author. And the success of his work in this respect strangely contrasts with much of the discordant clamor which nowadays is heard both at home and abroad. One need not be a convinced idealist to recognize and welcome the result. It is not remarkable that in an era of confusion and change a noble idealistic system should come like a fresh breeze to many who have long been struggling in defence of the spiritual verities. It is only surprising that so large a proportion of contemporary thinkers should be content to live a half or a full century behind their privilege, seeking intellectual and spiritual satisfaction in the detail inquiries, the mechanical conceptions, the merely biological explanations, the non-spiritual principles of life and society, which Professor Eucken so stoutly combats.

The present volume "is in all essential respects a version of the seventh German edition" of the *Lebensanschauungen*, Leipzig, 1907. The translation was begun, however, from the fifth edition; and, "solely with a view to condensation, a few paragraphs, and an occasional sentence or even phrase . . . have been omitted." This editorial privilege has been exercised with the full consent of the author, and the elisions occur principally in the earlier portions of the work, "in the relatively long accounts of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Augustine, and in the section on Origen." The aim of the translators has been to reproduce the original with fidelity rather than with slavish literalness. In this they appear to have succeeded, as well as in their endeavor to render Eucken's difficult, if distinguished German style into flowing, untechnical English. The careful indexes add to the value of the book.

A. C. ARMSTRONG.

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Die Bedeutung der Tropismen für die Psychologie. Von JACQUES LOEB. J. A. Barth, Leipzig, 1909. — pp. 51.

More than twenty years ago Professor Loeb ventured the assertion that animals respond to light in the same fixed way that plants do; that is to say, he proposed so to extend Sachs's botanical law that 'orientation is determined by the direction of the light-rays' as to cover the responsive movements of animals. He proposed also to take over into zoölogy the concept of the 'tropism.' Before many years had passed not only 'heliotropism,' but 'geotropism,' 'stereotropism,' 'chemotropism,' and other similar terms, came to be stock-in-trade of the student of animal behavior. Down to the present time Loeb and his pupils have contended for the 'tropic' nature of a great variety of animal movements. In consideration of the profound impression which this doctrine of tropisms has made upon the new science of

behavior, the recent booklet of Loeb's (a reprint of a lecture delivered at the Genevese Congress of last year) merits attention. Loeb has a horror of 'metaphysical' and 'speculative' explanations in biology, *i. e.*, theories other than physico-chemical. Reference to 'will' and 'instinct' as the springs of animal action was for him an appeal to metaphysics; he sought therefore to replace these agencies by the discovery of chemical processes set up directly by stimulus and issuing in movement. This procedure he calls both an 'analysis of psychical phenomena' and their 'explanation.' The writer is impatient of criticism, and he inclines, moreover, to an extreme and dogmatic statement of his views. He has himself therefore to thank if his opponents have construed his tropisms as a more general theory of animal activity than he intended. Indeed, his more recent writings and, in particular, the book under discussion, have shown plainly enough that even for Loeb the tropic movement is only one of at least three modes of response. To it must be added "sensitivity to difference" and "associative memory," terms taken over from psychology and bent to assume new meanings. It is not the tropism, he says now, that he was concerned about; it is, instead the reduction of mental phenomena in general to physicochemical processes (p. 39).

The strength of Professor Loeb's position lies in its methodological excellence. It seeks the *immediate* organic conditions of movement and the dependence of these conditions, in their turn, upon environmental agencies (stimuli). So far as method is concerned, the procedure is vastly to be preferred over the uncritical use of 'free-will' and 'instinct.' But Loeb is wrong in supposing that he thereby disposes of the psychological problems involved. Like most biologists who essay the study of behavior, he is hopelessly confused as regards the essential difference between biological and psychological objects. So complete is this confusion that Loeb can, with one hand, cast out 'will' and 'instinct' while, with the other, he grasps at 'associative memory' and 'ideas.' What will and instinct need is not to be cast out, but to be analyzed, and analyzed in the light of their organic substrate. Associative memory and ideas, on the other hand, do not properly lend themselves to the physical explanation of reactions. Loeb's quarrel with the psychologist must be carried on from one side. His use and abuse of psychological terms and objects are foreign to the science of psychology, which nevertheless welcomes most heartily his splendid contributions made to our knowledge of organic response to environmental change.

MADISON BENTLEY.

Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie, sixth edition, Band I. Von WILHELM WUNDT. W. Engelmann, Leipzig, 1908. — pp. xv, 725.

The beginning of still another *umgearbeitete* edition of Wundt's compendious *Grundzüge*, sent out almost upon the heels of the fifth, has created some surprise among psychologists. The primary reason for this new first

volume (the only volume that has thus far appeared) seems to have been the author's desire to revise his chapter on the Intensity of Sensation, and more specifically to express his views on mental measurement and the psychophysical methods. This chapter has grown from thirty odd pages in the first edition (1874) to one hundred and fifty in the sixth. Since the fifth, and especially since the fourth, edition came out much new work has been done on the 'reconstruction' of the quantitative methods. It is important then that Wundt, who picked up directly from Weber and Fechner the application of mathematics to psychology, should incorporate the new material into his system. A second change worthy of comment is the introduction, in the new edition, of a section on general psychological method (pp. 23–42). This section was obviously inspired by Wundt's recent controversy over the *Ausfragemethode* of the Würzburg school. In condemning the method of Marbe and Külpe, Wundt wrote out at length his own logic of psychological method (see *Psych. Studien.*, iii, 301). The section now included goes back definitely to that discussion. The part treating of Pre-psychological Concepts, omitted from the fifth edition, has now been replaced. Throughout the volume, the text reveals a vast number of small changes. Several additions have been made to the neurological chapters. Altogether the volume has grown by more than a hundred pages.

MADISON BENTLEY.

Les principales théories de la logique contemporaine. Par P. HERMANT ET A. VAN DE WAELE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 302.

This work was written for a prize competition and received commendation from the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques. It gives an exposition and criticism of the theories of knowledge produced by the various schools in Germany, England, and France during the nineteenth century, and in this connection it investigates the problems of reality, truth, judgment, and inference.

With regard to the method followed the authors say in the preface: "One who would expound or criticise the thought of an epoch must decide whether it is better to study each system in its unity or whether it is preferable to follow the different aspects of a problem as it has presented itself to the different thinkers who have attacked it. The first method sacrifices the genesis and evolution of the ideas but gives greater unity; the second enables one to follow the general trend of the ideas and makes criticism easier and more concise" (p. 1). The latter method is adopted.

The German contribution to logical conceptions is considered under the following headings: "Naïve Realism;" "Absolute Idealism;" "Neo-Kantians;" "Theory of Immanence;" Lotze, Sigwart, Benno-Erdmann, Jul. Bergmann; Transcendental Realism; Empirio-Criticism.

The authors hold Wundt and Riehl to be the most important thinkers among the naïve realists, and their doctrines are considered in this connection, although the realistic thesis appears to have had little influence on their

logical theories. Their definitions of concept and judgment are made in entire independence of realism. At the end of this section, the conclusion is drawn that naïve realism, in spite of its apparent simplicity, rests on a fanciful hypothesis. It gives absolute value to an unknown substratum. The uselessness of the theory has been the cause of its downfall (p. 26).

Under the theory of Absolute Idealism, Hegel, Prantl, Schmitt, Lasson, and Michelet are among the names discussed. The authors find the doctrines of this school inadequate. The strict logical necessity of the system has no room for facts without value from the point of view of mental development. It is unable to account for the divergences in the world as conceived by different individuals. Each moment in the development has its element of truth, therefore the system as a whole can provide no criterion of truth (p. 42).

The Neo-Kantians, Lange, Cohen, Zeller, Windelband, Schultze, Erhardt, and Volkelt, are next taken up. The fundamental characteristic of this school is found in its admission of a thing-in-itself which has no qualities except existence (p. 44). The forms of thought exist in virtue of the fundamental nature of mind itself and operate with absolute necessity; these forms are the basis of all logical processes and cannot be demonstrated (p. 48). The theory is dualistic, since form and matter are independent of each other (p. 50). If all individuals think according to fixed forms, the authors find it difficult to understand how divergences and contradictions can arise. Moreover, the problem of the immediately given is also left very vague (p. 62).

The Theory of Immanence, we are told, was originated by Schuppe although the conception was not unknown to the ancients. This view has many points in common with Fichte and Hegel. Immanence has been fruitful in its insistence on the collective character of reality and truth, and more particularly in its conception of the grades of reality. Schuppe has treated the judgment in an illuminating way and has rendered logic a service in reducing to their true proportions the barriers which had been set up between the different functions of the understanding. But, it is maintained, the theory is wrong in taking the self as its point of departure, for the self is not an original datum, but is reached by analysis and opposition. Far from being able to establish the existence of other individuals, it itself is determined by means of other individuals (p. 80).

As Lotze, Sigwart, Benno-Erdmann, and Jul. Bergmann cannot well be placed in any of the conventional schools, they are treated in a separate section. They are conceded to be among the most prominent thinkers on logical problems. But, for reasons which space does not permit us to state, they are pronounced unable to give a satisfactory explanation of truth, judgment and inference, and are obliged to take refuge in metaphysics (pp. 125–126).

Transcendental Realism is represented by Natorp and von Hartmann. According to Natorp, it is the business of logic to explain how knowledge

forms a unity. The unity is not given by simple absence of contradiction, and even formal validity must have its basis in objective truth. The problem of consciousness is analogous to the solution of an equation. The object is the unknown quantity to be deduced by means of the given. As in the equation, we have the conditions necessary for the solution. We can establish an equation between the known sensations and the unknown object. If it were otherwise, the problem of knowledge would be incomprehensible as well as insoluble. This view is criticised for asserting an equation that is not formulated (p. 131).

Empirio-Criticism is intimately related to French positivism, both being revolts against classical metaphysics. It considers philosophy as the product of an evolution from common sense to scientific thought. Avenarius and Mach arrive at similar results. The concrete sciences furnish the point of departure; everything known is given by experience. Those things are true which are most useful, therefore truth is not absolute. Empirio-criticism is commended for bringing human life and philosophy into closer relation and for the application of the Darwinian theory to the problem of consciousness. The objection is made, however, that it takes, without criticism, the ordinary man's theory of knowledge as its starting point (p. 150).

English thinkers are treated under the schools Realism, Idealism, and Pragmatism. The conclusions reached in connection with English Realism are that Mill, Hamilton, Spencer, Veitch, and Venn, the men considered in this section, have not been able to give a satisfactory explanation of the relation between thought and its object. The problem of judgment has given the realists trouble. They ought to find their criterion of truth in the agreement of thought and things. But since it is impossible to pass beyond the psychical states, belief, or the principle of contradiction, or necessary association, have been taken as the criterion. Their explanation of induction is also unsatisfactory (p. 176).

The English Idealists, Green, Bradley, Bain, Bosanquet, and Hobhouse are credited with having done valuable work in connection with special problems; but not with having produced any complete and new systems. The main interest of this school is to be found in its application of the conception of evolution to the mental life and in its proof that mental activity makes considerable additions to the sense given data.

Pragmatism is found to be a local expression of a general philosophical tendency. It has been the foe of all absolutism. At the outset, its tendency was to free itself from all metaphysics but it has failed in this attempt. James, Dewey, Schiller, and Moore are among the men examined in this connection.

The contemporary French philosophers have not been original metaphysicians, but nevertheless they have treated special problems with great originality. In psychology their work has had a profound influence on contemporary thought. In France psychology has invaded the realm of logic.

Poincaré, Rabier, Ribot, Binet, Paulhan, Renouvier, Fouillée, and Janet are among the thinkers considered in this part of the work.

The neo-scholastic movement is interesting as an attempt to adapt mediæval philosophy to present-day requirements. The school has little importance for logic.

In the conclusion, the authors have indicated what seems to them to be the true theory. This view has much in common with pragmatism and positivism. We are told that neither reality nor truth can be taken as the starting point. The special feature of the logical process is affirmation; but as affirmation is the result of volition, it falls within the field of psychology. All rational processes aiming at truth are mental operations and hence psychological. It has been maintained that logic is a normative science while psychology is not; but the authors seem to hold that this distinction is not ultimate. We have a right, therefore, to base our logical investigations on psychology if it proves useful to do so (pp. 265–269). Survival value determines which among the systems of our ideas is to be called real and true (p. 275). Reality is that group among the diverse mental systems which has most value in maintaining the race (p. 276). Nature is only the best unified and most useful group among our states of consciousness (p. 280).

The book is the result of a conscientious attempt to explain the main logical problems of modern thought. It has brought together and criticised, from a definite point of view, much interesting material. To criticise the work in detail would involve a discussion of most of the difficult questions of modern epistemology. The difficulties which the authors have are obvious. A work which attempts to state and evaluate all contemporary logical theories has a big task on its hands, and it would be strange if it were able to do full justice to all positions. Without elaborating upon what appear to be defects of appreciation, one might say that it is hardly fair to English idealism to assert that it has produced no system but has only taken up special questions. In general the work might be said to be open to two objections: first, that on account of the large number of schools considered it has been necessary to dispose of each in too summary a manner; and second, most of the objections to pragmatism and positivism could be urged against its own point of view.

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Princeton University.

Logic, Inductive and Deductive. By Adam L. Jones. New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1909. — pp. x, 304.

The purpose of this book as given in the preface runs: "This book is intended as a text-book and not at all as a contribution to logical theory."

A characteristic most important from this pedagogical point of view is the arrangement of subject-matter. Of the three parts into which the book is divided the first (189 of the 300 pages) is devoted to a study of details in

method, both inductive and deductive, with no heavy line of demarcation between them. The second part describes certain interesting 'supplementary methods' connected with statistics. And in the third part, questions that deal with the nature of scientific systems as systems are considered. The treatment throughout is clear and concise, and the theory well illustrated. Examples and questions connected with the student's interests as well as with more technical science are given at the end of each chapter, though there are hardly enough of these to admit of much variation in a course from year to year. At the end of the book come three longer examples of classic pieces of complex scientific reasoning.

The significant points in the range of subject matter are: (1) the introduction early in the course of an analysis of the nature of perception as the source from which we get our facts; (2) the entire omission of any further analysis of the reasoning process; (3) the explicit setting-aside of all consideration of such theories as Karl Pearson's for instance, as to the relation of the external world to our scientific laws, except for assertions that the laws science discovers are the laws of things; (4) the discussion of certain 'extra-syllogistic' reasoning, notably that found in mathematical induction and in the use of figures in geometry; (5) a more detailed analysis of statistical method than is often given, supplemented by a short illustrated discussion of 'The Graphic Method of Representing Data and their Relations'; and (6) the comparison of mathematics, science, and history as systems of knowledge.

One's judgment of the value of these discussions and omissions would need more justification than a short notice allows. The analysis of the nature of perception seems to me, for instance, particularly valuable, but chiefly because it suggests the very theory I understand Mr. Jones to deny, the subjective character of even the simplest forms of knowledge. As 'An Introduction to Scientific Method' I wish that the book might make more direct reference to the use of biographies of investigators where we have live and significant inductions actually in process, and where the use of any definite methods appears a characteristic no more fundamental than the slow growth of law out of repeated attempts to conceive as well as challenge all possible explanations.

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The following books also have been received:

The Classical Moralists. Selections Illustrating Ethics from Socrates to Martineau. Compiled by BENJAMIN RAND. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909. — pp. xix, 797.

Charles Darwin and the Origin of Species. By E. B. POULTON. London and New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909. — pp. xv, 302.

The Individual and Reality. By E. D. FAWCETT. London and New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909. — pp. xxiv, 449. $4.25.

The Moral Life. A Study in Genetic Ethics. By A. E. DAVIES. Baltimore, Review Publishing Co., 1909. — pp. xii, 187.

Æsthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic. Translated from the Italian of BENEDETTO CROCE by DOUGLAS AINSLIE. London and New York, The Macmillan Co., 1909. — pp. xxxi, 403.

Plato's Doctrine of Ideas. By J. A. STEWART. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1909. — pp. 207.

The Symposium of Plato. Edited by R. G. BURY. Cambridge, W. Heffer and Sons, 1909. — pp. lxxi, 179.

Philosophy as a Science. By PAUL CARUS. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1909. — pp. ix, 213. $0.50.

Æsthetics. By KATE GORDON. New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1909. — pp. 315.

Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson 1820–1872. With Annotations. Two volumes. Edited by EDWARD WALDO EMERSON and WALDO EMERSON FORBES. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909. — pp. xxvi, 394; xvi, 541.

The Human Race. By JAMES SAMUELSON. London, Swan Sonnenschein and Co., Lim., 1910. — pp. xii, 192.

Authority in Religion. J. H. LECKIE. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1909. — pp. x, 238.

The Divine Worker in Creation and Providence. By J. OSWALD DYKES. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark; Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909. — pp. xvi, 336.

St. Matthew's Gospel. With Introduction and Notes by EDWARD E. ANDERSON. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark; Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909. — pp. xxi, 243.

Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Illinois. (The Psychological Review, Monograph Supplements, Vol. XI, No. 1.) Lancaster, Pa., The Review Publishing Co., 1909. — pp. 177.

A Study of the Conception of Nature among the Pre-Socratics. By W. A. HEIDEL. (Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. XLV, No. 4.) 1910. — pp. 54.

System der Aesthetik. Von JOHANNES VOLKELT. Band II. München, C. H. Beck'sche, 1910. — pp. xxii, 569. M. 10.50.

Die Entwicklung der Theologie in der Griechischen Philosophie. Von EDWARD CAIRD. Autorisierte Übersetzung von HILMAR WILMANNS. Halle, A. S. Max Niemeyer, 1909. — pp. xvi, 532.

Philosophische Reden und Vorträge. Von CARL STUMPF. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1910. — pp. 261. M. 5.

Der Pragmatismus. GUNTHER JACOBY. Leipzig, Verlag Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1909. — pp. 57. M. 1.20.

Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie. GUSTAV STÖRRING. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann, 1909. — pp. v, 330. M. 6.

Lessings Philosophie. Herausgegeben von PAUL LORENTZ. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1909. — pp. lxxxvi, 396. M. 4.50.

Schillers philosophische Schriften und Gedichte. Herausgegeben von EUGEN KÜHNEMANN. Zweite, vermehrte auflage. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1910. — pp. 437. M. 4.50.

Immanuel Kants kleinere Schriften zur Naturphilosophie. Von OTTO BUEK. Erste Abteilung. Zweite Auflage. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1909. — pp. xlii, 338. M. 4.

Shaftsbury. Ein Brief über den Enthusiasmus Die Moralisten. Ins Deutsche übertragen und eingeleitet von MAX FRISCHEISEN-KÖHLER. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1909. — pp xxxi, 212. M. 3.

De la Mettrie. Der Mensch eine Maschine. Übersetzt von MAX BRAHN. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1909. — pp. xxii, 72. M. 1.80.

Geschichte der Erziehung. Von F. M. SCHIELE. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1909. — pp. 166. M. 2.40.

Das Welterlebnis. Von E. ZSCHIMMER. Erster Teil. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann, 1909. — pp. 77.

Le sens de l'existence. Par LUDWIG STEIN. Paris, V. Girard & E. Briere, 1909. — pp. xi, 534. 12 fr.

David Friedrich Strauss. La vie et l'œuvre. Par ALBERT LÉVY. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910. — pp. iii, 292. 5 fr.

Dieu et Science. Par ÉLIE DE CYON. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910. — xvi, 444.

L'art et le geste. Par JEAN D'UDINE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910. — pp. xvii, 284.

Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures. Par L. LÉVY-BRUHL. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910. — pp. 461.

Précis de Psychologie. Par HERMANN EBBINGHAUS. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910. —pp. 316. 5 fr.

L'erreur morale établie par l'histoire l'évolution des systèmes. Par MAURICE PRADINES. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. viii, 702.

Principes de toute philosophie de l'action. Par MAURICE PRADINES. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. ii, 305.

Le sens de l'histoire. Par MAX NORDAU. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910. — pp. 428. 7 fr. 50.

Essais sur la connaissance. Par GEORGE FONSEGRIVE. Deuxième édition. Librairie Lecoffre, J. Gabalda & Cie. — pp. 271. 3 fr. 50.

La philosophie de S. S. Laurie. Par GEORGES REMACLE. Bruxelles, M. Weissenbruch, 1909. — pp. xxxi, 524.

Problemi di estetica. Per BENEDETTO CROCE. Bari, Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1910. — pp. viii, 513.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mêt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Nêo-Sc.* = *Revue Nêo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie. Transcendental psychologie und Transcendentalogik. HEINRICH RICKERT. Kant-Studien, XIV, pp. 169–228.

Epistemology is concerned with thinking in so far as it is true; and, in order to be true, thought must depend upon an object. The author holds that the very conception of truth excludes all theories based on empirical psychology — Relativism, Pragmatism, Instrumentalism, or by whatever names they may be called. The problem of Epistemology concerns the form, not the content, of knowledge. The two methods of approach here dealt with both attempt to determine the transcendental object of knowledge; and therefore both belong in the sphere of transcendental philosophy. Transcendental psychology begins with the act of knowledge as a psychical process, seeking by analysis of this to penetrate to the transcendent object. Transcendental logic, on the other hand, passes at once to the sphere of the transcendent object, dealing as "pure" logic, with this in abstraction from the act of knowing. The author goes on to show that both have advantages and disadvantages, and may accordingly be employed to supplement each other. A psychological analysis of judgment, as the act of knowledge, shows as its fundamental factors the feeling of certainty (*Evidenz*), and the recognition of a transcendent *Sollen* as the object of the act. But the connection of the act with the object is not exhibited. Transcendental logic, on its side, shows us that the transcendent object must belong in the sphere of meanings, and that the meaning which transcends all existence must be a value, and can only be understood as a value. Transcendental logic then does not deal with the world of existence but with the realm of transcendent values. But its defect is that it fails to show what significance these transcendent values have for actual

knowledge. If we are to make intelligible the knowledge of an object, we must do so by passing from knowledge to the object, and not from the object to knowledge. This is to revert to transcendental psychology. How does existence become meaning, or reality take on value? This we can understand only if we assume an immanent meaning in the psychological act itself. The meaning of the act of judgment is the recognition or taking up an attitude towards a value. Logic must avoid separating meaning and existence so sharply from each other as to ignore the act of knowledge and its immanent meaning. Otherwise it becomes empty. For the eternally valid forms can only be found in relation to the temporal images. Transcendent psychology may learn from 'pure' logic to guard against psychologism and metaphysics in epistemology. And the study of transcendental psychology may teach 'pure' logic that the over-empirical sphere of the logical can be understood only as a world of theoretical values, and that therefore epistemology must be a critique of reason; *i. e.*, a science that is concerned, not with existence but with meanings, not with realities but with values; that it is in Kant's phrase not *quæstio facti* but *quæstio juris*.

J. E. C.

On Truth and Coherence. F. H. BRADLEY. Mind, No. 71, pp. 329–342.

This article defends, against the recent criticisms of Professor Stout and Mr. Russell, the theory that coherence will work as a test of truth in the case of facts due to sensible perception and memory. Mr. Bradley contends that no other test will work, and that therefore there are no judgments of sense which are in principle infallible. The test he advocates is the idea of a whole of knowledge as wide and as consistent as possible — a system characterized by coherence and comprehensiveness. Though admitting that our intelligence cannot construct the world of perceptions and feelings, but depends on what is given, he holds that facts of perception which are immediate and ultimate and above criticism are vicious abstractions. With every datum of perception or memory a modified interpretation is in principle possible, and no such fact, therefore, is given free from all possibility of error. Two reasons have been advanced for maintaining independent facts and infallible judgments: (1) Such data, it may be said, can be actually shown. But, urges Mr. Bradley, when one has descended beyond the level of error, one is apt to be below the level of any fact or any truth which one can use. (2) They must exist, since without them the intelligence cannot work. This rests on the assumption, our writer maintains, that experience is a structure which must rest on some static foundation; whereas it is really a system, in which the facts which are taken up are continually readjusted to form a consistent whole. "Facts" are justified because and as far as, while taking them as real, one is better able to deal with the incoming new "facts" and in general make the world wider and more harmonious. The objection might be raised that there is something

fundamental, something given, in the world of an individual which is for him indispensable and infallible. But to grant this, is not to admit it in the form of an infallible judgment. Besides, urges Mr. Bradley, conceivably a judgment might be fundamental and infallible for me, in the sense that to modify it or doubt it would entail the loss of my personal identity, while to another mind or to a wider experience it might be seen to require modification or, apart from correction, might appear as an error. There seems to be no way to pass from relative to absolute infallibility, or to argue from an assumed necessary implication in my personal existence to a necessity which is more than relative.

EDW. L. SCHAUB.

Coherence and Contradiction. F. H. BRADLEY. Mind, No. 72, pp. 489–508.

In a preceding article, the author pointed out that coherence and comprehensiveness are the two aspects of system, and in the present paper, he undertakes to show how system stands to contradiction. The proper business of philosophy is to satisfy the intellect, but in so doing, it meets all the wants of our nature, since any need of our being, left unsatisfied, is certain to have manifested itself in idea. Truth, then, may be said to consist in "an ideal expression of the Universe, at once coherent and comprehensive. It must not conflict with itself, and there must be no suggestion which fails to fall inside it." The question now is: Can these two principles be demonstrated as aspects of one? It is not sufficient verification of their unity simply to claim that each partial object everywhere visibly involves an internal contradiction, and so points to a wider synthesis of complementary opposites. However, in seeking a principle of unity, we need not go far aside, for with every object there is present something already beyond it, and the universe is actually now experienced by me as beyond the object. Judgment transcends and must transcend that immediate unity of feeling on which it cannot cease to depend. But since that whole and its way of unity is not properly ideal, and since now we are in the world of truth and ideas, the judgment has failed to express itself. Furthermore, this world is not to be found revealed as a unity of either external or internal relations. Either the object itself, however, does, through its own internal content, pass for us visibly beyond its own limits, or, on the other hand, there is an addition which comes to us from the whole which we feel. These are the two facts which demonstrate that system is connected essentially with contradiction and its absence, and that an object which is short of the whole tends naturally to suggest its complement. Finally, then, the assumption that what satisfies us is real, and that reality must satisfy us, is tolerable, only when we hold that "the Universe is substantially one with each of us, and actually as a whole, feels and wills and knows itself within us." "Our truth, such as it is, has its indispensable part in the one transcendent experience and is so far secure. But that any particular truths of

ours, as we conceive them, should be unconditioned and absolute, seems hardly probable."

GEORGE T. COLMAN.

The Opponents of Eternal Values. HUGO MÜNSTERBERG. Psych. Bull., VI, 10, pp. 329–338.

In this article the author attempts to meet the objections of those who have thoughtfully entered into the spirit of his work. It has been contended that, as a psychologist, he has, especially in his *Willenshandlung*, torn into pieces the same will for which he now maintains a metaphysical unity. Yet this very book closes with the statement that nothing but sensations and feelings compose the will "in the metaphysical reality of which there lies the deepest problem of existence." Moreover, the *Grundzüge der Psychologie* insists on the teleological character of reality and yet it describes the psychological will in essentially the same terms as did his first work. "Consistent psychological atomism of the will and radical teleological philosophy of the will belong most intimately together. The real will which comes in question as an act of meaning, agreeing and disagreeing with others, obeying or disobeying ideals, is never that phenomenon which the descriptive psychologist analyzes, because it is never a phenomenon." Some seem willing to accept a voluntaristic interpretation of reality, yet insist that the relativism of personal interests cannot be transcended. However, "that which is necessarily postulated as constituting experience cannot be unreal in our possible experience." One certainly arrives at trans-subjective values, if "it can be shown that the subject function by which the experience becomes constituted as an objective, existing world is ultimately will activity." The eternal values have not a transcendent existence, but they have transcendental validity. "The deepest nature of our purposive activity involves a fundamental demand which must be fulfilled in order to find a world at all," and truth, beauty, law, etc., are only different aspects of this one fundamental demand. Pragmatism has been inclined to assert that such an idealism can have merely a naïve confidence that there is an absolute truth without knowing anything about it. Professor Münsterberg believes that his whole book is a reply to this contention, since it is an effort to go beyond the mere statement that there is truth. We need scientific methods and results, but "the philosophy of truth and beauty and morality and religion can no longer be reached in our time simply by analyzing social phenomena and bringing them into axiological connections."

EDW. L. SCHAUB.

The Relation of Time and Eternity. JOHN ELLIS MCTAGGART. Mind, No. 71, pp. 343–362.

The word eternity is used in at least three distinct senses. (1) In common parlance it often denotes unending time, so that time is simply a part of

eternity. (2) It may designate the timelessness of truths, in which case the relation of eternity to time is simply that of truth to the subject-matter of the truth or, since, on this view, nothing which exists is eternal, it is the relation of a truth to the reality of which it is true. Inasmuch as it puts every fact in the same connection with eternity, this view utterly fails to give us any insight into the degrees of reality, and stability in the universe. (3) Eternity may denote the timelessness of existences. Our ordinary world of experience presents itself as temporal. Whatever is temporal and is real at all exists; but we cannot say, conversely, that whatever exists is temporal, since timeless existence is at least a possibility. Assuming the actuality of an eternal existence, what is its relation to existence in time? Metaphorically, it is very appropriate to speak of it as an eternal present because (*a*), while the past and future are constantly changing their positions in regard to us, the present is analogous to the timeless in that it can never be brought nearer to us or farther from us; (*b*) the present is regarded as having more reality than either the past or the future; (*c*) the present alone is regarded as capable of exercising an immediate causal influence. Yet presentness involves a distinct time reference to past and future, and therefore cannot properly be predicated of the eternal in the same sense that existence can. As a psychical event in time one may properly speak of a judgment regarding the timeless as "now," but this cannot be applied to the existence of the timeless itself. Many contend that all existence is eternal and that our experience of time is only an appearance which disguises the nature of the timeless reality. This view, championed at the present time by Mr. Bradley, is basal in the systems of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. Without discussing its truth or falsity, what consequences does it involve? We necessarily perceive things in time and it is incorrect to call this erroneous, since it does not include an erroneous judgment regarding reality. Indeed, when existence appears to us under the form of time, this is not mere illusion, but reality is revealed partly, although not entirely as it really is. The decisive question is whether there is any law according to which states in time, as we pass from earlier states to later, tend to become more adequate or less adequate representations of the timeless reality. If there is not, then the eternal may be regarded as present for the same reasons and with the same limitations as on the theory that both time and eternity are real. Under certain conditions, however, the assertion that the eternal is past or future might be much more than a metaphor. If time is only an illusory way of regarding a timeless reality, there is good reason to hold that the order is determined by the adequacy with which the states represent the eternal reality, so that those states come next together which vary only infinitesimally in the degree of their adequacy, and that the whole of the time-series shows a steady process of change of adequacy. If this change were such that there is increasing adequacy, the eternal may be considered as the final stage in the time process and is as truly future as anything can be. Similarly, the timeless

reality might be presented as the beginning of the past or, in case the least adequate were in the middle of the series, as the beginning of the past as well as the end of the future. Which of these is the true series is closely bound up with the question of whether good or evil predominates in the universe. Empirical induction, the doctrine of a God who is on the side of the good, and the theory of the unreality of evil are all incapable of furnishing a solution. In the basis of the unreality of time it does, however, seem possible to show that the different representations which appear to us as the time series are in such an order that those which appear as later are the more adequate. In that case we must look on the eternal as the end of time and on time as essentially the process by which we reach to the eternal and its perfection.

EDW. L. SCHAUB.

L'orientation de la pensée philosophique de David Hume. L. LÉVY-BRUHL. Rev. de Mét. XVII, 5, pp. 595–619.

David Hume's publication of the *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding* was an attempt to win the attention of the public to his philosophical theories, by substituting for the comparatively involved and abstract manner of the *Treatise* the easy style of a series of elegant essays. The *Inquiry*, however, while being a free and impoverished version of the *Treatise*, is nevertheless not unfaithful to the essential spirit of the latter. Thus, Kant was able to grasp the fundamental Humian position from the *Inquiry* alone. Lévy-Bruhl argues that Hume never really disavowed the work of his youth; it expressed his lifelong philosophical attitude. The aim of the *Treatise* is indicated by its sub-title: "An attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects." The Cartesian science, metaphysically biased, could not serve as a model. Hume took as his guide the example of the Newtonian method in physical science; the search after actual connections, rather than after supposititious essences and first principles. This modest satisfaction with actual results, as opposed to the ambitious striving after unprovable ultimates, Hume aimed to introduce into the sphere of moral inquiry, and this became the guiding principle of his science of man. The phenomenalism of his epistemology is not based on metaphysical considerations of any sort; it is an attitude taken for purely methodological reasons. He presupposes nothing in experience which the latter does not directly release. Hence the difference between him and Locke and Berkeley, who have their postulates about matters infinite. Hume restricts himself to experience. The word 'experience' he uses in two senses: referring to the simple sense-impression, as distinguished from the ideas of the understanding, and again, experience, as embodying the sum-total of phenomena and their mutual relations. He asks himself the question: How is experience possible? The connection between phenomena, Hume argues, has no objective basis; neither can it be demonstrated either *a priori* or *a posteriori*. He finds the solution of

the problem in the constant conjunction of certain phenomena which rouse the attitude of belief in the perceiver's mind; causality is thus explained subjectively. Kant was able to accept Hume's solution of the problem; only, for him it involved different implications. Whereas Hume's conclusions led him to espouse a sceptical attitude, Kant used a position essentially identical in evolving a theory of experience which found the explanation of the latter in the organizing and unifying consciousness of the knowing subject.

R. A. TSANOFF.

The Problem of Induction and the Doctrine of Formal Cause. W. J. ROBERTS. Mind, No. 72, pp. 538–551.

"The only kind of causation that has any special relation to induction is that which Aristotle sought to indicate by the name of Formal Causation. If this contention is justified it will follow that the speculations of Hume and Kant, according to which causation is to be resolved into invariable succession (Hume) or into invariable and necessary succession (Kant) and the still further refinements of their followers, have not advanced our comprehension of the problem of Induction." The law of universal causation, which maintains the determination of every event by the whole system of reality, while it is evidently true, does not enable us to perform a single act of inductive reasoning. In the first place, the principle of inductive reasoning, with its assumptions of plurality of causes and of the possibility of isolating particular events from the rest of the universe, is obviously false. Secondly, we have no warrant for supposing that antecedents and consequents exactly similar are ever repeated. The relation between causation and induction is found, then, only in Aristotle's doctrine of formal cause, which is merely another expression for the fact that generalization, or the assignment of phenomena to classes or kinds, is a form of explanation. "We reason inductively without consciously using any such principle as the Law of Causation, the Uniformity of Nature, or the determination of particular instances by universal laws." We may say, then, in accord with Aristotle, that, inasmuch as the form or universal is a cause, the rational principle involved in the inductive process is essentially the principle that the particulars are determined by the universal or species. To be sure, Aristotle does not supply a completely adequate knowledge of induction, and yet he reveals the principle which enables us to reconstruct an intelligible and reasonable theory of inductive inference.

GEORGE T. COLMAN.

Eine entwicklungstheoretische Betrachtung über das Verhältnis von Wissen und Glauben. PAUL C. FRANZE. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XV, 3, pp. 356–368.

We recognize the truth of judgments by their evidence, but there can be certainty and probability of truth without evidence — belief in contrast to knowledge. True judging signifies high spiritual development, but judging

according to evidence signifies true judging; therefore judging according to evidence signifies high spiritual development, and the greater the demands for evidence, the higher the development. Thus in man's requirement of evidence we have a standard for a theory of development. Men of the past were contented with undemonstrated judgments, but now there is a falling away from simple belief, and a desire for higher evidence. Men are now more highly developed. Often they do accept views which are not evident, because they are founded on natural science, but the error lies in thinking that these theories possess the same grade of reality as the science itself. Man can succeed in satisfying his demand for the evident either by obtaining a view of the universe in demonstrated statements, as in mathematics or logic; by renouncing entirely the undemonstrable; or by recognizing that the manifest and that which is not manifest are each entitled to different realms. Yet in reality these are blended with each other, for, when separated, they prove to be mere abstractions. The separation, however, shows the two sides, the outer — that of the manifest, of knowledge, causality, and science; and the other — that of ideas, belief, will, philosophy, and religion. Philosophy belongs to the latter because it concerns itself with the coherence of reality and is the statement of an undemonstrable judgment, while science explains the causal connection of phenomena and expresses demonstrable judgments. Man at first confesses both spheres, then believes the undemonstrable must be eliminated, but finally differentiates and blends the two. Then he can again believe without evidence as far as statements are subjectively certain or probable.

C. STEPHENSON.

The Meaning of Literature for Philosophy. ERNEST ALBEE. Int. J. E., XX, 1, pp. 1–10.

All arts except, perhaps, the purely decorative, are interpretations of life; but of them all, literature is the most significant and permanent. The principal reasons for this are that it is the most direct, it can deal with all phases of life, and it is less limited by technical conventions than other arts. Arnold's definition of poetry as a "criticism of life" *may* be true of poetry and of literature in general, but it need not necessarily be so. Wordsworth's work was a peculiar combination of criticism and interpretation, but his definite theories are more suited to prose than poetry and have not added to his reputation as a poet. His views were philosophically of little value, and yet philosophy can ill afford to neglect him or even lesser poets. Poetry develops sympathy, and sympathy is necessary in the moral life. Poetry is a creative interpretation, a dynamic synthesis of man's relation to his fellowmen and his environment. It shows two main motives or tendencies — the dramatic or objective, and the prophetic, or the attempt to deal with ultimate problems. Even in the face of apparent failure of ideals and decadence of literary traditions, the poet-prophet retains his faith in truth.

HELEN M. CLARKE.

Jean Jacques Rousseau, a Forerunner of Pragmatism. ALBERT SCHINZ. The Monist XIX, 4, pp. 481–513.

Pragmatism is "a philosophy that judges of the value of theories and ideas from their consequences." If this means scientific consequences, the doctrine is not new; if it means ethical consequences, then too it refers to an inclination that men have always shown, and pragmatism is merely an attempt to justify this inclination. Rousseau may be considered a forerunner of pragmatism and is in many ways comparable to James. The development of thought of the two men shows a striking parallelism. Both began by studying natural sciences, and both passed through a period of psychological interest in which the tendency was toward sensationalism or materialism. This is shown in James' theory of emotion and in Rousseau's theory that our moral lives are dependent upon material conditions. Finally, both decided for a pragmatic system. For James "the true is the expedient in the way of our thinking" and "we can not reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow from it." Rousseau said of himself that he "never listened calmly to any theory that he believed harmful to the public weal." He is concerned to get a philosophy that shall be morally good for humanity even at the expense of truth. Now if objective truth and morality agreed, all philosophy would be pragmatic. Since they do not, pragmatism must create a confusion between the two standpoints. Rousseau maintains that man is an intellectual being but that merely intellectual thinking takes us farther from the truth. He therefore admits the existence of other judgments than merely intellectual judgments, that is, moral and pragmatic. What is this practical reason? We always make intellectual judgments but we may do so objectively or subjectively. The sentiment or moral judgment of Rousseau is merely judgment applied in the interest of morals. Pragmatists would have us believe that all philosophy consists in its moral application. Rousseau and James agree in their pragmatic views of religion, in that they see its proof in its usefulness for life. James is more philosophical than Rousseau, in that the latter assumes that everything in the world is rationally and morally harmonious, while the former accepts pluralism as a consequence of his theory. The two agree in insisting that the end of life is happiness, but that it can be gained more fully by some asceticism; in appealing to man's love of risk and conquest to justify evil; and in a certain leaning toward mysticism. The writings of both are products of an age when the moral life of society was threatened by the rapid change of scientific thought. Finally, it may be doubted whether either James or Rousseau is consistent or fully convinced of his own theories.

HELEN M. CLARKE.

Die assoziativen Faktoren im ästhetischen Geniessen. RICHARD MÜLLER-FREIENFELS. Z. f. Psych., LIV, 1 u. 2, pp. 71–118.

Recent works on the psychology of æsthetic feeling show that generalization and agreement in this subject are almost impossible. The chief value of

such works lies, not in their statistical material, but in their wealth of individual introspections. The present author's own conclusions are based (1) upon the study of works of art, and (2) upon answers to questions put to people of different callings and different ages. Æsthetic feeling is a complex phenomenon including sensation, feeling, perception, representation, conception, judgment, and affection. In children and naïve individuals sense perception and feeling predominate; in the more intellectual, acts of judgment are most important. The æsthetic relation of the ego to the object involves the same functions as the practical and scientific relations, except that the æsthetic relation is without outside end and is disinterested. Æsthetic feelings include as sub-groups feelings of activity and of form, reproduced feelings, re-lived and imitative states. The activity feelings are those produced by the perceptive and representative activities in themselves and apart from their meaning. In the brain, as in other organs, normal functioning is agreeable and inactivity disagreeable. Activity feelings are not truly artistic, but they are a step toward the artistic, and the two are distinguishable in degree, not in kind. Formal ideas, in a narrower sense, are those aroused by the combination of simple ideas, without regard to their meaning. That object gives the most pleasure which has the greatest ability to arouse representations in proportion to the effort put forth. Unity in multiplicity and climax are applications of this rule. Associative ideas may be divided into two classes — objective and subjective. The former include associations of impressions from different sense orders, which are given together in perception, and are called objective because they are possible, if not necessary, to all men. The latter include associations with experiences which are peculiar to the individual and are therefore subjective. No sharp line of distinction can be drawn between the two. Each of these forms of association has a corresponding form of feeling. Ideas in themselves have beauty and give pleasure, whether they are aroused objectively or subjectively, in the above sense. These two kinds of feelings are usually experienced together. They may reënforce each other or they may tend to neutralize each other, as in the association of a work of art with its parody. The subjective element is never lacking in artistic impressions even though it may not come explicitly to consciousness. The attention moves from one thing to another and at one instant is not unitary. The appreciation of any work of art is affected by the surroundings in which it is enjoyed, the observer's knowledge of the artist's life and reminiscences from past experience. The mind is never a mere blank, and the one that is most nearly so is least able to appreciate the beautiful. But though the subjective element has a part in æsthetic feeling, it should be excluded as far as possible from æsthetic judgment and criticism.

A further division of feeling is the re-lined. We enter into the drama, or form, or picture so wholly as to experience the feelings of the actors. This is not the highest kind of appreciation, and if it were the only kind, tragedy would be unbearable. This may be called the attitude of the

Mitspieler as distinguished from that of the *Zuschauer*. These represent different relations of the ego to the object. There is a difference of opinion as to which has the higher form of enjoyment. The former probably has the more intense pleasure, while the latter has the richer and more manifold.

HELEN M. CLARKE.

Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology. G. H. MEAD. Psych. Bull., VI, 12, pp. 401–408,

Psychologists are ill agreed as to a definition of Social Psychology. The author selects the respective views of McDougall, Royce, and Baldwin, and seeks to discover the psychological implications of each. These views are "that human nature is endowed with and organized by social instincts and impulses; that the consciousness of meaning has arisen through social intercommunication"; and that the self which every act implies can exist only in a society of other selves. If the positions are correct, social psychology must be a "counterpart of physiological psychology." They are alike in that each presupposes the subject matter of other sciences as its precondition. "By no possibility can psychology deal with the material with which physiology and the social sciences deal, because the consciousness of psychological science arises within a physical and a social world that are presuppositions of itself."

HARVEY G. TOWNSEND.

The Physiological Basis of Relational Processes. MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN. Psych. Bull., VI, 11, pp. 369–378.

In dealing with the so-called 'relational' processes, although they are not referable to a particular sense organ, it is desirable to show that their physiological substrate is of the usual sensory type. "They are so nearly sensory that it is no wonder we are tempted to think that better introspective analysis would make them wholly so." Moreover, as we are familiar with sensory processes we can be more secure and certain in dealing with them. Kinæsthetic sensory impulses seem to be best fitted as a basis, because they are capable of accompanying excitations from all other senses; they are the most closely associated in introspection with the relational processes; and the "unanalyzable character of the fusion of afferent kinæsthetic processes required by this theory would be accounted for by the fact" that the attitudes are phylogenetically very old, and the analysis of them is a "late and imperfect development."

HARVEY G. TOWNSEND.

The Present Task of Ethical Theory. JAMES H. TUFTS. Int. J. E., XX, 2, pp. 141–152.

The writer aims to point out the re-interpretations of some of our ethical conceptions which seem necessary in order to make them vital to the prob-

lems of modern life, in morals, education, and jurisprudence. Ethics cannot afford to neglect the temporal and the practical and to seek only the eternal truths of a pure science. In fact, all of our ethical conceptions, however pure they may appear to be, have unmistakable signs of the age and peculiar conditions under which they were formed. "Two features of the present situation which are highly important for ethical theory are: (1) The increasing development of general scientific method, and its successful application to the mental and social sciences and the problems of human welfare; (2) the increase in social organization of all kinds, and the corresponding reaction upon the life of the individual." The particular conceptions discussed are Reason, the Self, Freedom, Happiness, and the State. We no longer oppose sense-perception to reflective thought, but insist on a constant reference of hypotheses to particulars and an interpretation of particulars by theory. We do not set the world of law over against the world of purpose, but realize that the formulation of laws is itself a work of selective purpose aimed at the realization of further purpose. Ethics would do well to recognize in its conception of reason that "from the standpoint of present science the great antithesis which is most important is that between the method of trial and error and the method of definitely adopting means to consciously selected ends." The self should be regarded as a unity of purpose rather than a unity *versus* plurality. The present issue regarding freedom is most frequently presented in biological and sociological terms. When it is asked whether a person is completely determined by heredity and environment a solution is suggested by the sciences in question. "In so far as science is taking active steps to control heredity through eugenics it is certainly answering the first part of the question. In so far as the methods of publicity and social influence give each a chance to know and affect the public sentiment, social psychology is answering the second." Freedom, thus conceived, is not a question of *either-or*, but of *how far* and *how much*. The indications of modern life signify that happiness means a progressive sharing of each individual in the thought and life of the world. "Neither the individualism of English radicalism, nor the idealism of Russian militarism, nor the socialism of the German proletariat affords an adequate statement for present political and social philosophy." The complexity of our social organization renders impracticable any class philosophy. The universal element in human life is not merely the state, in its aspect of authority and government, as Hegel held; but science and education, industrial and commercial life, have all aided greatly in a conception of sympathy, of common welfare, of constructive morality, which is gradually transforming the function of government.

EDW. L. SCHAUB.

Ethics and Politics. R. M. MACIVER. Int. J. E., XX, 1, pp. 72–86.

Aristotle doubted whether it is the same thing to be a good man and to be a good citizen, and this doubt has often been echoed since. To accept

this would be to undermine the foundations of ethics. We must understand the relations of man as an individual to the societies of which he is a member. We know an object as a complex of attributes and an individual as existing in various relations, but the individual object or person is more than a mere complex of attributes or relations. There has always been a tendency to subordinate all other social relations to some one, as the tribal relation or the state. This makes ethics subordinate to politics, while it should be the judge of all man's relations. The very idea of government involves a distinction between the governed and the governing, even in ideal self-government where the two become aspects of the same person. This gives two parts to the question — the duty of the citizen, which is Aristotle's problem; and the duty of the governed, which is Machiavelli's. Machiavelli concluded that a ruler could not maintain a united state by following recognized principles of ethics, because the necessary power could be gained only by the violation of ethical principles. This conclusion is due to a false abstraction of the man from the citizen. Ethics applies not to man in the abstract, but to man in his various relations of which citizenship is one. Since self-government is only partially realized, there must be some conflict between law and the individual conscience. Even here, law may often be realized without violating ethical principles, because these principles themselves involve obedience to law, especially where disobedience would strike at the security of the state. There are cases, however, where the individual and the common ideas of the good of the state disagree, and here there is real conflict. Society must move onward from one conception to another, and the new conceptions originate with the individual and are given by him to society. In such cases both state and individual seem to be right, though their ideas conflict. Progress involves relativity in ethics; it makes place for law and, in rare cases, for the disobedience which is the greater loyalty.

HELEN M. CLARKE.

NOTES.

Professor J. Mark Baldwin has severed his connection with the *Psychological Review*, which he founded in conjunction with Professor Cattell sixteen years ago. The Review will hereafter be edited by Professor H. C. Warren, of Princeton, and J. B. Watson, of Johns Hopkins University, who have been associated with Professor Baldwin for some years in conducting the journal.

The *Revue de Philosophie* for December, 1909, containing 180 pages, is entirely devoted to Saint Anselm of Canterbury, in commemoration of the eighth centenary of his death. The first article, by A. Dufourcq, *Saint Anselme, son temps, son rôle*, treats of the decadence of the Christian Church before the eleventh century, and the part of Anselm, mystic, rationalist, and diplomatist, in its renovation. Comte Domet de Vorges, in *Le milieu philosophique à l'époque de saint Anselme*, brings out Anselm's relation to the rationalism of his time and the force of his logical procedure, maintaining that he has the glory of having first opened the path to modern reason. *L'École du Bec et saint Anselme*, is the subject of an article by A. Porée, while J. Drāseke contributes a study, *Sur la question des sources d'Anselme*. In an article on *La preuve ontologique de l'existence de Dieu et saint Anselme*, A. Lepidi advances the opinion that this famous argument would hold at the present day in essential respects, if restated in a new form. J. Geyser, in *La demonstration a priori de l'existence de Dieu chez saint Anselme*, compares the *a posteriori*, causal argument of Descartes with the *a priori* argument of Anselm, saying that the latter reduces itself to an analytical explanation of our concept of God. The remaining articles are B. Adlhoch, *Anselme et Gannilon;* E. Beurlier, *Les rapports de la raison et de la foi dans la philosophie de saint Anselme:* J. Bainvel, *La theologie de saint Anselme;* B. Maréchaux, *La sainteté en saint Anselme. Theorie et pratique; Notes sur les fêtes du centenaire à Aoste.*

Professor W. B. Pillsbury, of the University of Michigan, has been elected president of the American Psychological Association; and Professor Edward F. Buchner, of Johns Hopkins University, has been made president of the Southern Association for Philosophy and Psychology.

Professor J. W. Baird, of the University of Illinois, has accepted a call as professor of psychology to Clark University, succeeding Professor E. C. Sanford, who has become president of Clark College.

Dr. Bernard Bosanquet, formerly Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews, has been appointed Gifford Lecturer in the University of Edinburgh for 1911–13.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals:

MIND, No. 73: *W. L. Mackenzie*, Observations on the Case of Sally Beauchamp; *F. C. S. Schiller*, The Present Phase of 'Idealist' Philosophy; *H. S. Shelton*, On Evolutionary Empiricism; *J. Shawcross*, Association and Æsthetic Perception; Critical Notices; New Books; Philosophical Periodicals; Notes.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, VIII, 2: *F. von Hügel*, Father Tyrrell: Some Memorials of the Last Twelve Years of His Life; *C. E. Osborne*, George Tyrrell; A Friend's Impressions; *Henry Jones*, Tennyson; *E. B. Clapp*, Greek Religion and Morality as set forth by Pindar; *K. C. Anderson*, The Collapse of Liberal Christianity; *P. T. Forsyth*, Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy, Heresy, and Freedom; Divorçons; *A. Gehring*, Grounds of Faith; *Eduard König*, Faith and Knowledge; *E. F. Carritt*, Truth in Art and in Religion; *R. L. Gales*, Catholicism and Happiness; *R. R. Marett*, Savage Supreme Beings and the Bull Roarer; *W. A. Ross* and *G. W. Allen*, Self-Assertion in Nietzsche and Self-Surrender in Boehme; Discussions; Reviews; Recent Books and Articles.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XX, 2: *J. H. Muirhead*, The Ethical Aspect of the New Theology; *James H. Tufts*, The Present Task of Ethical Theory; *W. R. Sorley*, The Philosophical Attitude; *Thorstein Veblen*, Christian Morals and the Competitive System; *Thomas Jones*, Pauperism: Facts and Theories; *C. W. Super*, Ethics and Language; Book Reviews.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XXI, 1: *J. P. Porter*, Intelligence and Imitation in Birds; A Criterion of Imitation; *Ernest Jones*, The Œdipus Complex as an Explanation of Hamlet's Mystery; *E. A. Acher*, Spontaneous Constructions and Primitive Activities of Children Analogous to those of Primitive Man; *L. R. Geissler*, The Measurability of Attention by Professor Wirth's Method, Minor Studies from the Psychological Laboratories of Vassar College; Psychological Literature; Note.

THE MONIST, XX, 1: *Editor*, Truth; *Bernhard Pick*, The Personality of Jesus in the Talmud; *Editor*, The Nature of Logical and Mathematical Thought; *H. Poincaré*, The Future of Mathematics; *P. E. B. Jourdain*, Transfinite Numbers and the Principles of Mathematics; Criticisms and Discussions.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, VI, 26: *C. H. Ames*, William Torrey Harris; *R. B. Perry*, A Division of the Problem of Epistemology; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News; Index to Volume VI.

VII, 1: *R. B. Perry*, The Ego-centric Predicament; *William Brown*, Educational Psychology in the Secondary Schools; Discussion; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VII, 2: *William James*, Bradley or Bergson?; *J. E. W. Wallin*, The Duration of Attention, Reversible Perspectives, and the Refractory Phase of the Reflex Arc; Societies; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XVI, 2; *A. Buchenau*, Über Malebranches Lehre von der Wahrheit und ihre Bedeutung für die Methodik der Wissenschaften; *Léon Robin*, Sur le conception aristotélicienne de la causalité; *I. H. Jensen*, Democrit und Platon; *Leo Jordan*, Pars Secunda Philosophiae, seu Metaphysica; Jahresbericht.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, LIV, 4 u. 5: *W. Köhler*, Akustische Untersuchungen; *Paul Kullman*, Statistische Untersuchungen zur Sprachpsychologie; *W. Poppelreuter*, Über die Bedeutung der scheinbaren Grösse und Gestall für die Gesichtsraumwahrnehmung; Literaturbericht.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXV, 1: *E. D. Roberty*, Energétique et sociologie; *J. de Gaultier*, Le Réalisme du continu; Observations et documents; Revue critique; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, X, 1: *E. Joyau*, La Théorie aristotélicienne de l'intelligence; *G. Jeanjean*, La pédagogie nouvelle; *A. Veronnet*, L' atome nécessaire; *Paul Charles*, Etude sur les théories de la connaissance; Le positivisme; Analyses et comptes rendus.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XVIII, 1: *F. Enriques*, La métaphysique de Hegel considérée d'un point de vue scientifique; *A. Lasson*, Quelques remarques sur l' "Éthique à Nicomaque"; *Ch. Dunan*, La morale positive; *C. Bouglé*, Le Darwinisme en sociologie; Études Critiques; Questions Pratiques; Supplément.